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PUBLIC ALPHAEvolving coverage — see the methodology and the corrections log.
Conflict Module · Eastern Europe · Campaign

Force generation and mobilisation

Campaign record

Force generation and mobilisation

The campaign fought in recruitment offices and budget lines, and the one that sets what either army can do on the ground.

OngoingSince February 2022
In short

Both states have spent the war solving the same problem by opposite means: Ukraine through mobilisation law and territorial formations, Russia through paid contract recruitment, prisoners, volunteer structures and imported manpower. Infantry availability, not equipment, is the binding constraint on both sides.

Summary

Ukraine declared general mobilisation and martial law on the first day of the invasion and has extended both continuously since, expanding Territorial Defence enormously in 2022 and repeatedly revising conscription age, exemption and enforcement rules under sustained domestic and partner pressure. Russia avoided a second formal mobilisation after the politically costly partial mobilisation of September 2022, relying instead on high-paying contract recruitment, prisoner recruitment through private and later ministry structures, regional volunteer formations, and from October 2024 on North Korean troops. Both approaches solve the same problem — replacing infantry losses in an attritional war — and both carry costs their governments treat as political rather than military. The competition between them is continuous and is the single best predictor of what either army can attempt.

Why it matters

Equipment can be supplied by partners; trained infantry cannot. This is why force generation, not weapons transfer, is the variable analysts watch when asking whether a line will hold. It is also the point at which the war reaches furthest into each society: conscription enforcement is Ukraine's most divisive domestic issue, and the avoidance of a second mobilisation wave is the clearest evidence of what the Russian leadership believes it can ask of its own population.

Stated objectives

What the participants say. Each entry cites where the position was stated; Vigil records that it was made, not that it is true.

Assessed objectives

Vigil's reading, graded. Kept structurally apart from stated positions so an assessment can never be published as someone's declared aim.

  • Russia's reliance on financial incentives rather than compulsion is a political choice about what the leadership believes it can ask, and it is expensive enough to constitute a real fiscal constraint.

    Confidence: ModerateSources: ISW campaign assessments · Russian Central Bank and Rosstat published statistics

  • Ukraine's manpower constraint is demographic and structural rather than a policy failure, and no available policy change resolves it — which is why the argument is about enforcement and fairness rather than about totals.

    Confidence: ModerateSources: ISW campaign assessments · The Kyiv Independent

Primary forces

  • Armed Forces of Ukraine Primary force · Confidence: High · as of 2026-06
  • Territorial Defence Forces Primary force · Confidence: High · as of 2026-06

    Territorial Defence expanded from a small framework into a large branch in 2022 and is the clearest institutional record of Ukrainian force expansion.

Opposing forces

  • Armed Forces of Russia Opposing force · Confidence: High · as of 2026-06
  • MoD volunteer formations Opposing force · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2026-06

    Ministry-run volunteer structures absorbed much of the recruitment previously conducted by private companies after 2023.

Supporting & external

  • National Guard Supporting force · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2026-06

    National Guard recruitment, including through offensive-guard brigades, became a parallel channel to army mobilisation.

  • BARS combat reserve formations Supporting force · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2026-06

Reported participants

  • Wagner Group → Africa Corps Reported participant · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2023-08

    Private structures conducted prisoner recruitment at scale until the 2023 mutiny and subsequent absorption of that function by state bodies.

Phases

Outcome and present status

Unresolved, and the closest thing the war has to a decisive variable. Both systems have so far replaced losses well enough to prevent collapse and not well enough to enable operational breakthrough. Russia's method is fiscally expensive and politically cheap; Ukraine's is fiscally cheap and politically expensive. Whichever fails first is the most plausible route to a change in the war's character that does not come from outside it.

Observed adaptations

  • Russia converted prisoner recruitment from a private-company practice into a state function after the 2023 mutiny, removing the political risk while retaining the manpower stream.

    as of 2024-06Confidence: ModerateSources: ISW campaign assessments · Reuters

  • Ukraine created recruitment pathways tied to specific brigades and roles rather than to general mobilisation, an attempt to make service predictable enough to attract volunteers.

    as of 2025-06Confidence: ModerateSources: The Kyiv Independent · Ukrainian military and General Staff statements

  • Both sides shifted trained-manpower priority toward drone operators, a role that did not exist at scale in 2022 and now competes directly with infantry for the same people.

    as of 2026-06Confidence: ModerateSources: RUSI component and capability analyses · ISW campaign assessments

Political implications

Mobilisation enforcement is Ukraine's most divisive domestic issue, and the avoidance of a second wave is the clearest constraint on Russian decision-making.

Military implications

Sets the ceiling on what either army can attempt, independent of equipment availability.

Economic implications

Russian recruitment bonuses and Ukrainian military salaries are both large fiscal commitments competing with everything else in each budget.

What remains unknown

  • Neither state publishes reliable recruitment, casualty or current strength figures, and both treat the numbers as instruments. This module states none of them.
  • North Korean troop numbers and their employment are assessed by several governments with a wide spread between estimates.
  • Ukrainian mobilisation enforcement practice varies by region and is reported anecdotally rather than measured.
  • The fiscal cost of Russian recruitment bonuses is partially visible in regional budgets and is not consolidated in any published federal series.

Readings the evidence also supports

  • Russia's avoidance of a second mobilisation can be read as evidence that paid recruitment is sufficient, or as evidence that the leadership judges the political risk unacceptable even though the manpower is needed. The two imply very different fragility, and recruitment data is not published in a form that distinguishes them.
  • Ukrainian mobilisation controversy can be read as a sign of approaching manpower exhaustion, or as the ordinary politics of conscription in a democracy at war, which was contentious from the beginning. Both readings have been advanced by Ukrainian officials.

Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.

What to watch

Ukrainian conscription-age and exemption changes

Each change is a political cost paid for a manpower gain, which makes the changes themselves a measure of how tight the constraint has become.

Any second Russian formal mobilisation

Would be the most significant political signal of the war's second half, and its absence has been consistent enough to make it informative.

Russian recruitment bonus levels

Rising payments against flat recruitment indicate the pool is thinning — a better indicator than any announced total.

Foreign manpower beyond North Korea

A precedent has been set. Its extension to other suppliers would change the arithmetic again.

Sensitivity: Delayed · contextualConfidence: ModerateStatus as of 2026-07Reviewed 2026-07-26Sources: ISW campaign assessments · Reuters · The Moscow Times · The Kyiv Independent · UK Ministry of Defence — Defence Intelligence updates · Official government statementsMethodologyCorrections