- Emblème de catégorie Vigil · pas un insigne officiel
Provenance de l’identité
Emblème de catégorie Vigil — établi à partir du domaine, de l’échelon et du rôle propres à cette fiche. Pas un insigne officiel.
En bref
Les forces armées du Liban, placées sous un commandement unique de l’armée, qui commande les forces terrestres, l’armée de l’air et la marine. La force que l’État a chargée, depuis août 2025, de réserver les armes à l’État, en commençant au sud du Litani.
- Périmètre
- Structure, rôle, filiation et liens. 3 fiches subordonnées publiées.
- Subordination
- Subordination confirmée
- Sources
- 10 dans la fiche
- État de la fiche
- Complète
- Zone d’activité générale
- All of Lebanon; the south of the Litani is the area where its tasks have been defined first. A land-centred force organised in brigades and regiments under the Army Command, with the Air Force and Navy as smaller services; the south is held through the South Litani Sector Command. Described at structural level only.
- Historique notable
- The army split along communal lines in the civil war: officers formed a breakaway army in 1976, and in 1984 Shiite soldiers were called on to disobey orders. After the 1989 Taif Agreement it was rebuilt by mixing units across communities and absorbing former militiamen, while Hezbollah kept its arms outside the militia disarmament. It deployed to the south after Resolution 1701 in 2006, fought Fatah al-Islam at Nahr al-Bared in 2007 and operated against jihadist groups on the Syrian border in the following decade. The 2019 financial collapse cut the value of its pay and drove thousands of soldiers out. The November 2024 cessation of hostilities (S/2024/870) placed only official forces in the area south of the Litani, tasked them to dismantle unauthorised infrastructure and confiscate unauthorised arms starting there, and set a US- and French-supported target of a 10,000-strong army deployment in the south; the caretaker cabinet funded the recruitment of 1,500 soldiers that month. On 5 August 2025 the Council of Ministers tasked the army with an implementation plan to confine arms to the state; on 5 September 2025 it "welcomed" the army's plan and its successive phases, kept its content secret, and asked for monthly reports. On 8 January 2026 the army stated that the plan's first phase had achieved its objectives and that it held operational control south of the Litani except for areas still occupied by Israel; Cabinet asked the army to prepare a plan for north of the river, and it heard the second phase on 16 February. When Hezbollah opened fire on 2 March 2026, Cabinet banned all Hezbollah military and security activity as unlawful, ordered the military and security agencies to prevent launches and arrest violators, and told the army to begin the north-of-Litani part of its plan at once. In the war that followed the army repositioned and temporarily withdrew from areas near the Blue Line while keeping some presence south of the Litani (UN). An international conference to support the army, set for Paris on 5 March 2026, was postponed by that war; a preparatory meeting was held in Paris on 17 September. The 3 June 2026 joint statement and the 26 June Trilateral Framework made pilot zones under the army's exclusive control the vehicle for Israeli redeployment; press reported the army's first pilot-zone deployment in July 2026. It works alongside UNIFIL, whose operations cease on 31 December 2026, and has coordinated through the 2024 Mechanism (meetings suspended from 18 March 2026) and the 2026 Military Coordination Group for Lebanon.
- Points forts
- The one Lebanese institution that every party, domestic and foreign, names as the legitimate holder of arms, with a Cabinet mandate in writing and a standing coordination channel with Israel through the United States. A cross-communal force that has held together since its post-war rebuilding, with two decades of US-funded equipment and training (more than $3bn since 2006, by the Arab Reform Initiative's count, and a further $190m for the army in a $230m package reported released in late September 2025) and a broad group of foreign backers, European and Arab.
- Limites
- Limited capacity, which the government itself says bounds the plan's pace, and dependence on foreign funding and reimbursement: soldiers' pay remains a fraction of its pre-2019 value, operations lean on in-kind donations, and new US assistance is tied to verifiable milestones. It was equipped for internal security and border control, not for heavy combat. The army's phase-one claim is its own, contested by Israel as insufficient. No enforcement of the 2 March 2026 ban against Hezbollah is established: Hezbollah rejected the decision (UN). No deployment figure for 2026 is published, and the plan's content is secret.
Formations subordonnées
Les rangées ne servent qu’à la mise en page — leur position et leur ordre n’indiquent ni hiérarchie, ni importance, ni séquence, ni force. Chaque fiche affichée est un subordonné immédiat de l’organisation sélectionnée.
Filiation et histoire institutionnelle
Formal parent institution: Ministry of National Defence (Lebanon)
An army that deploys rather than confronts: it extends state presence by deployment, checkpoints and taking over sites, and has avoided force against Hezbollah to keep its cross-communal ranks intact. Since 2025 a written disarmament mandate tests that habit, without a clear result.
Modes opératoires privilégiés
Presence before force. Without an agreed national defence strategy or military doctrine, the army has long acted on "security through consensus": it fights when there is political cover, as against Fatah al-Islam in 2007 and jihadist groups on the Syrian border, and otherwise extends the state by deploying, manning checkpoints, patrolling and taking control of sites. Its work south of the Litani since 2024 follows the same pattern: deployment into areas Israel vacates, the takeover of weapons sites and caches, documentation through the international mechanisms, and monthly reporting to Cabinet. The pilot zones under the 2026 Framework apply it zone by zone, with the army deploying after Israeli withdrawal under a coordination group with US participation; the third party meant to verify each zone had not been named by October 2026.
Une généralisation large sur la manière dont cette organisation opère, qualifiée comme une évaluation — pas une description des tactiques actuelles, et délibérément sans aucun score de capacité ni d’efficacité.
