What this system is
Gold is roughly 80 per cent of Mali's exports, concentrated in the western belt around Kayes and Kéniéba, and the junta has squeezed the sector hard; Niger's uranium at Arlit passed to state operational control in December 2024 and was declared nationalised in June 2025. Both are fiscal bases under pressure.
The fiscal base of two of the three AES states, and the arena in which the juntas' terms with foreign operators are being set.
Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-08Reviewed 2026-10-03
The system
- Overview
- In Mali, a 2023 mining code raising the state's take was followed by a two-year confrontation with Barrick over the Loulo–Gounkoto complex — provisional administration, an ICSID arbitration, and a settlement in November 2025 in which the company paid roughly US$430m in total, withdrew its claims and accepted the code in exchange for a ten-year permit extension and restored operational control, regained on 18 December 2025. In Niger, Orano halted output at Arlit in October 2024, the mine passed to Nigerien operational control in December 2024, nationalisation was announced in June 2025, and an ICSID tribunal has ordered Niger not to sell the stockpiled uranium pending Orano's claims — an order the state has said on television it intends to disregard. The signal to foreign operators across the Sahel is the module's reading of both.
- Current state · as of 2026-08
- Mali: Loulo–Gounkoto restarted at the end of 2025, permit renewed in February 2026, 2026 guidance of 260,000 to 290,000 attributable ounces. Niger: the uranium dispute unresolved and conducted in public, as of August 2026.
- Commodities and outputs
- Gold
Nodes
The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.
- ArlitMining area · broad region
Niger's uranium district, under state operational control since December 2024.
- KayesMajor city
- Western gold belt (Kayes–Kéniéba)Mining area · broad region
The industrial and artisanal goldfields of western Mali — the state's fiscal base and an emerging conflict frontier.
- KéniébaMining area · broad region
Routes and operators
Supply systems running through it
- Mali's fuel import corridorsFuel imports · 6 nodes · 5 documented disruptions · joined by its nodesThree overland routes supply a landlocked state's entire fuel demand — and since September 2025 they have been the target of a declared blockade.
Organisations that run it
- BarrickMining company · ActiveThe operator of Loulo–Gounkoto, the largest industrial gold complex in Mali's western belt, which regained operational control in December 2025 after a two-year confrontation with the state.
- SOMAÏRMining company · Status uncertainThe operator of the Arlit uranium mine — 63.4 per cent Orano, 36.6 per cent the state's SOPAMIN on paper, under Nigerien operational control since December 2024 and declared nationalised in June 2025.
Dependencies and constraints
Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.
Foreign operators' willingness to work under the new codes. Industrial output in both states depends on operators who have been squeezed, arbitrated against and, in Niger, nationalised; the Barrick settlement is the module's measure of what terms hold.
Gold revenue. Roughly 80 per cent of Mali's exports and the state's indispensable revenue.
An ICSID tribunal has ordered Niger not to sell or transfer the stockpiled uranium pending Orano's claims.
The Loulo permit renewed for ten years and transferred to Barrick's local subsidiary.
Barrick regained operational control of Loulo–Gounkoto; production resumed in the last days of the year.
Niger announced the nationalisation of SOMAÏR, the Arlit operator.
Transmission chains through this system
Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.
- Road insecurity → market supply → hunger and service collapseCivilian impact · as of 2026-07
- asset Confirmed
- disruption Confirmed
- exposure Confirmed
- significance Plausible exposure
- Fuel blockade → transport costs → food, power and fiscal exposureEconomic exposure · as of 2026-08
- asset Confirmed
- disruption Confirmed
- exposure Confirmed
- significance Plausible exposure
Watch questions bearing on it
- Can the government supply what it holds?active · Assessment changed 2026-09-27
- Is Islamic State Sahel's pressure in western Niger reaching the capital's approaches and the export infrastructure?active · Assessment changed 2026-09-27
- Are the three states becoming more dependent on Russian sustainment?active · No material change 2026-09-27
- Does corridor pressure tighten or ease?active · No material change 2026-09-27
- Does the confederation do anything its members could not?active · No material change 2026-09-27
- Does the state put back a position it has lost?active · Movement observed 2026-09-27
Events at its nodes
Economic exposures it underlies
Actors and arrangements
What remains unknown
- No 2026 produced-ounce figure against guidance was read; Arlit output since the 2024 halt is not published in a form the module has read.
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Assessed as of — 2026-08 Last reviewed — 2026-10-03