- Vigil category device · not official insignia
Identity provenance
Vigil category device — drawn from this record’s own domain, echelon and role. Not an official insignia.
In brief
The military created to defend the revolution rather than the territory — a second armed force with its own ground, naval and aerospace services, holding the missile programme and the external portfolio, and answering to the Supreme Leader in parallel with the Artesh.
- Scope
- Structure, role, lineage and links. 4 subordinate records published.
- Subordination
- Subordination confirmed
- Sources
- 3 on the record
- Record state
- Partial
Broad area of activity
Iran, the Gulf, and — through the Quds Force — the wider region
Notable history
Khomeini established the Guard in May 1979, months after the revolution and while the Artesh he did not trust was still intact. Its constitutional mandate is to defend the revolution, which is a political task as much as a military one, and over four decades it grew from a militia into a full parallel military with its own ground forces, its own navy, its own aerospace force, its own intelligence service and its own logistics. It also acquired the capabilities that matter most in this system: the ballistic missile and drone programmes sit in its Aerospace Force, the asymmetric Gulf maritime mission sits in its Navy, and its external operations sit in the Quds Force. Israel's opening strike in June 2025 killed its commander-in-chief and the entire senior leadership of its Aerospace Force; the opening strike of the 2026 war killed his successor.
Strengths
Holds the capabilities the Iranian state actually uses — missiles, drones, Gulf maritime denial, external partnerships. Its parallel structure makes the Iranian military hard to paralyse by destroying one chain of command, and its continued missile operations after catastrophic leadership losses in both wars indicate that operational authority is pre-delegated well below the top.
Limitations
Its autonomy is also a defect: analysts describe genuine joint integration with the Artesh as difficult, with duplicated logistics and separate service cultures imposing coordination costs without operational benefit. Its senior leadership has been targeted successfully and repeatedly, and many of the roughly thirty senior officers killed in early 2026 are reported not to have been replaced — a claim this module carries as reported. Nothing here states what forces it holds, where they are, or what condition they are in.
Subordinate formations
Rows are layout only — position and order carry no hierarchy, importance, sequence or strength. Every record shown is an immediate subordinate of the selected organisation.
Related organisations
- Armed Forces General Staff Institutionally linked to · as of 2026-09 · moderate confidence
Coordination in mandate; contested in practice. Accounts of the AFGS describe it as holding operational control across the force structure, while the same accounts describe the Revolutionary Guard as operating with enough autonomy that genuine joint integration is difficult and the joint staff functions largely as a deconfliction mechanism. This module records the disagreement rather than picking a side, and encodes neither as a command line.
- Artesh Institutionally linked to · as of 2026-09 · high confidence
Parallel, not subordinate. The two forces maintain separate ground, air and naval services, separate intelligence and separate logistics, and both answer to the Supreme Leader rather than to each other. Analysts describe very little interoperability between them outside air defence.
Lineage & institutional history
Campaigns
Campaigns naming this organisation as a participant. The campaign record owns the relationship and grades it; this list is computed.
- The 2026 interstate war Opposing force · Since 28 February 2026 · high confidence · as of 2026-09
The Iranian institution that holds the missile and drone programmes and the Gulf maritime mission — the two things Iran has actually done in this war. CRS records US strikes on command and control centres associated with the IRGC specifically.
- The twelve-day war, June 2025 Opposing force · 13 – 24 June 2025 · high confidence · as of 2025-06
Key events
Energy and shipping targets struck across four Gulf states
Over two days, Qatar's Ras Laffan LNG complex and the Mesaieed power-plant water tank, the Mussafah fuel terminal and Fujairah oil terminal in the UAE, and the Omani ports of Duqm and Salalah are reported struck; QatarEnergy suspends LNG production. The IRGC claims responsibility for a drone strike on the tanker Athe Nova, which it identified as an ally of the United States.
United States and Iranian exchange of strikes
United States Central Command states it struck Iranian military sites after the IRGC attempted to attack United States troops and commercial shipping in the strait; Iranian media report strikes at Sirik, Konarak, Bandar Abbas, Jask, Asaluyeh, Ahvaz and Qeshm. Iran conducts retaliatory strikes against United States facilities in Jordan, Bahrain and Iraq, and Kuwait reports its air defences engaging drones and missiles.
Quick actions
System access
Where this record connects into the rest of Vigil. Each row is here because this organisation actually reaches it.
Assessed as of2026-09Last reviewed2026-09-04
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