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Zadeklarowany plan

Deklarowany monopol państwa libańskiego na broń

Co państwo libańskie postanowiło w sprawie broni Hezbollahu od sierpnia 2025 r. — i jak niewiele z tego publicznie dostępne dane i wpisy pozwalają komukolwiek zweryfikować.

Izrael–Liban / Błękitna Linia

Zadeklarowany plan
Ocena na dzień
2026-10
Ostatni przegląd
2026-10-12

OcenaPewność: wysoka

Koncepcja, którą strona publicznie zadeklarowała lub opublikowała. Vigil odnotowuje, że deklaracja istnieje i kto ją złożył. NIE jest to stwierdzenie, że cokolwiek jest realizowane, przygotowywane lub zamierzone w jakiejkolwiek perspektywie czasowej.

Zadeklarowany plan — nie zaobserwowana operacja

Koncepcja, którą strona publicznie zadeklarowała lub opublikowała. Vigil odnotowuje, że deklaracja istnieje i kto ją złożył. NIE jest to stwierdzenie, że cokolwiek jest realizowane, przygotowywane lub zamierzone w jakiejkolwiek perspektywie czasowej.

Declared by
The Lebanese Council of Ministers, through its decisions of 5 and 7 August 2025, 5 September 2025, 16 February 2026 and 2 March 2026, and the Lebanese Armed Forces, which drew up the phased plan and declared its first phase complete in January 2026.
What this rests on
Published cabinet communiqués, read in Arabic from the Presidency's site, and the UN Secretary-General's 1701 reports, which quote the 2 March 2026 decision and record the army's account of the first phase. The army's plan itself is secret by cabinet decision; the record rests on the decisions about it, not on its content.
Principal uncertainty
The plan's content, phasing and geography are not public, and the army has said it will execute it according to its available capabilities. Hezbollah has rejected every decision. Whether any disarmament has taken place against Hezbollah's will, rather than through army control of abandoned or surrendered sites, cannot be established from open sources.
What would change this assessment
Publication of the plan or its phase reports; a verified handover of Hezbollah weapons north of the Litani; a cabinet decision rescinding or suspending the 2025–2026 decisions; or verification under the Trilateral Framework certifying disarmament in a pilot zone.
What Vigil is not claiming
Vigil is NOT claiming that Hezbollah has been disarmed, that the cabinet ban of 2 March 2026 has been enforced, or that enforcement against Hezbollah is established anywhere. The army's declaration that its first phase was complete is recorded as the army's declaration. This record documents decisions and declarations, not their execution.

Classification: declared Pewność: wysoka Stan na 2026-10

Źródła: Lebanese government statements and decisions (Presidency, Council of Ministers, ministries)↗ · Lebanese Armed Forces — official communiqués↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗
Lokalizator — zarys lądów z Natural Earth 110m (domena publiczna); miejsca wymienione w tym wpisie (liczba: 4), we współrzędnych, które moduł już publikuje. Nie narysowano tras, granic, kontroli ani aktywności.

Czym była ta kampania

The Lebanese state's declared plan to confine all arms to its own forces: the August–September 2025 cabinet decisions, the army's phased plan, its January 2026 claim to have completed phase one south of the Litani, and the 2 March 2026 ban. Enforcement against Hezbollah is not established.

For the first time a Lebanese government has committed the state, in its own decisions, to disarming Hezbollah, and has declared its military activity unlawful. That commitment is now the hinge of the Israel–Lebanon front: Israeli withdrawal under the Framework follows verified disarmament, so the credibility of the Lebanese declaration sets the pace of everything else. The gap between what has been declared and what can be verified is the record's central fact.

Pewność: wysoka Stan na 2026-10Przejrzano 2026-10-12

Podsumowanie

On 5 August 2025 Lebanon's cabinet tasked the army with a plan to confine arms, before the end of the year, to the forces listed in the 2024 cessation of hostilities, and on 7 August it approved the objectives of a US paper that included ending the armed presence of all non-state actors, Hezbollah among them, south and north of the Litani. On 5 September it welcomed and took note of the army's phased plan, kept its content secret and asked for monthly reports. In January 2026 the army declared the first phase, south of the Litani, complete except in areas under Israeli occupation, and the cabinet asked it to prepare the area north of the river; on 16 February it took note of the army's presentation of the second phase, which the information minister described as four months, extendable. On 2 March 2026, as Hezbollah entered the war, the cabinet banned Hezbollah's security and military activity as unlawful and instructed the army to implement the north-of-Litani part immediately. The Trilateral Framework of 26 June 2026 placed the same objective inside a sequence of verified disarmament and Israeli withdrawal, zone by zone. Hezbollah has rejected each decision.

Deklarowane cele

Co mówią uczestnicy. Każda pozycja wskazuje, gdzie stanowisko zostało wyrażone; Vigil odnotowuje, że je wyrażono, a nie że jest prawdziwe.

Cele w ocenie Vigil

Odczytanie Vigil, ze stopniem pewności. Strukturalnie oddzielone od deklarowanych stanowisk, aby ocena nigdy nie mogła zostać opublikowana jako czyjś deklarowany cel.

Siły główne

  • Libańskie Siły Zbrojne Siły główne · Pewność: wysoka · stan na 2026-07

    The body tasked with executing the plan and reporting monthly to cabinet.

