- Vigil類別圖示 · 非官方徽記
識別來源
Vigil類別圖示——依此紀錄自身的領域、層級與角色繪製。並非官方徽記。
概要
黎巴嫩的武裝部隊，由單一的陸軍司令部統轄，指揮陸上部隊、空軍與海軍。自2025年8月起，國家賦予其將武器限於國家的任務，從利塔尼河以南開始。
- 範圍
- 結構、角色、沿革與連結。已發布3筆下屬紀錄。
- 隸屬
- 隸屬：已證實
- 來源
- 紀錄所載：10
- 紀錄狀態
- 完整
- 廣泛活動地區
- All of Lebanon; the south of the Litani is the area where its tasks have been defined first. A land-centred force organised in brigades and regiments under the Army Command, with the Air Force and Navy as smaller services; the south is held through the South Litani Sector Command. Described at structural level only.
- 重要歷史
- The army split along communal lines in the civil war: officers formed a breakaway army in 1976, and in 1984 Shiite soldiers were called on to disobey orders. After the 1989 Taif Agreement it was rebuilt by mixing units across communities and absorbing former militiamen, while Hezbollah kept its arms outside the militia disarmament. It deployed to the south after Resolution 1701 in 2006, fought Fatah al-Islam at Nahr al-Bared in 2007 and operated against jihadist groups on the Syrian border in the following decade. The 2019 financial collapse cut the value of its pay and drove thousands of soldiers out. The November 2024 cessation of hostilities (S/2024/870) placed only official forces in the area south of the Litani, tasked them to dismantle unauthorised infrastructure and confiscate unauthorised arms starting there, and set a US- and French-supported target of a 10,000-strong army deployment in the south; the caretaker cabinet funded the recruitment of 1,500 soldiers that month. On 5 August 2025 the Council of Ministers tasked the army with an implementation plan to confine arms to the state; on 5 September 2025 it "welcomed" the army's plan and its successive phases, kept its content secret, and asked for monthly reports. On 8 January 2026 the army stated that the plan's first phase had achieved its objectives and that it held operational control south of the Litani except for areas still occupied by Israel; Cabinet asked the army to prepare a plan for north of the river, and it heard the second phase on 16 February. When Hezbollah opened fire on 2 March 2026, Cabinet banned all Hezbollah military and security activity as unlawful, ordered the military and security agencies to prevent launches and arrest violators, and told the army to begin the north-of-Litani part of its plan at once. In the war that followed the army repositioned and temporarily withdrew from areas near the Blue Line while keeping some presence south of the Litani (UN). An international conference to support the army, set for Paris on 5 March 2026, was postponed by that war; a preparatory meeting was held in Paris on 17 September. The 3 June 2026 joint statement and the 26 June Trilateral Framework made pilot zones under the army's exclusive control the vehicle for Israeli redeployment; press reported the army's first pilot-zone deployment in July 2026. It works alongside UNIFIL, whose operations cease on 31 December 2026, and has coordinated through the 2024 Mechanism (meetings suspended from 18 March 2026) and the 2026 Military Coordination Group for Lebanon.
- 優勢
- The one Lebanese institution that every party, domestic and foreign, names as the legitimate holder of arms, with a Cabinet mandate in writing and a standing coordination channel with Israel through the United States. A cross-communal force that has held together since its post-war rebuilding, with two decades of US-funded equipment and training (more than $3bn since 2006, by the Arab Reform Initiative's count, and a further $190m for the army in a $230m package reported released in late September 2025) and a broad group of foreign backers, European and Arab.
- 限制
- Limited capacity, which the government itself says bounds the plan's pace, and dependence on foreign funding and reimbursement: soldiers' pay remains a fraction of its pre-2019 value, operations lean on in-kind donations, and new US assistance is tied to verifiable milestones. It was equipped for internal security and border control, not for heavy combat. The army's phase-one claim is its own, contested by Israel as insufficient. No enforcement of the 2 March 2026 ban against Hezbollah is established: Hezbollah rejected the decision (UN). No deployment figure for 2026 is published, and the plan's content is secret.
沿革與機構歷史
Formal parent institution: Ministry of National Defence (Lebanon)
An army that deploys rather than confronts: it extends state presence by deployment, checkpoints and taking over sites, and has avoided force against Hezbollah to keep its cross-communal ranks intact. Since 2025 a written disarmament mandate tests that habit, without a clear result.
偏好的作戰方式
Presence before force. Without an agreed national defence strategy or military doctrine, the army has long acted on "security through consensus": it fights when there is political cover, as against Fatah al-Islam in 2007 and jihadist groups on the Syrian border, and otherwise extends the state by deploying, manning checkpoints, patrolling and taking control of sites. Its work south of the Litani since 2024 follows the same pattern: deployment into areas Israel vacates, the takeover of weapons sites and caches, documentation through the international mechanisms, and monthly reporting to Cabinet. The pilot zones under the 2026 Framework apply it zone by zone, with the army deploying after Israeli withdrawal under a coordination group with US participation; the third party meant to verify each zone had not been named by October 2026.
