- رمز فئة من Vigil · ليس شارة رسمية
مصدر الهوية
رمز فئة من Vigil — مستمد من مجال هذا السجل نفسه ومستواه ودوره. ليس شارة رسمية.
نبذة
القوات المسلحة للبنان تحت قيادة واحدة للجيش، تقود القوات البرية والقوات الجوية والقوات البحرية. وهي القوة التي كلّفتها الدولة منذ أغسطس 2025 بحصر السلاح بيد الدولة، بدءًا من جنوب الليطاني.
- النطاق
- البنية والدور والأصول والروابط. السجلات التابعة المنشورة: 3.
- التبعية
- التبعية مؤكدة
- المصادر
- في السجل: 10
- حالة السجل
- كامل
- المنطقة العامة للنشاط
- All of Lebanon; the south of the Litani is the area where its tasks have been defined first. A land-centred force organised in brigades and regiments under the Army Command, with the Air Force and Navy as smaller services; the south is held through the South Litani Sector Command. Described at structural level only.
- تاريخ بارز
- The army split along communal lines in the civil war: officers formed a breakaway army in 1976, and in 1984 Shiite soldiers were called on to disobey orders. After the 1989 Taif Agreement it was rebuilt by mixing units across communities and absorbing former militiamen, while Hezbollah kept its arms outside the militia disarmament. It deployed to the south after Resolution 1701 in 2006, fought Fatah al-Islam at Nahr al-Bared in 2007 and operated against jihadist groups on the Syrian border in the following decade. The 2019 financial collapse cut the value of its pay and drove thousands of soldiers out. The November 2024 cessation of hostilities (S/2024/870) placed only official forces in the area south of the Litani, tasked them to dismantle unauthorised infrastructure and confiscate unauthorised arms starting there, and set a US- and French-supported target of a 10,000-strong army deployment in the south; the caretaker cabinet funded the recruitment of 1,500 soldiers that month. On 5 August 2025 the Council of Ministers tasked the army with an implementation plan to confine arms to the state; on 5 September 2025 it "welcomed" the army's plan and its successive phases, kept its content secret, and asked for monthly reports. On 8 January 2026 the army stated that the plan's first phase had achieved its objectives and that it held operational control south of the Litani except for areas still occupied by Israel; Cabinet asked the army to prepare a plan for north of the river, and it heard the second phase on 16 February. When Hezbollah opened fire on 2 March 2026, Cabinet banned all Hezbollah military and security activity as unlawful, ordered the military and security agencies to prevent launches and arrest violators, and told the army to begin the north-of-Litani part of its plan at once. In the war that followed the army repositioned and temporarily withdrew from areas near the Blue Line while keeping some presence south of the Litani (UN). An international conference to support the army, set for Paris on 5 March 2026, was postponed by that war; a preparatory meeting was held in Paris on 17 September. The 3 June 2026 joint statement and the 26 June Trilateral Framework made pilot zones under the army's exclusive control the vehicle for Israeli redeployment; press reported the army's first pilot-zone deployment in July 2026. It works alongside UNIFIL, whose operations cease on 31 December 2026, and has coordinated through the 2024 Mechanism (meetings suspended from 18 March 2026) and the 2026 Military Coordination Group for Lebanon.
- نقاط القوة
- The one Lebanese institution that every party, domestic and foreign, names as the legitimate holder of arms, with a Cabinet mandate in writing and a standing coordination channel with Israel through the United States. A cross-communal force that has held together since its post-war rebuilding, with two decades of US-funded equipment and training (more than $3bn since 2006, by the Arab Reform Initiative's count, and a further $190m for the army in a $230m package reported released in late September 2025) and a broad group of foreign backers, European and Arab.
- مواطن القصور
- Limited capacity, which the government itself says bounds the plan's pace, and dependence on foreign funding and reimbursement: soldiers' pay remains a fraction of its pre-2019 value, operations lean on in-kind donations, and new US assistance is tied to verifiable milestones. It was equipped for internal security and border control, not for heavy combat. The army's phase-one claim is its own, contested by Israel as insufficient. No enforcement of the 2 March 2026 ban against Hezbollah is established: Hezbollah rejected the decision (UN). No deployment figure for 2026 is published, and the plan's content is secret.