Style de commandement
A single Army Command under the Council of Ministers, which decides the army's missions and has reserved to itself the content of the disarmament plan. The command has put institutional cohesion first, reportedly fearing that a confrontation with Hezbollah would fracture the force.
Là où cette généralisation ne tient plus
The generalisation fails in three ways. First, the army has used force against armed groups when it had political cover, so its caution toward Hezbollah is a choice about one adversary and one community, not an inability to fight. Second, since March 2026 the written mandate goes beyond consensus: Cabinet has ordered the army to prevent launches and arrest violators, and whether the army acts on that against Hezbollah's will is not established either way. Third, its pace in the south is set as much by Israeli occupation and strikes, and by funding, as by its own method.
Adaptations observées
From consensus to written mandate: Cabinet decisions of August and September 2025 and the 2 March 2026 ban give the army a disarmament task and an order to prevent launches, the first time a Lebanese government has committed the state to disarming Hezbollah in its own decisions.
Zone-by-zone deployment, with verification still to be assigned: the June 2026 Framework made pilot zones under the army's exclusive control the vehicle for Israeli withdrawal, and the army deployed into the first of them in July 2026.
Funding sought as a programme rather than year by year: the army put its needs to donors through a 2026 support conference, with salaries and incentives among the short-term items; the conference was postponed by the war and had not been held by mid-September 2026.
Ce qui reste inconnu
- Lebanon has no published defence strategy or doctrine document, and the disarmament plan's content is secret by Cabinet decision.
- The army does not publish its personnel total, and this module records no strengths, deployment figures or positions.
- Whether any disarmament has taken place against Hezbollah's will, rather than through control of abandoned or surrendered sites, cannot be established from open sources.
Campagnes
Campagnes nommant cette organisation comme participante. La fiche de campagne détient la relation et lui attribue son degré de confiance ; cette liste est calculée.
- Le front libanais, 2023–2024 Affected party · 8 October 2023 – 27 November 2024 · high confidence · as of 2024-11
Not a party to the fighting; lost personnel to Israeli strikes during the campaign, and under the cessation became the force meant to deploy south of the Litani as Israel withdrew.
- Le monopole des armes déclaré par l’État libanais Primary force · Declared plan · high confidence · as of 2026-07
The body tasked with executing the plan and reporting monthly to cabinet.
- La guerre du Liban de 2026 Affected party · Since 2 March 2026 · high confidence · as of 2026-07
Not a party to the fighting; the UN records 33 Lebanese army personnel killed to 20 June and the army's temporary withdrawal from areas near the Blue Line. Under the Framework it is the force that deploys into pilot zones as Israel withdraws.
Événements clés
La résolution 1701 met fin à la guerre de 2006 entre Israël et le Hezbollah
Un raid transfrontalier du Hezbollah le 12 juillet 2006 ouvre une guerre de 34 jours. Le 11 août, le Conseil de sécurité adopte à l’unanimité la résolution 1701, qui appelle à une cessation totale des hostilités, au déploiement de l’armée libanaise et d’une FINUL renforcée au sud du Litani à mesure qu’Israël se retire, à une zone entre la Ligne bleue et le Litani exempte de tout personnel armé et de toute arme autres que ceux de l’État et de la FINUL, et à l’application intégrale de la résolution 1559. Les hostilités cessent le 14 août.
La cessation des hostilités entre Israël et le Liban et son Mécanisme
Les États-Unis et la France annoncent une cessation des hostilités entre Israël et le Liban, effective à 04 h 00 le 27 novembre 2024 ; son texte en treize paragraphes est transmis au Conseil de sécurité en annexe du document S/2024/870. Le Liban s’engage à empêcher les attaques du Hezbollah et d’autres groupes armés et à réserver les armes aux forces officielles énumérées, « en commençant par » la zone au sud du Litani ; Israël doit se retirer au sud de la Ligne bleue dans un délai de 60 jours à mesure que l’armée libanaise se déploie, avec un objectif de 10,000 soldats dans le sud. Un Mécanisme présidé par les États-Unis, avec la France, la FINUL, Israël et le Liban, en assure la surveillance. Le Hezbollah n’y est pas partie.
Le gouvernement libanais charge l’armée de réserver les armes à l’État
Le gouvernement formé début 2025 sous le président Joseph Aoun et le Premier ministre Nawaf Salam charge l’armée libanaise, le 5 août 2025, d’élaborer un plan visant à réserver les armes, avant la fin de l’année, aux seules forces énumérées dans la cessation de 2024. Le 7 août, il approuve les objectifs d’un document américain, parmi lesquels la fin progressive de la présence armée de tous les acteurs non étatiques, y compris le Hezbollah, sur le territoire libanais au sud comme au nord du Litani. Le 5 septembre, il salue le plan par étapes de l’armée, en prend acte et en garde le contenu secret. Le Hezbollah rejette ces décisions.
L’armée libanaise se déploie dans les premières zones pilotes après le retrait israélien
Selon des articles de presse, Israël se retire de secteurs autour de Froun et de Srifa, puis de Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, et l’armée libanaise s’y déploie. Le Cadre consigne deux zones initiales convenues par les deux armées sans les nommer ; aucune autre zone n’est signalée après juillet.
Actions rapides
Accès au système
Là où cette fiche se rattache au reste de Vigil. Chaque ligne figure ici parce que cette organisation y aboutit effectivement.
Évalué au — 2026-10 Dernière revue — 2026-10-12
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