Plan déclaré — pas une opération observée
Un concept qu’une partie a publiquement déclaré ou publié. Vigil consigne que la déclaration existe et qui l’a faite. Ce n’est PAS une affirmation selon laquelle quoi que ce soit serait en cours d’exécution, en préparation ou envisagé, à quelque échéance que ce soit.
- Declared by
- The Lebanese Council of Ministers, through its decisions of 5 and 7 August 2025, 5 September 2025, 16 February 2026 and 2 March 2026, and the Lebanese Armed Forces, which drew up the phased plan and declared its first phase complete in January 2026.
- What this rests on
- Published cabinet communiqués, read in Arabic from the Presidency's site, and the UN Secretary-General's 1701 reports, which quote the 2 March 2026 decision and record the army's account of the first phase. The army's plan itself is secret by cabinet decision; the record rests on the decisions about it, not on its content.
- Principal uncertainty
- The plan's content, phasing and geography are not public, and the army has said it will execute it according to its available capabilities. Hezbollah has rejected every decision. Whether any disarmament has taken place against Hezbollah's will, rather than through army control of abandoned or surrendered sites, cannot be established from open sources.
- What would change this assessment
- Publication of the plan or its phase reports; a verified handover of Hezbollah weapons north of the Litani; a cabinet decision rescinding or suspending the 2025–2026 decisions; or verification under the Trilateral Framework certifying disarmament in a pilot zone.
- What Vigil is not claiming
- Vigil is NOT claiming that Hezbollah has been disarmed, that the cabinet ban of 2 March 2026 has been enforced, or that enforcement against Hezbollah is established anywhere. The army's declaration that its first phase was complete is recorded as the army's declaration. This record documents decisions and declarations, not their execution.
Ce qu’a été cette campagne
The Lebanese state's declared plan to confine all arms to its own forces: the August–September 2025 cabinet decisions, the army's phased plan, its January 2026 claim to have completed phase one south of the Litani, and the 2 March 2026 ban. Enforcement against Hezbollah is not established.
For the first time a Lebanese government has committed the state, in its own decisions, to disarming Hezbollah, and has declared its military activity unlawful. That commitment is now the hinge of the Israel–Lebanon front: Israeli withdrawal under the Framework follows verified disarmament, so the credibility of the Lebanese declaration sets the pace of everything else. The gap between what has been declared and what can be verified is the record's central fact.
Confiance : élevée Au 2026-10Revu le 2026-10-12
Synthèse
On 5 August 2025 Lebanon's cabinet tasked the army with a plan to confine arms, before the end of the year, to the forces listed in the 2024 cessation of hostilities, and on 7 August it approved the objectives of a US paper that included ending the armed presence of all non-state actors, Hezbollah among them, south and north of the Litani. On 5 September it welcomed and took note of the army's phased plan, kept its content secret and asked for monthly reports. In January 2026 the army declared the first phase, south of the Litani, complete except in areas under Israeli occupation, and the cabinet asked it to prepare the area north of the river; on 16 February it took note of the army's presentation of the second phase, which the information minister described as four months, extendable. On 2 March 2026, as Hezbollah entered the war, the cabinet banned Hezbollah's security and military activity as unlawful and instructed the army to implement the north-of-Litani part immediately. The Trilateral Framework of 26 June 2026 placed the same objective inside a sequence of verified disarmament and Israeli withdrawal, zone by zone. Hezbollah has rejected each decision.
Objectifs déclarés
Ce que disent les participants. Chaque entrée cite où la position a été exprimée ; Vigil consigne qu’elle a été exprimée, non qu’elle est vraie.
Confine arms to the Lebanese state's listed forces across all of Lebanon, beginning south of the Litani, with Hezbollah obliged to hand its weapons to the state and confine itself to political activity.
The army states it will execute the plan according to its available capabilities, with Israeli attacks named as the first constraint.
Hezbollah rejects the decisions and ties any discussion of its arms to Israeli withdrawal and the end of Israeli strikes.
Objectifs évalués
La lecture de Vigil, assortie d’un degré de confiance. Tenue structurellement à l’écart des positions déclarées, afin qu’une évaluation ne puisse jamais être publiée comme l’objectif déclaré de quelqu’un.
The first phase was achievable largely because Hezbollah's presence south of the Litani had been degraded in 2024 and the army could take control of sites without confronting it; the second phase, north of the river, is where the declared plan would meet resistance.
Forces principales
- Lebanese Armed Forces Force principale · Confiance : élevée · au 2026-07
The body tasked with executing the plan and reporting monthly to cabinet.
