- Vigil類別圖示 · 非官方徽記
識別來源
Vigil類別圖示——依此紀錄自身的領域、層級與角色繪製。並非官方徽記。
概要
A navigation grouping, not a command: the Russian deployments in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger differ in scale, posture and evidence, and are recorded separately for that reason. What they share since 2025 is an institution — the Ministry of Defence's Africa Corps, successor to the Wagner deployment — and a sustainment chain that runs through the Russian state.
- 範圍
- 結構、角色、沿革與連結。已發布4筆下屬紀錄。
- 隸屬
- 隸屬：已證實
- 來源
- 紀錄所載：3
- 紀錄狀態
- 部分
- 廣泛活動地區
- Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger — each contingent recorded on its own terms; nothing here describes positions or strength.
- 重要歷史
- The presence began as a private one. Wagner deployed to Mali from December 2021 as France withdrew, fought the 2023 northern campaign, suffered its worst African defeat at Tinzaouatène in July 2024, and was repeatedly implicated in mass civilian killings documented by UN reporting. After the 2023 mutiny the Russian state folded the group under Ministry of Defence control and in June 2025 rebranded its Mali deployment as Africa Corps, with most personnel carried over. Burkina Faso and Niger never had Wagner: the corps arrived in Ouagadougou in January 2024 as an instructor contingent whose announced expansion collapsed, and relocated to Niamey's Air Base 101 in May 2024 while American personnel were still leaving. Moscow has officially credited its Niger contingent with two engagements — repelling the January 2026 airport attack and intervening against the August 2026 mutiny — the only such acknowledgements in the region. In Mali the corps withdrew from the far north under negotiated terms in April 2026 and has been described since as shifting effort from ground commitments to air support, intelligence and convoy escort.
- 優勢
- A single institutional owner since 2025 and a state sustainment chain, which make the deployments legible in a way the contractor phase was not; and, for the host governments, a partner without governance conditions.
- 限制
- Three contingents of different scale, record and evidence, which is why this record refuses to sum them. Command above the corps is reported rather than published, personnel figures are unofficial, and the Mali contingent's civilian-harm record and its 2024–2026 battlefield losses are part of what any reading of the presence must carry.
下屬部隊
各列僅為版面配置 — 位置與順序不代表任何層級、重要性、先後或強度。所顯示的每一筆紀錄都是所選組織的直屬下級。
敏感度：公開 · 結構性 信心：中等 來源： Official government statements · Established international media reporting · Established historical record 方法論 更正
評估截至 — 2026-08 最近檢視 — 2026-09-28
在結構中檢視此部隊 互動式：選取此紀錄並追蹤與其關聯的內容。