التشكيلات التابعة
الصفوف للتخطيط فقط — فالموضع والترتيب لا يحملان أي تراتبية أو أهمية أو تسلسل أو قوة. وكل سجل معروض تابع مباشر للتنظيم المحدد.
الأصول والتاريخ المؤسسي
Formal parent institution: Ministry of National Defence (Lebanon)
An army that deploys rather than confronts: it extends state presence by deployment, checkpoints and taking over sites, and has avoided force against Hezbollah to keep its cross-communal ranks intact. Since 2025 a written disarmament mandate tests that habit, without a clear result.
أساليب العمل المفضلة
Presence before force. Without an agreed national defence strategy or military doctrine, the army has long acted on "security through consensus": it fights when there is political cover, as against Fatah al-Islam in 2007 and jihadist groups on the Syrian border, and otherwise extends the state by deploying, manning checkpoints, patrolling and taking control of sites. Its work south of the Litani since 2024 follows the same pattern: deployment into areas Israel vacates, the takeover of weapons sites and caches, documentation through the international mechanisms, and monthly reporting to Cabinet. The pilot zones under the 2026 Framework apply it zone by zone, with the army deploying after Israeli withdrawal under a coordination group with US participation; the third party meant to verify each zone had not been named by October 2026.
تعميم عام عن طريقة عمل هذا التنظيم، مصنَّف بوصفه تقييمًا — لا وصفًا للتكتيكات الحالية، ولا يحمل عمدًا أي درجة للقدرة أو الفعالية.
أسلوب القيادة
A single Army Command under the Council of Ministers, which decides the army's missions and has reserved to itself the content of the disarmament plan. The command has put institutional cohesion first, reportedly fearing that a confrontation with Hezbollah would fracture the force.
أين ينهار هذا التعميم
The generalisation fails in three ways. First, the army has used force against armed groups when it had political cover, so its caution toward Hezbollah is a choice about one adversary and one community, not an inability to fight. Second, since March 2026 the written mandate goes beyond consensus: Cabinet has ordered the army to prevent launches and arrest violators, and whether the army acts on that against Hezbollah's will is not established either way. Third, its pace in the south is set as much by Israeli occupation and strikes, and by funding, as by its own method.
التكيّفات المرصودة
From consensus to written mandate: Cabinet decisions of August and September 2025 and the 2 March 2026 ban give the army a disarmament task and an order to prevent launches, the first time a Lebanese government has committed the state to disarming Hezbollah in its own decisions.
Zone-by-zone deployment, with verification still to be assigned: the June 2026 Framework made pilot zones under the army's exclusive control the vehicle for Israeli withdrawal, and the army deployed into the first of them in July 2026.
Funding sought as a programme rather than year by year: the army put its needs to donors through a 2026 support conference, with salaries and incentives among the short-term items; the conference was postponed by the war and had not been held by mid-September 2026.
ما لا يزال مجهولًا
- Lebanon has no published defence strategy or doctrine document, and the disarmament plan's content is secret by Cabinet decision.
- The army does not publish its personnel total, and this module records no strengths, deployment figures or positions.
- Whether any disarmament has taken place against Hezbollah's will, rather than through control of abandoned or surrendered sites, cannot be established from open sources.
الحملات
حملات تذكر هذا التنظيم بوصفه مشاركًا. يملك سجل الحملة العلاقة ويصنّفها؛ وهذه القائمة محسوبة آليًا.
- الجبهة اللبنانية، 2023–2024 Affected party · 8 October 2023 – 27 November 2024 · high confidence · as of 2024-11
Not a party to the fighting; lost personnel to Israeli strikes during the campaign, and under the cessation became the force meant to deploy south of the Litani as Israel withdrew.
- حصر السلاح بيد الدولة كما أعلنه لبنان Primary force · Declared plan · high confidence · as of 2026-07
The body tasked with executing the plan and reporting monthly to cabinet.
