What this campaign was
From the seizure of the Galaxy Leader on 19 November 2023 the Houthi movement attacked shipping it linked to Israel, and for a time to the US and UK, in the Red Sea. Coalition defence, US–UK and Israeli strikes and a May 2025 US ceasefire did not end it; attacks stopped after the Gaza ceasefire of 10 October 2025.
It is the precedent the module's Red Sea reading rests on. The campaign showed that passage through Bab el-Mandeb could be withdrawn from a category of shipping by declaration and a few attacks, that the price of a voyage rather than a physical closure decided who sailed, and that two years of naval defence and strikes on Yemen did not restore it — the same mechanism the module records at Hormuz in 2026, and the reason a 2026 blockade of Saudi shipping at the same strait was immediately credible. Its sharpest single consequence fell on Israel's own Red Sea port at Eilat, which lost most of its shipping within weeks of the Galaxy Leader seizure.
Confidence: High As of 2025-11Reviewed 2026-10-13
Summary
The Houthi movement claimed missile and drone launches towards Israel from 31 October 2023, and on 19 November seized the car carrier Galaxy Leader and took it to Hodeidah, stating that it would target Israel-linked shipping until the war in Gaza ended. Attacks widened through the southern Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden. The United States announced Operation Prosperity Guardian on 18 December 2023, a defensive operation under the Combined Maritime Forces and its Task Force 153; the United States and the United Kingdom struck targets in Yemen from the night of 11–12 January 2024; the European Union launched Aspides in February 2024; and Israel struck Hodeidah on 20 July 2024, the day after a Houthi drone killed a man in Tel Aviv. When the Gaza ceasefire took effect on 19 January 2025 the movement said it would confine attacks to Israel-linked ships and released the Galaxy Leader's crew three days later. The United States re-designated Ansarallah a Foreign Terrorist Organization in March 2025. After Israel halted aid into Gaza, the movement reinstated its ban on Israeli shipping on 11 March; the United States struck Yemen from 15 March until an Oman-mediated ceasefire on 6 May, which the movement said did not include Israel. In July 2025 it sank the Magic Seas and the Eternity C, Greek-operated bulk carriers whose companies' ships had called at Israeli ports. By Reuters' and the Associated Press's counts the campaign attacked more than a hundred merchant ships, sank four, seized one and killed at least nine mariners. No attack was claimed after the Gaza ceasefire of 10 October 2025.
Stated objectives
What the participants say. Each entry cites where the position was stated; Vigil records that it was made, not that it is true.
The movement stated that it was acting in support of Gaza, that its targets were ships linked to Israel — extended in 2024 to US and UK shipping after the strikes on Yemen — and that it would stop when the war in Gaza stopped.
The United States stated the purpose of Operation Prosperity Guardian as ensuring freedom of navigation in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and of the 2025 strikes as ending attacks on shipping.
Assessed objectives
Vigil's reading, graded. Kept structurally apart from stated positions so an assessment can never be published as someone's declared aim.
The movement's target set followed its own stated linkage to Gaza closely enough — narrowed in January 2025, widened in March, stopped in October — that its decisions are better read as its own than as directed from Tehran, while Iranian material support is attributed by the United States and disputed by Iran.
Primary forces
- Houthi armed forces Primary force · Confidence: High · as of 2025-10
The force that declared the targeting of Israel-linked shipping and claimed the attacks.
- Houthi naval and coastal forces Primary force · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2025-07
The component through which seizures, small-boat and uncrewed surface attacks on ships were carried out, on the movement's own released footage and UKMTO advisories; attribution to the component is Vigil's.
- Houthi missile and drone forces Primary force · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2025-10
The component through which anti-ship missile and drone attacks and launches at Israel are delivered; attribution to the component is Vigil's.
Opposing forces
- US Central Command Opposing force · Confidence: High · as of 2025-05
Struck targets in Yemen with the United Kingdom from January 2024 and alone from 15 March to 6 May 2025. The regional command is Vigil's institutional identification.
