The Turkish-organised factions were declared dissolved into the new Syrian state on 29 January 2025 and rebuilt as army divisions, several under their former commanders. The membership is real on paper and in the order of battle; how far command and pay pass through Damascus varies by faction.
Syrian transitional government has as a member Turkish-backed Syrian factions (SNA lineage). A directional arrangement: the two parties do not hold the same position in it. Authored once and read from both ends.
الترتيب
- الحالة
- نشطساري المفعول وقيد العمل. لا يقول شيئًا عن مدى نجاحه في العمل، ولا عن الاتجاه الذي يسير فيه.آخر تغيير جوهري: 2025-08-13.
- ما يغطيه
- الدفاعمؤسسيفئات وثّقت المصادر أن الترتيب يشملها. ليست مقياسًا: فالعلاقة التي تغطي عددًا أكبر منها توصف بتفصيل أكبر، ولا تُعدّ أرسخ.
ملخص
On 29 January 2025 the transitional presidency announced the dissolution of all armed factions into the Ministry of Defence. The SNA formations became the raw material of the new army's northern order of battle — the 62nd, 70th, 76th, 80th and 86th divisions among those this module's Atlas carries — often under the same commanders, with Turkish sustainment continuing through the August 2025 training and advisory memorandum between Ankara and Damascus. UN investigators reported the participation of government-affiliated forces in the March 2025 coastal killings, and the degree to which the former factions answer to a single chain of command is described as varying substantially by faction: several retain their own patronage arrangements. Türkiye's August 2026 removal of an integrated former YPG commander from its wanted list shows the same state-to-state logic applied to the other side of the north. Vigil records the membership as active and the integration as ungraded.
لماذا يهم
The new army's northern divisions are the former SNA, and the state's ability to hold the north against Israel's airfield strikes, to police the returns to Ras al-Ain and to present a single chain of command to its Turkish and American partners all depend on whether this membership is real. It is the relationship the module's single-chain-of-command question is actually about.
الاتفاقات
- Dissolution of armed factions into the Ministry of Defence · وُقّع في 2025-01-29
Announced at the same conference that named al-Sharaa president; implementing arrangements per faction were not published.
الأحداث ذات الصلة
- تسمية الشرع رئيسًا؛ وحلّ هيئة تحرير الشام والفصائل يناير 2025
سياسي · تغيير في القيادة
- مجازر الساحل 6 – 10 مارس 2025
Humanitarian · Military
- مذكرة التدريب والاستشارة التركية–السورية 13 أغسطس 2025، ونُفّذت حتى 2026
عسكري · دبلوماسي
- تركيا تشطب قائدًا سابقًا في وحدات حماية الشعب جرى دمجه من قائمة المطلوبين لديها 14 أغسطس 2026
سياسي · دبلوماسي
المنظمات
البنى التي تعمل هذه العلاقة من خلالها. ليست أطرافًا فيها — فالطرفان هما الجهتان الفاعلتان المذكورتان أعلاه.
الأماكن
علامات ينشرها هذا الملف أصلًا. ولا يضيف هذا السجل أي دقة جغرافية خاصة به.
ما لا يزال مجهولًا
- No published account establishes, faction by faction, which command, pay and patronage lines now run through Damascus.
- Whether Turkish sustainment of the former factions continues outside the state-to-state memorandum is reported and not established.
قراءات تدعمها الأدلة أيضًا
- The integration may be read as a genuine absorption slowed by capacity, or as a relabelling that leaves the factions' structures intact; the coastal-violence reporting is consistent with the second and the divisions' subsequent conduct is not yet documented enough to decide.
مُدرجة لأن تقييم السجل نفسه ليس التقييم الوحيد الذي تسمح به مصادره — لا بوصفها تحوّطًا من التقييم أعلاه.
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التقييم حتى — 2026-08 آخر مراجعة — 2026-09-14