Wsparcie i podmioty zewnętrzne

  • Dowództwo Sektora na Południe od Litani Siły wspierające · Pewność: umiarkowana · stan na 2026-01

    The army's command in the area of the declared first phase and of the Framework's first pilot zone.

  • Tymczasowe Siły ONZ w Libanie (UNIFIL) Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2026-06

    Supports the army's deployment south of the Litani under Resolution 1701; the UN records one UNIFIL position handed to the army by June 2026. It ends operations on 31 December 2026.

  • Mechanizm (wstrzymanie działań zbrojnych z 2024 r.) Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2026-03

    The US-chaired Mechanism of the 2024 cessation, the monitoring body in place while the first phase was carried out; the UN records that it suspended its meetings on 18 March 2026, and its status since is not established.

  • Wojskowa Grupa Koordynacyjna ds. Libanu (MCG4L) Siły wspierające · Pewność: umiarkowana · stan na 2026-10

    The Military Coordination Group for Lebanon, named on 26 June 2026, is the Framework's channel for deconfliction and verification of the disarmament-for-withdrawal sequence. Its composition is not published.

Strony dotknięte skutkami

  • Organizacja wojskowa Hezbollahu Strona dotknięta skutkami · Pewność: wysoka · stan na 2026-07

    The object of the declared plan, which has rejected it. Its ministers remained in the government after the 2 March 2026 ban.

Fazy

listopad 2024 Pewność: wysoka

The 2024 cessation's obligation

The cessation of 27 November 2024 committed Lebanon to confine arms to listed official forces, "starting with" the area south of the Litani. Whether the obligation covers all of Lebanon is disputed between Israel and Hezbollah.

Źródła: Treaty and agreement texts — Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and neighbours↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗

5 sierpnia – 5 września 2025 Pewność: wysoka

The cabinet decisions

The cabinet tasked the army with a plan on 5 August, approved the objectives of a US paper on 7 August, and on 5 September welcomed and took note of the army's phased plan, keeping its content secret. The communiqué records no approval vote on the plan and no public timetable.

Źródła: Lebanese government statements and decisions (Presidency, Council of Ministers, ministries)↗ · L'Orient Today / L'Orient-Le Jour↗

styczeń 2026 Pewność: umiarkowana

Phase one declared complete south of the Litani

The army declared the first phase, south of the Litani, complete except in areas under Israeli occupation, and the cabinet asked it to prepare the area north of the river. The declaration is the army's; the UN Secretary-General's report of March 2026 records it.

Źródła: Lebanese Armed Forces — official communiqués↗ · Lebanese government statements and decisions (Presidency, Council of Ministers, ministries)↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗

16 February – 2 March 2026 Pewność: wysoka

Phase two and the 2 March ban

On 16 February the cabinet took note of the army's presentation of the second phase. On 2 March, as Hezbollah entered the war, it banned Hezbollah's security and military activity as unlawful and instructed the army to implement the north-of-Litani part immediately. Hezbollah rejected the decision, and the war overtook the second phase.

Źródła: Lebanese government statements and decisions (Presidency, Council of Ministers, ministries)↗ · UN Security Council resolutions, Secretary-General reports and meeting records (Levant)↗

czerwiec – lipiec 2026 Pewność: wysoka

The Framework's verification structure and the pilot zones

The Trilateral Framework of 26 June 2026 provides that the army restores sovereign authority pending verified disarmament of non-state armed groups, zone by zone, with Israeli redeployment following, coordinated through a military coordination group with US participation. The army deployed into the first pilot zones in July after Israeli withdrawal.

Źródła: Treaty and agreement texts — Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and neighbours↗ · US government statements and documents on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon · L'Orient Today / L'Orient-Le Jour↗

Implikacje polityczne

The declaration binds the Lebanese state publicly while Hezbollah's ministers remain in its government, and parliament has extended its own term to May 2028.

Implikacje wojskowe

Under the Framework, verified disarmament is the condition for Israeli withdrawal, so a declaration the public record cannot verify leaves the forward defence line in place.

Co pozostaje nieznane

  • The army's plan, its phase reports and its geography are secret by cabinet decision.
  • No Lebanese army deployment figure for February–June 2026 has been published.
  • The Framework's security annex is known only from a leaked text, and the composition of the coordination group is not published.
  • The press name "Homeland Shield" for the army's plan is not confirmed in any official text and is not used.

Inne odczytania, które przesłanki również dopuszczają

  • The declared plan can be read as a genuine state commitment constrained by capability and by Israeli occupation, as a declaration made to secure external support and Israeli withdrawal, or as both. The public record supports each reading.

Wymienione, ponieważ ocena zawarta we wpisie nie jest jedyną, na jaką pozwalają jego źródła — a nie jako zastrzeżenie osłabiające powyższą ocenę.

Pytania Watch, których dotyczy ta kampania

Stałe pytania analityczne, których przesłanki dotyczą tej kampanii, każde z najnowszym przeglądem. Wyprowadzone z obiektu Watch, nigdy nie powtarzane tutaj.

Zobacz w trybie Eksploruj siły, które ją prowadzą Interaktywnie: wybierz ten wpis i prześledź, co się z nim łączy.

Ocena na dzień — 2026-10 Ostatni przegląd — 2026-10-12

Powiązane wpisy

Wpisy (liczba: 12), które wymienia ta kampania lub które ją wymieniają — każdy to wyraźne odwołanie w opublikowanym wpisie; nic nie wywnioskowano z samej tematyki.