The Turkish-organised factions were declared dissolved into the new Syrian state on 29 January 2025 and rebuilt as army divisions, several under their former commanders. The membership is real on paper and in the order of battle; how far command and pay pass through Damascus varies by faction.
Syrian transitional government counts as a member Turkish-backed Syrian factions (SNA lineage). A directional arrangement: the two parties do not hold the same position in it. Authored once and read from both ends.
The arrangement
- Status
- ActiveIn force and operating. Says nothing about how well it is working, or about which way it is heading.Last material change: 2025-08-13.
- What it covers
- DefenceInstitutionalCategories the arrangement is documented to include. Not a measure: a relationship covering more of them is described in more detail, not held more firmly.
Summary
On 29 January 2025 the transitional presidency announced the dissolution of all armed factions into the Ministry of Defence. The SNA formations became the raw material of the new army's northern order of battle — the 62nd, 70th, 76th, 80th and 86th divisions among those this module's Atlas carries — often under the same commanders, with Turkish sustainment continuing through the August 2025 training and advisory memorandum between Ankara and Damascus. UN investigators reported the participation of government-affiliated forces in the March 2025 coastal killings, and the degree to which the former factions answer to a single chain of command is described as varying substantially by faction: several retain their own patronage arrangements. Türkiye's August 2026 removal of an integrated former YPG commander from its wanted list shows the same state-to-state logic applied to the other side of the north. Vigil records the membership as active and the integration as ungraded.
Why it matters
The new army's northern divisions are the former SNA, and the state's ability to hold the north against Israel's airfield strikes, to police the returns to Ras al-Ain and to present a single chain of command to its Turkish and American partners all depend on whether this membership is real. It is the relationship the module's single-chain-of-command question is actually about.
Agreements
- Dissolution of armed factions into the Ministry of Defence · signed 2025-01-29
Announced at the same conference that named al-Sharaa president; implementing arrangements per faction were not published.
Related events
- Al-Sharaa named president; HTS and factions dissolved January 2025
Political · Leadership change
- The coastal massacres 6 – 10 March 2025
Humanitarian · Military
- The Turkish–Syrian training and advisory memorandum 13 August 2025, implemented through 2026
Military · Diplomatic
- Türkiye removes an integrated former YPG commander from its wanted list 14 August 2026
Political · Diplomatic
Organisations
Structures through which this relationship operates. Not parties to it — the parties are the two actors above.
What remains unknown
- No published account establishes, faction by faction, which command, pay and patronage lines now run through Damascus.
- Whether Turkish sustainment of the former factions continues outside the state-to-state memorandum is reported and not established.
Readings the evidence also supports
- The integration may be read as a genuine absorption slowed by capacity, or as a relabelling that leaves the factions' structures intact; the coastal-violence reporting is consistent with the second and the divisions' subsequent conduct is not yet documented enough to decide.
Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.
Watch questions this relationship bears on
Standing analytical questions whose evidence runs through this relationship, each with its latest review. Derived from the Watch object, never restated here.
All Syria relationships Open in Explore
Assessed as of — 2026-08 Last reviewed — 2026-09-14