Soutiens et acteurs extérieurs
- South Litani Sector Command Force d’appui · Confiance : modérée · au 2026-01
The army's command in the area of the declared first phase and of the Framework's first pilot zone.
- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2026-06
Supports the army's deployment south of the Litani under Resolution 1701; the UN records one UNIFIL position handed to the army by June 2026. It ends operations on 31 December 2026.
- Mécanisme (cessation des hostilités de 2024) Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2026-03
The US-chaired Mechanism of the 2024 cessation, the monitoring body in place while the first phase was carried out; the UN records that it suspended its meetings on 18 March 2026, and its status since is not established.
- Military Coordination Group for Lebanon (MCG4L) Force d’appui · Confiance : modérée · au 2026-10
The Military Coordination Group for Lebanon, named on 26 June 2026, is the Framework's channel for deconfliction and verification of the disarmament-for-withdrawal sequence. Its composition is not published.
Parties touchées
- Hezbollah's military organisation Partie touchée · Confiance : élevée · au 2026-07
The object of the declared plan, which has rejected it. Its ministers remained in the government after the 2 March 2026 ban.
The 2024 cessation's obligation
The cessation of 27 November 2024 committed Lebanon to confine arms to listed official forces, "starting with" the area south of the Litani. Whether the obligation covers all of Lebanon is disputed between Israel and Hezbollah.
The cabinet decisions
The cabinet tasked the army with a plan on 5 August, approved the objectives of a US paper on 7 August, and on 5 September welcomed and took note of the army's phased plan, keeping its content secret. The communiqué records no approval vote on the plan and no public timetable.
Phase one declared complete south of the Litani
The army declared the first phase, south of the Litani, complete except in areas under Israeli occupation, and the cabinet asked it to prepare the area north of the river. The declaration is the army's; the UN Secretary-General's report of March 2026 records it.
Phase two and the 2 March ban
On 16 February the cabinet took note of the army's presentation of the second phase. On 2 March, as Hezbollah entered the war, it banned Hezbollah's security and military activity as unlawful and instructed the army to implement the north-of-Litani part immediately. Hezbollah rejected the decision, and the war overtook the second phase.
The Framework's verification structure and the pilot zones
The Trilateral Framework of 26 June 2026 provides that the army restores sovereign authority pending verified disarmament of non-state armed groups, zone by zone, with Israeli redeployment following, coordinated through a military coordination group with US participation. The army deployed into the first pilot zones in July after Israeli withdrawal.
Implications politiques
The declaration binds the Lebanese state publicly while Hezbollah's ministers remain in its government, and parliament has extended its own term to May 2028.
Implications militaires
Under the Framework, verified disarmament is the condition for Israeli withdrawal, so a declaration the public record cannot verify leaves the forward defence line in place.
Événements liés
Lieux
Lieux que ce module publie déjà comme repères cartographiques, listés parce que la campagne les concerne. Pas une zone d’opérations.
Couches de référence
Ce qui reste inconnu
- The army's plan, its phase reports and its geography are secret by cabinet decision.
- No Lebanese army deployment figure for February–June 2026 has been published.
- The Framework's security annex is known only from a leaked text, and the composition of the coordination group is not published.
- The press name "Homeland Shield" for the army's plan is not confirmed in any official text and is not used.
Lectures que les éléments permettent aussi
- The declared plan can be read as a genuine state commitment constrained by capability and by Israeli occupation, as a declaration made to secure external support and Israeli withdrawal, or as both. The public record supports each reading.
Figure ici parce que l’évaluation propre à la fiche n’est pas la seule que ses sources permettent — et non comme une réserve sur l’évaluation ci-dessus.
Questions Watch que cette campagne concerne
Questions analytiques permanentes dont les éléments passent par cette campagne, chacune avec sa dernière revue. Dérivées de l’objet Watch, jamais reformulées ici.
- MilitaireLes armes du Hezbollah passent-elles à l’État libanais — prises par l’armée, inscrites dans un calendrier du gouvernement ou cédées par la direction du Hezbollah ?
- MilitaireLe soutien iranien parvient-il au Hezbollah et aux groupes armés palestiniens au Liban et dans les territoires palestiniens, et est-il intercepté du côté libanais ?
- MilitaireLa séquence zone par zone du Cadre Israël–Liban progresse-t-elle — les forces israéliennes quittant des zones nommées et l’armée libanaise y entrant — ou la zone tenue par Israël se maintient-elle ou s’étend-elle ?
Voir dans Explorer la force qui conduit cette campagne Interactif : sélectionnez cette fiche et suivez ce qui s’y rattache.
Évalué au — 2026-10 Dernière revue — 2026-10-12