خطة معلنة — ليست عملية مرصودة
مفهوم أعلنه طرف ما علنًا أو نشره. يسجل Vigil أن الإعلان موجود ومن أصدره. وهو ليس قولًا بأن أي شيء قيد التنفيذ أو الإعداد أو مقصود على أي مدى زمني.
- Declared by
- The Lebanese Council of Ministers, through its decisions of 5 and 7 August 2025, 5 September 2025, 16 February 2026 and 2 March 2026, and the Lebanese Armed Forces, which drew up the phased plan and declared its first phase complete in January 2026.
- What this rests on
- Published cabinet communiqués, read in Arabic from the Presidency's site, and the UN Secretary-General's 1701 reports, which quote the 2 March 2026 decision and record the army's account of the first phase. The army's plan itself is secret by cabinet decision; the record rests on the decisions about it, not on its content.
- Principal uncertainty
- The plan's content, phasing and geography are not public, and the army has said it will execute it according to its available capabilities. Hezbollah has rejected every decision. Whether any disarmament has taken place against Hezbollah's will, rather than through army control of abandoned or surrendered sites, cannot be established from open sources.
- What would change this assessment
- Publication of the plan or its phase reports; a verified handover of Hezbollah weapons north of the Litani; a cabinet decision rescinding or suspending the 2025–2026 decisions; or verification under the Trilateral Framework certifying disarmament in a pilot zone.
- What Vigil is not claiming
- Vigil is NOT claiming that Hezbollah has been disarmed, that the cabinet ban of 2 March 2026 has been enforced, or that enforcement against Hezbollah is established anywhere. The army's declaration that its first phase was complete is recorded as the army's declaration. This record documents decisions and declarations, not their execution.
ما كانت هذه الحملة
The Lebanese state's declared plan to confine all arms to its own forces: the August–September 2025 cabinet decisions, the army's phased plan, its January 2026 claim to have completed phase one south of the Litani, and the 2 March 2026 ban. Enforcement against Hezbollah is not established.
For the first time a Lebanese government has committed the state, in its own decisions, to disarming Hezbollah, and has declared its military activity unlawful. That commitment is now the hinge of the Israel–Lebanon front: Israeli withdrawal under the Framework follows verified disarmament, so the credibility of the Lebanese declaration sets the pace of everything else. The gap between what has been declared and what can be verified is the record's central fact.
الثقة: عالية حتى 2026-10رُوجع 2026-10-12
ملخص
On 5 August 2025 Lebanon's cabinet tasked the army with a plan to confine arms, before the end of the year, to the forces listed in the 2024 cessation of hostilities, and on 7 August it approved the objectives of a US paper that included ending the armed presence of all non-state actors, Hezbollah among them, south and north of the Litani. On 5 September it welcomed and took note of the army's phased plan, kept its content secret and asked for monthly reports. In January 2026 the army declared the first phase, south of the Litani, complete except in areas under Israeli occupation, and the cabinet asked it to prepare the area north of the river; on 16 February it took note of the army's presentation of the second phase, which the information minister described as four months, extendable. On 2 March 2026, as Hezbollah entered the war, the cabinet banned Hezbollah's security and military activity as unlawful and instructed the army to implement the north-of-Litani part immediately. The Trilateral Framework of 26 June 2026 placed the same objective inside a sequence of verified disarmament and Israeli withdrawal, zone by zone. Hezbollah has rejected each decision.
الأهداف المعلنة
ما يقوله المشاركون. يذكر كل بند الموضع الذي أُعلن فيه الموقف؛ ويسجل Vigil أنه صدر، لا أنه صحيح.
Confine arms to the Lebanese state's listed forces across all of Lebanon, beginning south of the Litani, with Hezbollah obliged to hand its weapons to the state and confine itself to political activity.
The army states it will execute the plan according to its available capabilities, with Israeli attacks named as the first constraint.
Hezbollah rejects the decisions and ties any discussion of its arms to Israeli withdrawal and the end of Israeli strikes.
الأهداف بحسب التقييم
قراءة Vigil، مصنّفة بدرجات. وتُفصل بنيويًا عن المواقف المعلنة كي لا يُنشر تقييمٌ أبدًا على أنه هدف أعلنه أحد.
The first phase was achievable largely because Hezbollah's presence south of the Litani had been degraded in 2024 and the army could take control of sites without confronting it; the second phase, north of the river, is where the declared plan would meet resistance.
القوات الرئيسية
- الجيش اللبناني القوة الرئيسية · الثقة: عالية · حتى 2026-07
The body tasked with executing the plan and reporting monthly to cabinet.
الداعمون والأطراف الخارجية
- قيادة قطاع جنوب الليطاني القوة الداعمة · الثقة: متوسطة · حتى 2026-01
The army's command in the area of the declared first phase and of the Framework's first pilot zone.
- قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان (اليونيفيل) Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2026-06
Supports the army's deployment south of the Litani under Resolution 1701; the UN records one UNIFIL position handed to the army by June 2026. It ends operations on 31 December 2026.
- الآلية (وقف الأعمال العدائية لعام 2024) Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2026-03
The US-chaired Mechanism of the 2024 cessation, the monitoring body in place while the first phase was carried out; the UN records that it suspended its meetings on 18 March 2026, and its status since is not established.
- مجموعة التنسيق العسكري الخاصة بلبنان (MCG4L) القوة الداعمة · الثقة: متوسطة · حتى 2026-10
The Military Coordination Group for Lebanon, named on 26 June 2026, is the Framework's channel for deconfliction and verification of the disarmament-for-withdrawal sequence. Its composition is not published.
الأطراف المتأثرة
- التنظيم العسكري لحزب الله طرف متأثر · الثقة: عالية · حتى 2026-07
The object of the declared plan, which has rejected it. Its ministers remained in the government after the 2 March 2026 ban.
The 2024 cessation's obligation
The cessation of 27 November 2024 committed Lebanon to confine arms to listed official forces, "starting with" the area south of the Litani. Whether the obligation covers all of Lebanon is disputed between Israel and Hezbollah.
The cabinet decisions
The cabinet tasked the army with a plan on 5 August, approved the objectives of a US paper on 7 August, and on 5 September welcomed and took note of the army's phased plan, keeping its content secret. The communiqué records no approval vote on the plan and no public timetable.
Phase one declared complete south of the Litani
The army declared the first phase, south of the Litani, complete except in areas under Israeli occupation, and the cabinet asked it to prepare the area north of the river. The declaration is the army's; the UN Secretary-General's report of March 2026 records it.
Phase two and the 2 March ban
On 16 February the cabinet took note of the army's presentation of the second phase. On 2 March, as Hezbollah entered the war, it banned Hezbollah's security and military activity as unlawful and instructed the army to implement the north-of-Litani part immediately. Hezbollah rejected the decision, and the war overtook the second phase.
The Framework's verification structure and the pilot zones
The Trilateral Framework of 26 June 2026 provides that the army restores sovereign authority pending verified disarmament of non-state armed groups, zone by zone, with Israeli redeployment following, coordinated through a military coordination group with US participation. The army deployed into the first pilot zones in July after Israeli withdrawal.
التداعيات السياسية
The declaration binds the Lebanese state publicly while Hezbollah's ministers remain in its government, and parliament has extended its own term to May 2028.
التداعيات العسكرية
Under the Framework, verified disarmament is the condition for Israeli withdrawal, so a declaration the public record cannot verify leaves the forward defence line in place.
الأحداث المرتبطة
المواقع
أماكن ينشرها هذا الملف أصلًا بوصفها علامات على الخريطة، وتُدرج لأن الحملة تتعلق بها. ليست منطقة عمليات.
الطبقات المرجعية
ما لا يزال مجهولًا
- The army's plan, its phase reports and its geography are secret by cabinet decision.
- No Lebanese army deployment figure for February–June 2026 has been published.
- The Framework's security annex is known only from a leaked text, and the composition of the coordination group is not published.
- The press name "Homeland Shield" for the army's plan is not confirmed in any official text and is not used.
قراءات تدعمها الأدلة أيضًا
- The declared plan can be read as a genuine state commitment constrained by capability and by Israeli occupation, as a declaration made to secure external support and Israeli withdrawal, or as both. The public record supports each reading.
مُدرجة لأن تقييم السجل نفسه ليس التقييم الوحيد الذي تسمح به مصادره — لا بوصفها تحوّطًا من التقييم أعلاه.
أسئلة Watch التي تتصل بها هذه الحملة
أسئلة تحليلية دائمة تمر الأدلة الخاصة بها عبر هذه الحملة، ولكلٍّ منها آخر مراجعة لها. مستمدة من سجل Watch، ولا يُعاد ذكرها هنا.
- عسكريهل ينتقل سلاح حزب الله إلى الدولة اللبنانية — بأن يتسلّمه الجيش، أو يُدرج في جدول زمني لمجلس الوزراء، أو تتنازل عنه قيادة حزب الله؟
- عسكريهل يصل الدعم الإيراني إلى حزب الله والجماعات المسلحة الفلسطينية في لبنان والأراضي الفلسطينية، وهل يُعترَض على الجانب اللبناني؟
- عسكريهل يتقدّم تسلسل الإطار الإسرائيلي–اللبناني منطقةً تلو الأخرى — بمغادرة القوات الإسرائيلية مناطق مسمّاة ودخول الجيش اللبناني إليها — أم أن المنطقة التي تسيطر عليها إسرائيل تبقى على حالها أو تتسع؟
اعرض القوة التي تدير هذه الحملة في «استكشف» تفاعلي: اختر هذا السجل وتتبّع ما يرتبط به.
التقييم حتى — 2026-10 آخر مراجعة — 2026-10-12