- 國家隸屬 · 俄羅斯
- Vigil類別圖示 · 非官方徽記
識別來源
國家隸屬：俄羅斯。
Vigil類別圖示——依此紀錄自身的領域、層級與角色繪製。並非官方徽記。
概要
俄羅斯國防部在馬利的遠征部隊——自2025年6月起接替瓦格納的部署，與FDS並肩作戰。
- 範圍
- 結構、角色、沿革與連結。未發布任何下屬紀錄。
- 隸屬
- 隸屬：已證實
- 來源
- 紀錄所載：10
- 紀錄狀態
- 完整
- 廣泛活動地區
- Bamako and the remaining northern and central hubs — Gao and Sévaré prominently in 2026 reporting. Analysts assess that after the loss of Kidal it withdrew from the far north and concentrated closer to Bamako, taking a more supporting role.
- 重要歷史
- The defence-ministry-run successor to Wagner’s Mali deployment, announced in June 2025 with most personnel carried over. The rebrand made Russia’s presence formal state policy. Africa Corps personnel were reported in Mali from late 2024, in Bamako and the centre while Wagner held the north; when Wagner posted "mission accomplished" on 6 June 2025 the corps said nothing would change, and a diplomatic source told AFP that most Russian-national Wagner personnel would be absorbed into it. Its recruits sign one-year contracts with Ministry of Defence volunteer formations — outside the regular armed forces — at pay advertised at roughly 230,000–280,000 roubles a month, with stated priority for former Wagner fighters; analysts and Russian mercenary channels put the ex-Wagner share at 70–80 per cent. Command is reported, not published: Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and military-intelligence general Andrei Averyanov above the corps, and from early 2026 Major-General Vladimir Selivyorstov, an airborne officer, as the Mali commander. Sustainment is a state chain — flight tracking identified Ministry transport-unit and state-linked flights into Bamako through 2025–26, and sea convoys via Conakry delivered vehicles in early 2025. A Malian transitional-council official said in July 2026 that "coordination and cooperation have been established" between the armed forces and the corps. In the 2026 offensives it defended Bamako airport, withdrew from the far north under negotiated terms — leaving Aguelhok and Tessalit on 27 April — lost helicopters and personnel, acknowledged by Russian state media, and led the column that retook Anéfis in July. Published analysis from mid-2026 describes a deliberate shift after Kidal: fewer ground commitments, a larger share of effort in air support, intelligence provision to the FDS and convoy escort on the corridors from Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Senegal, alongside armed and first-person-view drone use, including a reported strike on a JNIM fuel depot in the Timbuktu region. One analyst characterises the posture as minimising personnel exposure while maximising effect from the air. That is an assessment of a completed repositioning, not a statement of current locations or strength at any place. This record covers the organisation’s role in the Mali conflict module only; Vigil scopes force records to the theatre they operate in, and a future global-entity model may connect theatre-specific roles across modules.
- 優勢
- State backing and resupply from Russia; aviation and fire-support integration with the FDS; continuity of personnel and local knowledge from the Wagner phase; a growing armed-drone capability that substitutes for ground presence.
- 限制
- Fixed to a shrinking set of hubs; its visibility makes every loss a publicised test of Russian prestige; inherits the predecessor’s documented conduct record and the grievances it produced, and is now itself the subject of a documented civilian-harm case in its own right rather than only through the Wagner lineage. Human Rights Watch reported on 31 July 2026 that two air strikes on Kyrnia, in the Mopti region, on 15 June 2026 killed eight civilians including three children at a village chief’s residence and a cattle market, and assessed the attack as apparently unlawful. Africa Corps had publicly claimed the strike hit a gathering of armed-group commanders; the investigation found no known armed-group casualties at the two impact points. The legal characterisation is Human Rights Watch’s and is recorded here as that organisation’s finding. A second investigation, published 20 August 2026, found that more than 100 Africa Corps fighters accompanied by Malian soldiers raided Bombori in the same region on 10 July 2026, summarily killing nine civilians including four children, rounding up and beating at least 80 men and boys, and burning at least eight homes; the organisation wrote to the Russian and Malian defence ministers on 4 and 5 August and received no reply. No Malian or Russian official investigation, denial or acknowledgement has been announced in either case, and that consistent non-response is this record’s standing finding about the accountability environment rather than a finding about any single incident.
相關組織
- 馬利國防與安全部隊（FDS） 合作對象 · 高信心
Joint operations documented through the 2026 fighting, including the Anéfis relief column.
沿革與機構歷史
前身部隊： 瓦格納集團 — 馬利部署歷程
相關地點
Anéfis: Personnel accompanied the relief column ambushed near Tabrichat on 9 July 2026 and the second column that reached the town. Gao–Kidal corridor: The axis its 2026 relief operations were fought along.
戰役
將此組織列為參與方的戰役。該關係由戰役紀錄擁有並評定等級；此清單為計算所得。
- JNIM燃料封鎖戰役 Supporting force · Declared September 2025; eased and reimposed since · moderate confidence · as of 2026-07
Documented in joint operations with the FDS through the 2026 fighting. Its specific role in corridor security is less well reported than its role in the northern and central hubs.
- FLA–JNIM攻勢，2026年 Supporting force · April 2026 – present · moderate confidence · as of 2026-07
Withdrew from the far north in April under reportedly negotiated terms; led the column that retook Anéfis in July, with acknowledged losses.