- حرب لبنان 2026 Affected party · Since 2 March 2026 · high confidence · as of 2026-07
Not a party to the fighting; the UN records 33 Lebanese army personnel killed to 20 June and the army's temporary withdrawal from areas near the Blue Line. Under the Framework it is the force that deploys into pilot zones as Israel withdraws.
الأحداث الرئيسية
القرار 1701 ينهي حرب 2006 بين إسرائيل وحزب الله
تفتح غارة عبر الحدود شنّها حزب الله في 12 يوليو 2006 حربًا استمرت 34 يومًا. وفي 11 أغسطس يعتمد مجلس الأمن بالإجماع القرار 1701، الذي يدعو إلى وقف كامل للأعمال العدائية، ونشر الجيش اللبناني وقوة اليونيفيل بعد توسيعها جنوب الليطاني مع انسحاب إسرائيل، وإلى منطقة بين الخط الأزرق والليطاني خالية من أي أفراد مسلحين وأسلحة غير تلك التابعة للدولة ولليونيفيل، وإلى التنفيذ الكامل للقرار 1559. وتتوقف الأعمال العدائية في 14 أغسطس.
وقف الأعمال العدائية بين إسرائيل ولبنان و«الآلية» الخاصة به
تعلن الولايات المتحدة وفرنسا وقفًا للأعمال العدائية بين إسرائيل ولبنان، يسري اعتبارًا من الساعة 04:00 في 27 نوفمبر 2024؛ ويُعمَّم نصه المؤلف من ثلاث عشرة فقرة على مجلس الأمن بوصفه مرفقًا للوثيقة S/2024/870. ويتعهد لبنان بمنع الهجمات من جانب حزب الله والجماعات المسلحة الأخرى وبحصر السلاح في القوات الرسمية المدرجة، «بدءًا من» المنطقة الواقعة جنوب الليطاني؛ وعلى إسرائيل الانسحاب إلى جنوب الخط الأزرق في غضون 60 يومًا مع انتشار الجيش اللبناني، وصولًا إلى قوام مستهدف قدره 10,000 جندي في الجنوب. وتراقب تنفيذه «آلية» برئاسة أمريكية تضم فرنسا واليونيفيل وإسرائيل ولبنان. وحزب الله ليس طرفًا فيه.
مجلس الوزراء اللبناني يكلّف الجيش بحصر السلاح بيد الدولة
تكلّف الحكومة التي شُكّلت في مطلع 2025 في عهد الرئيس جوزاف عون ورئيس الوزراء نواف سلام الجيشَ اللبناني في 5 أغسطس 2025 بوضع خطة لحصر السلاح، قبل نهاية العام، في القوات المدرجة في وقف الأعمال العدائية لعام 2024 دون سواها. وفي 7 أغسطس توافق على أهداف ورقة أمريكية، من بينها الإنهاء التدريجي للوجود المسلح لجميع الجهات الفاعلة من غير الدول، بما فيها حزب الله، في الأراضي اللبنانية جنوب الليطاني وشماله. وفي 5 سبتمبر ترحّب بخطة الجيش المرحلية وتأخذ علمًا بها وتُبقي مضمونها سريًا. ويرفض حزب الله القرارات.
الجيش اللبناني ينتشر في المناطق التجريبية الأولى بعد الانسحاب الإسرائيلي
بحسب تقارير صحفية، تنسحب إسرائيل من مناطق حول فرون وصريفا، ثم زوطر الغربية، وينتشر فيها الجيش اللبناني. ويسجّل الإطار منطقتين أوليين اتفق عليهما الجيشان دون تسميتهما؛ ولم تُفِد التقارير بأي منطقة أخرى بعد يوليو.
إجراءات سريعة
الوصول إلى النظام
حيث يتصل هذا السجل ببقية Vigil. وكل صف هنا لأن هذا التنظيم يصل إليه فعلًا.
التقييم حتى — 2026-10 آخر مراجعة — 2026-10-12
اعرض هذه القوة في البنية تفاعلي: اختر هذا السجل وتتبّع ما يرتبط به.