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Kampagne

Kräfteaufwuchs und Mobilisierung

Die Kampagne, die in Rekrutierungsbüros und Haushaltsposten geführt wird, und diejenige, die festlegt, was jede Armee am Boden tun kann.

Seit Februar 2022 Kräfteaufwuchs und Rüstungsindustrie

Andauernd
Eingeschätzt zum Stand
2026-08
Zuletzt überprüft
2026-08-26

EinschätzungMittlere Konfidenz

Kontext, keine Zielerfassung. Kampagneneinträge beschreiben Ziele, Beteiligte, Phasen und Ergebnisse auf der Ebene veröffentlichter Analysen; sie enthalten keine aktuellen Stellungen, Kräfteverhältnisse, Standorte oder Stärken von Einheiten.

Übersichtskarte — Landumriss aus Natural Earth 110m (gemeinfrei); 3 Orte, die dieser Eintrag nennt, an den Koordinaten, die das Modul bereits veröffentlicht. Es sind keine Routen, Grenzen, Kontrolle oder Aktivität eingezeichnet.

Was diese Kampagne war

Both states have spent the war solving the same problem by opposite means: Ukraine through mobilisation law and territorial formations, Russia through paid contract recruitment, prisoners, volunteer structures and imported manpower. Infantry availability, not equipment, is the binding constraint on both sides.

Equipment can be supplied by partners; trained infantry cannot. This is why force generation, not weapons transfer, is the variable analysts watch when asking whether a line will hold. It is also the point at which the war reaches furthest into each society: conscription enforcement is Ukraine's most divisive domestic issue, and the avoidance of a second mobilisation wave is the clearest evidence of what the Russian leadership believes it can ask of its own population.

Konfidenz: mittel Stand 2026-08Überprüft am 2026-08-26

Zusammenfassung

Ukraine declared general mobilisation and martial law on the first day of the invasion and has extended both continuously since, expanding Territorial Defence enormously in 2022 and repeatedly revising conscription age, exemption and enforcement rules under sustained domestic and partner pressure. Russia avoided a second formal mobilisation after the politically costly partial mobilisation of September 2022, relying instead on high-paying contract recruitment, prisoner recruitment through private and later ministry structures, regional volunteer formations, and from October 2024 on North Korean troops. Both approaches solve the same problem — replacing infantry losses in an attritional war — and both carry costs their governments treat as political rather than military. The competition between them is continuous and is the single best predictor of what either army can attempt.

Erklärte Ziele

Was die Beteiligten sagen. Jeder Eintrag nennt, wo die Position geäußert wurde; Vigil hält fest, dass sie geäußert wurde, nicht dass sie zutrifft.

Eingeschätzte Ziele

Vigils Lesart, eingestuft. Strukturell von erklärten Positionen getrennt gehalten, damit eine Einschätzung nie als erklärtes Ziel von jemandem veröffentlicht werden kann.

Hauptkräfte

  • Armed Forces of Ukraine Hauptkraft · Konfidenz: hoch · Stand 2026-06
  • Territorial Defence Forces Hauptkraft · Konfidenz: hoch · Stand 2026-06

    Territorial Defence expanded from a small framework into a large branch in 2022 and is the clearest institutional record of Ukrainian force expansion.

Gegnerische Kräfte

Unterstützend und extern

  • National Guard Unterstützende Kraft · Konfidenz: mittel · Stand 2026-06

    National Guard recruitment, including through offensive-guard brigades, became a parallel channel to army mobilisation.

  • BARS-Kampfreserveverbände Unterstützende Kraft · Konfidenz: mittel · Stand 2026-06

Reported participants

  • Wagner Group → Africa Corps Reported participant · Confidence: Moderate · as of 2023-08

    Private structures conducted prisoner recruitment at scale until the 2023 mutiny and subsequent absorption of that function by state bodies.

Phasen

2024 – heute Konfidenz: mittel

The manpower squeeze and imported troops

Ukraine lowered the mobilisation age and tightened enforcement under partner pressure amid public controversy; Russia added North Korean troops to a recruitment system that was covering but not exceeding losses.