關鍵事件
瓦格納撤出，非洲軍團留下
瓦格納宣布「任務完成」並撤離馬利；俄羅斯的存在在國防部主導的非洲軍團名義下延續，吸收了大部分相同人員。
FLA在通往Aguelhok的道路上伏擊一支馬利–俄羅斯後勤車隊
Azawad Liberation Front的戰士在距Aguelhok約四十公里的Anoumalane附近，攻擊了一支從Anéfis前往Aguelhok的馬利陸軍與非洲軍團後勤車隊。陸軍證實了這次攻擊；FLA聲稱摧毀了二十多輛車輛並造成數十人死亡，這些數字未經任何其他方面查證。
2026年4月攻勢 — 基達爾失守，國防部長遇害
FLA與JNIM發動了自2012年以來這場戰爭中規模最大的協同攻勢，報導稱這是兩者首次公開協同作戰：FLA在政府軍與俄羅斯部隊撤出遠北地區之際拿下基達爾，該撤離據報是依談判條件進行；Kati的一起汽車炸彈攻擊炸死了國防部長Sadio Camara。撤離範圍遠不止基達爾——據報非洲軍團於4月27日離開Aguelhok，但一支馬利駐軍留下並於7月在當地擊退了一次攻擊；政府軍與俄羅斯部隊離開了Tessalit，FLA在5月1日前已被拍到身在該鎮；馬利部隊撤出加奧地區的Tessit，廷巴克圖地區的Ber則經談判讓出。伊斯蘭國薩赫勒於4月28日加入，佔領了已撤空的Labbezanga邊境哨所，並在據報的俄羅斯壓力下撤出前短暫進入Ménaka鎮。JNIM於4月28日重新對巴馬科實施全面封鎖，聲稱在莫普提周邊取得大範圍進展，據報隨後在首都的各個入口設立了檢查站。
2026年7月的全國性攻擊與Anéfis之戰
第二波協同攻擊打擊了Anéfis、Aguelhok、加奧、Sévaré與Kéniéroba，後來又擴及Konna與Somadougou。FLA與JNIM戰士圍攻Anéfis基地，在Tabrichat附近伏擊一支馬利–非洲軍團解圍車隊，並擊落一架Mi-24；一支從加奧出發的第二縱隊突破包圍，陸軍於7月10日宣布收復該鎮，宣稱代價約30名士兵。
第二起有紀錄的非洲軍團平民傷害案件，以及第二次未獲回應
Human Rights Watch於2026年8月20日報告稱，受俄羅斯政府控制的非洲軍團部隊於2026年7月初在莫普提地區的Bombori村即決殺害了九名平民，其中包括四名兒童，並毆打了數十人。根據該組織的調查結果，超過100名非洲軍團人員在數名馬利士兵陪同下，於7月10日約05:00進入該村，闖入富拉尼族聚居區的民宅，圍捕了至少80名男子與男孩，就其被指與伊斯蘭主義武裝團體有關聯一事進行毆打與審問，槍殺了六名試圖逃跑的平民，並拘留和處決了另外三人，其中一人遭斬首；至少八棟房屋遭洗劫並焚毀。Human Rights Watch表示，它曾於8月4日與5日致函俄羅斯與馬利國防部長，說明其調查結果與問題，但未獲任何回覆。這些調查結果是該組織自身的調查，尚未經獨立證實；兩國政府均未公開回應。
Dioura營地被攻陷，且未獲重建
JNIM攻擊了莫普提地區Ténenkou行政區Dioura的馬利陸軍營地，並聲稱完全控制了兵營。安全、軍方與地方消息來源在八天內向AFP提供了不斷上升的死亡人數——起初是五十多名士兵與五名非洲軍團人員，接著是六十至八十人，然後是包括兩名軍官在內的一百多人，另有六十至九十人被俘；JNIM聲稱擊斃150人、俘虜93人。RFI的地方消息來源稱約一百人死亡、數十人被俘；9月21日，Reuters援引一名安全消息來源稱130人死亡、一百多人被扣為人質，並援引一名外交消息來源稱約120人死亡。馬利當局宣布對攻擊者展開空地聯合行動，承認在一場持續一週以上的行動中自身有未具體說明的損失，但未公布死亡人數。地方消息來源稱，攻擊者在次日返回，沒有增援部隊被派出，營地的武器被搬空；9月21日，RFI報導該地已無任何馬利士兵或非洲軍團人員留守。
參與者描述烏克蘭在Azawad Liberation Front的無人機部署
CNN發表了一份調查報導，稱約有十五名烏克蘭專家部署在馬利北部，與Azawad Liberation Front合作，提供訓練、支援與行動協助，而非參與前線作戰；一名操作員描述了遠端協調當地無人機飛行的方式——透過網際網路接收影像傳輸，並以無線電指揮飛機。這一說法依據的是對兩名據稱部署在當地的烏克蘭無人機操作員、一名烏克蘭國防情報局消息來源，以及一名具名的國防情報局發言人的訪談；報導引述該消息來源稱，基輔正將其無人機經驗轉化為外交政策工具。同一報導還載有三項較弱的說法，每一項都僅依據單一匿名消息來源：數名烏克蘭專家也在蘇丹；來自查德、尼日與布吉納法索的人員早先曾前往馬利接受烏克蘭無人機訓練；以及烏克蘭人協助了該陣線奪取基達爾。俄羅斯國防部另外表示，烏克蘭與歐洲的傭兵教官曾在那次攻擊前訓練了這些運動。沒有任何國家證實該說法的任何部分。
系統入口
此紀錄與Vigil其他部分的連結處。每一列之所以列在這裡，是因為此組織確實與之相連。
評估截至 — 2026-09 最近檢視 — 2026-09-09
在結構中檢視此部隊 互動式：選取此紀錄並追蹤與其關聯的內容。