- Vigil類別圖示 · 非官方徽記
識別來源
Vigil類別圖示——依此紀錄自身的領域、層級與角色繪製。並非官方徽記。
概要
沙那胡塞當局的軍隊——一個於2014年接收了葉門國家大部分軍火的叛亂運動，此後成為擁有自身飛彈、無人機與海岸部門的常規化部隊，編為七個軍區，也是本模組中唯一能夠封閉咽喉要道的非國家行為者。
- 範圍
- 結構、角色、沿革與連結。已發布2筆下屬紀錄。
- 隸屬
- 隸屬關係未知
- 來源
- 紀錄所載：3
- 紀錄狀態
- 部分
- 廣泛活動地區
- Northern and western Yemen, with reach across the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden
- 重要歷史
- When the Houthi movement took Sanaa in September 2014 it took most of the Yemeni state's armed forces with it, and a decade of war against a Saudi-led coalition turned an insurgency into something closer to a conventional military: a force organised in seven military regions with specialised departments for missiles and unmanned aircraft, a naval and coastal arm on the Red Sea, an intelligence service that watches the movement itself, and an underground defence industry near Sanaa and Saada. Its campaign against shipping from late 2023 drew American, British and European naval operations and Israeli strikes; in July 2026 it declared a blockade of vessels calling at Saudi ports, traffic through Bab el-Mandeb fell by about a quarter, and Saudi crude bound for Asia went the long way through Suez. Its relationship with Iran runs through the Quds Force and is real, contested in degree, and not what determines its targeting: the blockade serves Houthi objectives whether or not it serves Tehran's.
- 優勢
- Position at a chokepoint, a decade of surviving a far better-equipped coalition, and an arsenal — anti-ship and ballistic missiles, one-way attack drones, mines, small craft — that lets a non-state actor impose costs on global shipping.
- 限制
- Its published strength figures are unverifiable and this module carries none; its recruitment includes documented child soldiers and coerced migrants; and its campaign has brought strikes on the ports and infrastructure the population it governs depends on. Attribution of its weapons' origin is contested in degree. No military regions, brigades, launch sites or dispositions are recorded.
下屬部隊
各列僅為版面配置 — 位置與順序不代表任何層級、重要性、先後或強度。所顯示的每一筆紀錄都是所選組織的直屬下級。
相關組織
- EUNAVFOR ASPIDES 對立 · 截至2026-09 · 高信心
The operation exists to protect shipping from the Houthi campaign and has engaged Houthi drones and missiles in defence of merchant vessels. Its mandate is defensive: it does not conduct strikes on Yemen.
沿革與機構歷史
Formal parent institution: Answers to the Houthi movement's leadership in Sanaa, which claims the Yemeni state's armed forces as its own; Iranian support is documented and its degree contested, and the module records no command relationship.
相關地點
Sanaa: Seat of the movement's authority; association is structural, not positional. Bab el-Mandeb: The water the movement's July 2026 blockade declaration concerned; no position, launch site or pattern is described.
戰役
將此組織列為參與方的戰役。該關係由戰役紀錄擁有並評定等級；此清單為計算所得。
- 沙烏地–胡塞紅海戰線，2026年回合 Primary force · Since 13 July 2026 · high confidence
The force that declared the blockade, claimed the strike waves and took the coast.
關鍵事件
胡塞組織封鎖往返沙烏地港口的航運
胡塞組織在曼德海峽宣布封鎖停靠沙烏地港口的船隻。經由該海峽的船舶交通量下降約四分之一，沙烏地阿拉伯將運往亞洲的原油改經蘇伊士運河——使一趟從延布到南韓約二十四天的航程，變成約五十四天。
胡塞組織奪取紅海南部海岸並抵達曼德海峽
胡塞組織於9月10日拂曉奪取位於曼德海峽以北約75公里的摩卡港，並在隨後一天內奪取再往南約46公里的Dhubab、其後方的沿海村莊、海峽中的Perim（Mayyun）島，以及Hanish群島中的Zuqar——這是葉門紅海海岸最後一段由政府控制的地帶。報導形容結果是整段海岸線落入胡塞組織手中；目前未讀到經獨立查證的控制線。總統領導委員會副主席Tareq Saleh表示，他已下令進行戰略撤退，並在與阿拉伯聯軍司令部協商後成立替代指揮中心以重整部隊。報導指出，仍有一支政府部隊（一份說法稱逾兩千人）位於Hanish群島。該組織聲稱控制六個地區與5,400平方公里。一名胡塞政治局成員表示，紅海與曼德海峽的航行與貿易安全有序，例外仍是沙烏地的航運；一名胡塞指揮官則表示，隨著摩卡失守，該海峽可被視為處於該組織的管理之下。Al Jazeera報導，胡塞組織並未正式宣布控制該海峽。
系統入口
此紀錄與Vigil其他部分的連結處。每一列之所以列在這裡，是因為此組織確實與之相連。
評估截至 — 2026-09 最近檢視 — 2026-09-09
在結構中檢視此部隊 互動式：選取此紀錄並追蹤與其關聯的內容。