What this actor is
Israel holds two positions in this system simultaneously, and the war has strengthened both. It is a co-belligerent: the Congressional Research Service records Israel as having killed Iran's Supreme Leader on 28 February 2026 along with dozens of other senior Iranian figures. It is also, since the Abraham Accords and more so during this war, a defence partner of the United Arab Emirates — reported as deploying air-defence systems and personnel to Emirati territory for the first time. A relationship that might have been expected to break under a regional war has instead deepened, and that is one of the more consequential structural changes the war has produced.
Confidence: Moderate As of 2026-09-13Reviewed 2026-09-04
Two roles, one record
Vigil does not resolve the tension between Israel's position as a belligerent against Iran and its position as a Gulf security partner, because the tension is real and is part of what the module explains. Both are recorded on this one contextual actor rather than split into a convenient pair.
Attribution recorded precisely
Earlier Vigil drafting attributed the killing of Ali Khamenei jointly to the United States and Israel. The Congressional Research Service attributes it to Israel, and the module carries the narrower and better-sourced attribution. The event chronology itself is authored in P4.
What this module does not cover
Israel's own force structure, its conflicts outside this system, and its relationships in the Levant are not this module's subject and are not authored here. This record covers Israel only as an actor in the Iran–Gulf system.
Objectives
What the actor says, kept apart from what Vigil assesses. Each stated entry cites where the position was made; Vigil records that it was made, not that it is true.
Stated by the actor
Israeli statements have framed the campaign against Iran around its nuclear programme, its missile forces and its partner networks — the same three headings as the United States, with the leadership targeting of 28 February 2026 attributed to Israel by the Congressional Research Service.
As of 2026-03 Sources: Congressional Research Service — Iran, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz
Defence partnership with the United Arab Emirates under the Abraham Accords, extended during the war to reported deployment of air-defence systems and personnel on Emirati territory.
As of 2026-09 Sources: Congressional Research Service — Iran, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz · Gulf state official government sources
Assessed by Vigil
Israel's objective in this system is to convert the war into a durable degradation of Iran's missile and nuclear capacity while deepening the Gulf partnerships the war might have been expected to break; the second has so far held, and it is the more consequential structural change for the Gulf.
Confidence: Moderate Sources: Congressional Research Service — Iran, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz
Constraints
What limits this actor's options, with the kind of limit it is.
The tension between belligerent and Gulf security partner is real and unresolved: every Gulf state Israel defends is also a state Iran has struck in retaliation for the campaign Israel co-conducts.
External Confidence: Moderate Sources: Congressional Research Service — Iran, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz
The intelligence achievement that opened both wars — the leadership targeting of 2025 and 2026 — is not repeatable at will; the successor leadership and the unfilled posts are harder to characterise than the one that was struck.
Military Confidence: Low Sources: Congressional Research Service — Iran, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz · IranWire — IRGC and Basij institutional series↗
Sources of leverage
What this actor can bring to bear, and how firmly each is established.
Strike reach across Iran demonstrated in June 2025 and from February 2026, and the air-defence layers other Gulf states have sought.
Confidence: High Sources: Congressional Research Service — Iran, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz
What remains unknown
- What the Emirati deployment consists of, and whether any other Gulf state has accepted one; only the UAE case is reported.
Posture as of 2026-09-13Posture reviewed 2026-09-14
Not published for Israel and the GulfRed linesObservables
Elsewhere in Iran–Gulf
Last reviewed — 2026-09-04