- Combined Task Force 153 Opposing force · Confidence: High · as of 2023-12
Operation Prosperity Guardian was announced on 18 December 2023 under the umbrella of the Combined Maritime Forces and the leadership of Task Force 153, by the US Secretary of Defense's statement. Defensive: it escorted and defended shipping and did not strike Yemen.
- EUNAVFOR ASPIDES Opposing force · Confidence: High · as of 2025-10
Launched on 19 February 2024 with a defensive mandate; it does not strike Yemen.
- Israeli Air Force Opposing force · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2025-09
Struck Hodeidah on 20 July 2024 and Houthi-held Yemen repeatedly in 2025. The sources name Israel; the service identification is Vigil's.
The campaign opens
The movement seized the Galaxy Leader on 19 November 2023 after saying it would target Israeli vessels, and attacks with missiles, drones and boarding parties spread across the southern Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. Major carriers paused Red Sea transits and diverted around the Cape of Good Hope. Eilat's chief executive told Reuters on 21 December that the port had lost 85% of its activity.
Coalition defence and strikes on Yemen
The United States announced Operation Prosperity Guardian on 18 December 2023. US and UK forces struck targets in Yemen from the night of 11–12 January 2024, with further joint rounds through the year; the movement added US and UK shipping to its target set. The European Union launched Aspides on 19 February 2024. Israel struck Hodeidah port on 20 July 2024, the day after a Houthi drone killed one man in Tel Aviv. Shipping through the strait did not return.
The Gaza-ceasefire pause
With the Gaza ceasefire of 19 January 2025 the movement said, through its Sanaa coordination centre, that it would confine attacks to Israel-linked ships and lift its measures against US and UK shipping, and it released the Galaxy Leader's 25 crew to Oman on 22 January. The United States announced the re-designation of Ansarallah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on 4 March. After Israel halted aid into Gaza on 2 March, the movement reinstated its ban on Israeli shipping on 11 March.
US strikes and the Oman-mediated ceasefire
The United States struck Houthi-held Yemen from 15 March 2025. On 6 May Oman announced a ceasefire under which neither side would target the other, including US vessels; the movement said the next day that it did not cover Israel, and its launches at Israel continued.
The sinkings of July and the halt in October
On 6–9 July 2025 the movement sank the Magic Seas and the Eternity C. Eternity C crew were killed — three by the US State Department's count, at least four by maritime officials' as Reuters reported — and survivors were taken by the movement. Its stated grounds were that the ships' companies had called at Israeli ports. Attacks continued into late September. The Gaza ceasefire took effect on 10 October; the movement claimed no attack afterwards and in November signalled, in a letter to Hamas's armed wing, that it would resume if the war resumed.
Outcome and present status
Concluded without an agreement: the movement stopped claiming attacks when the Gaza ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025 and made the halt conditional on Gaza, as it had said it would. Neither the coalition's defence, nor the US–UK and Israeli strikes, nor the May 2025 ceasefire with the United States ended it. The halt was not permanent: during the 2026 war the movement fired missiles at Israel from 28 March 2026 and declared a total ban on Israeli shipping in the Red Sea on 8 June 2026, which belongs to the 2026 war and is not part of this campaign.
Political implications
The United States' separate ceasefire of May 2025 showed that the movement's target list was negotiable bilaterally — and that a ceasefire with one target state left the others exposed.
Economic implications
Container and car-carrier traffic left the Red Sea for the Cape route for most of two years; for Israel the cost concentrated at its only Red Sea port, which lost most of its traffic.
Linked events
Locations
Places this module already publishes as map markers, listed because the campaign is about them. Not an operational area.
Reference layers
What remains unknown
- Casualty and attack counts differ by source and date; the record carries the cumulative figures reported by Reuters and the Associated Press and adopts none of the parties' own.
- The degree of Iranian direction of the campaign is not established; US attribution of Iranian material support is carried as an attribution.
- The figure of four ships sunk includes ships sunk in 2024 (the Rubymar and the Tutor) that this record does not describe further.
See the force running this in Explore Interactive: select this record and follow what connects to it.
Assessed as of — 2025-11 Last reviewed — 2026-10-13