關於此組織運作方式的廣泛概括，以評估的形式評定等級 — 並非對當前戰術的描述，且刻意不附任何能力或效能分數。
指揮風格
A single Army Command under the Council of Ministers, which decides the army's missions and has reserved to itself the content of the disarmament plan. The command has put institutional cohesion first, reportedly fearing that a confrontation with Hezbollah would fracture the force.
此概括不適用之處
The generalisation fails in three ways. First, the army has used force against armed groups when it had political cover, so its caution toward Hezbollah is a choice about one adversary and one community, not an inability to fight. Second, since March 2026 the written mandate goes beyond consensus: Cabinet has ordered the army to prevent launches and arrest violators, and whether the army acts on that against Hezbollah's will is not established either way. Third, its pace in the south is set as much by Israeli occupation and strikes, and by funding, as by its own method.
觀察到的調整
From consensus to written mandate: Cabinet decisions of August and September 2025 and the 2 March 2026 ban give the army a disarmament task and an order to prevent launches, the first time a Lebanese government has committed the state to disarming Hezbollah in its own decisions.
Zone-by-zone deployment, with verification still to be assigned: the June 2026 Framework made pilot zones under the army's exclusive control the vehicle for Israeli withdrawal, and the army deployed into the first of them in July 2026.
Funding sought as a programme rather than year by year: the army put its needs to donors through a 2026 support conference, with salaries and incentives among the short-term items; the conference was postponed by the war and had not been held by mid-September 2026.
仍然未知的事項
- Lebanon has no published defence strategy or doctrine document, and the disarmament plan's content is secret by Cabinet decision.
- The army does not publish its personnel total, and this module records no strengths, deployment figures or positions.
- Whether any disarmament has taken place against Hezbollah's will, rather than through control of abandoned or surrendered sites, cannot be established from open sources.
戰役
將此組織列為參與方的戰役。該關係由戰役紀錄擁有並評定等級；此清單為計算所得。
- 黎巴嫩戰線，2023–2024年 Affected party · 8 October 2023 – 27 November 2024 · high confidence · as of 2024-11
Not a party to the fighting; lost personnel to Israeli strikes during the campaign, and under the cessation became the force meant to deploy south of the Litani as Israel withdrew.
- 黎巴嫩宣布的國家武器壟斷 Primary force · Declared plan · high confidence · as of 2026-07
The body tasked with executing the plan and reporting monthly to cabinet.
- 2026年黎巴嫩戰爭 Affected party · Since 2 March 2026 · high confidence · as of 2026-07
Not a party to the fighting; the UN records 33 Lebanese army personnel killed to 20 June and the army's temporary withdrawal from areas near the Blue Line. Under the Framework it is the force that deploys into pilot zones as Israel withdraws.
關鍵事件
第1701號決議結束2006年以色列–真主黨戰爭
真主黨於2006年7月12日發動越境突襲，引發一場為期34天的戰爭。8月11日，安理會一致通過第1701號決議，呼籲全面停止敵對行動；隨以色列撤軍，在利塔尼河以南部署黎巴嫩軍隊與擴編的聯合國駐黎巴嫩臨時部隊；藍線與利塔尼河之間的區域除國家與聯合國駐黎巴嫩臨時部隊外，不得有武裝人員與武器；並全面落實第1559號決議。敵對行動於8月14日停止。
以色列–黎巴嫩停止敵對行動安排及其監督機制
美國與法國宣布以色列與黎巴嫩之間停止敵對行動，自2024年11月27日04:00起生效；其十三段的文本作為S/2024/870的附件分發給安理會。黎巴嫩承諾防止真主黨及其他武裝團體發動攻擊，並將武器限定於所列的官方部隊，「從」利塔尼河以南地區「開始」；以色列須在黎巴嫩軍隊部署的同時，於60天內撤至藍線以南，目標是在南部部署10,000名兵力。由美國擔任主席、法國、聯合國駐黎巴嫩臨時部隊、以色列與黎巴嫩參與的監督機制負責監督。真主黨並非當事方。
黎巴嫩內閣責成軍隊將武器限定於國家
2025年初在約瑟夫·奧恩總統與納瓦夫·薩拉姆總理領導下組成的政府，於2025年8月5日責成黎巴嫩軍隊制定一項計畫，在年底前將武器僅限於2024年停止敵對行動安排中所列的部隊。8月7日，政府批准一份美國文件的目標，其中包括逐步結束包括真主黨在內所有非國家行為者在利塔尼河以南及以北黎巴嫩領土上的武裝存在。9月5日，政府對軍隊的分階段計畫表示歡迎並予以備案，並對其內容保密。真主黨拒絕接受這些決定。
以色列撤軍後，黎巴嫩軍隊部署進入首批試點區
根據媒體報導，以色列自Froun與Srifa周邊地區撤出，隨後自Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh撤出，黎巴嫩軍隊進駐這些地區。框架記錄了兩軍議定的兩個初始區，但未指明其名稱；7月之後沒有其他區的報導。
評估截至 — 2026-10 最近檢視 — 2026-10-12
在結構中檢視此部隊 互動式：選取此紀錄並追蹤與其關聯的內容。