Quellen: ISW campaign assessments↗ · Reuters↗ · The Kyiv Independent↗

2025 – 2026 Konfidenz: mittel

Substituting production for people

The other half of force generation, and the half this campaign was missing. Where manpower could not be found, Ukraine has substituted machines, and the substitution is now large enough to be a structural feature rather than an expedient: uncrewed systems do a growing share of the reconnaissance, strike and interception work that would otherwise require people at the front. Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council put domestic FPV production capacity above eight million units a year across more than 160 companies, reported 100,000 interceptor drones produced during 2025 across more than twenty producers, and stated that over 70 per cent of weapons procurement spending in 2025 went to domestic manufacturers. Those are the state's own figures and are recorded as its position rather than as established output. Two distinctions do the analytical work here. First, capacity is not production: the headline figure Kyiv publishes for 2026 — a projected industrial capacity of some 55 billion dollars — describes what the sector could build if it were paid to, and Ukraine's constraint on this lane has repeatedly been money rather than factory floor. Second, substitution has limits: drones have not replaced the infantry needed to hold ground, which is precisely where the manpower problem described in the phases above still binds.

Quellen: Official government statements · RUSI component and capability analyses↗ · ISW campaign assessments↗

Ausgang und heutiger Stand

Unresolved, and the closest thing the war has to a decisive variable. Both systems have so far replaced losses well enough to prevent collapse and not well enough to enable operational breakthrough. Russia's method is fiscally expensive and politically cheap; Ukraine's is fiscally cheap and politically expensive. Whichever fails first is the most plausible route to a change in the war's character that does not come from outside it.

Beobachtete Anpassungen

Politische Implikationen

Mobilisation enforcement is Ukraine's most divisive domestic issue, and the avoidance of a second wave is the clearest constraint on Russian decision-making.

Militärische Folgen

Sets the ceiling on what either army can attempt, independent of equipment availability.

Wirtschaftliche Implikationen

Russian recruitment bonuses and Ukrainian military salaries are both large fiscal commitments competing with everything else in each budget.

Was unbekannt bleibt

  • Neither state publishes reliable recruitment, casualty or current strength figures, and both treat the numbers as instruments. This module states none of them.
  • North Korean troop numbers and their employment are assessed by several governments with a wide spread between estimates.
  • Ukrainian mobilisation enforcement practice varies by region and is reported anecdotally rather than measured.
  • Ukrainian defence-industrial figures are published by the Ukrainian state about its own sector, and mix capacity, procurement share and output in the same announcements. No independent audit of production volumes exists. Where this record carries such a figure it names the quantity the source actually measured, and does not convert a capacity into an output.
  • The fiscal cost of Russian recruitment bonuses is partially visible in regional budgets and is not consolidated in any published federal series.

Lesarten, die die Belege ebenfalls stützen

  • Russia's avoidance of a second mobilisation can be read as evidence that paid recruitment is sufficient, or as evidence that the leadership judges the political risk unacceptable even though the manpower is needed. The two imply very different fragility, and recruitment data is not published in a form that distinguishes them.
  • Ukrainian mobilisation controversy can be read as a sign of approaching manpower exhaustion, or as the ordinary politics of conscription in a democracy at war, which was contentious from the beginning. Both readings have been advanced by Ukrainian officials.

Aufgeführt, weil die Einschätzung des Eintrags nicht die einzige ist, die seine Quellen zulassen — nicht als Absicherung der obigen Einschätzung.

Worauf zu achten ist

Änderungen beim wehrpflichtigen Alter und bei Freistellungen in der Ukraine

Each change is a political cost paid for a manpower gain, which makes the changes themselves a measure of how tight the constraint has become.

Ausländisches Personal über Nordkorea hinaus

A precedent has been set. Its extension to other suppliers would change the arithmetic again.

Watch-Fragen, für die diese Kampagne relevant ist

Ständige analytische Fragen, deren Belege über diese Kampagne laufen, jeweils mit ihrer letzten Überprüfung. Abgeleitet aus dem Watch-Objekt, hier nie wiederholt.

Die Kräfte, die dies führen, in Erkunden ansehen Interaktiv: Wählen Sie diesen Eintrag aus und verfolgen Sie, was mit ihm verbunden ist.

Eingeschätzt zum Stand — 2026-08 Zuletzt überprüft — 2026-08-26

Verknüpfte Einträge

13 Einträge, die diese Kampagne nennt oder die sie nennen — in jedem Fall ein ausdrücklicher Verweis in einem veröffentlichten Eintrag, nichts aus dem Themenbereich abgeleitet.