中華人民共和國 — 臺灣（中華民國）

摘要

The dispute dates from the 1949 retreat of the Republic of China government to Taiwan and the People's Republic's founding claim to the island; it has produced three strait crises, the 2005 Anti-Secession Law's conditions for "non-peaceful means", and, since the 2016 return of the Democratic Progressive Party to office, the suspension of the official cross-strait channels that had operated under the 1992 understanding. Beijing has refused contact with the Lai administration, conducted large-scale exercises around the island at each political milestone — August 2022, May 2024, Justice Mission-2025 in December 2025 — eroded the median line as a customary limit, and extended coast guard enforcement toward Taiwan's outlying islands and, in 2026, its eastern approaches. Taipei has raised defence spending, extended conscription and reserve training, and built a civil-resilience system around the assumption of blockade. Trade and investment across the strait remain large. Neither government recognises the other; Vigil describes both positions and adopts neither.

為何重要

Every other record in the module — the American ambiguity, the Japanese contingency debate, the semiconductor concentration, the coast guard threshold, the civil-resilience programme — is a function of this relationship, and until now the Diplomacy layer showed the module's system without its centre. The relationship's state is not a prediction: it is the standing fact the Watch questions measure movement against.

協議

• The 1992 understanding (the "1992 Consensus") · 簽署於1992-11

  An understanding reached between the two sides' semi-official bodies on "one China" with differing interpretations; its existence and content are themselves disputed between the parties and it is not accepted by the current Taiwanese government. Recorded because official cross-strait channels operated on its basis from 2008 to 2016.

• Anti-Secession Law · 簽署於2005-03-14

  A PRC domestic law, not a bilateral instrument; listed because its Article 8 conditions are the published basis on which the PRC reserves non-peaceful means. Taiwan rejects its application.

相關事件

• 中華民國政府撤退至臺灣 1949年12月

  Political · Territorial change · Military

• 第三次臺海危機——飛彈試射與航艦部署 1995–96

  軍事 · 外交

• 中華人民共和國通過反分裂國家法 2005年3月

  政治 · 外交

• 民進黨重返執政；兩岸對話中止 2016年1月

  政治 · 領導層變動

• 裴洛西訪問與數十年來規模最大的演習 2022年8月

  外交 · 軍事

• 海峽中線不再發揮約束作用 2022年8月起

  軍事

• 就職演習與更高的活動基準 2024年5月

  軍事

• 正義使命-2025：自2022年以來規模最大、距離最近的演習 2025年12月29–31日

  Military · Maritime

組織

此關係藉以運作的結構。它們並非關係的當事方——當事方是上方的兩個行為者。

地點

本模組已發布的標記。此紀錄本身不增加任何地理精度。

仍然未知的事項

• What the Article 8 condition "exhaustion of possibilities for peaceful reunification" means operationally is disputed and unpublished.
• Whether any unofficial channel between the two governments has operated since 2016 is reported inconsistently and is not authored.

證據同樣支持的其他解讀

• The intensification since 2022 can be read as preparation, as coercion short of war intended to shape Taiwanese politics, or as the normalisation of a new baseline; the module's activity-baseline question tracks the third reading and does not adopt the first.

列出這些解讀，是因為該紀錄本身的評估並非其來源所允許的唯一評估 — 而不是對上述評估的保留。