俄羅斯 — 烏克蘭

摘要

The relationship's modern shape was set in 2014, when Russia seized Crimea and armed the separatist entities in Donetsk and Luhansk, and in the Minsk agreements that froze rather than resolved that war. The full-scale invasion of 24 February 2022 failed to take Kyiv, took and lost ground in the south and east through 2022–23, and settled into a drone-saturated attrition along a front of over a thousand kilometres. Russia declared the annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in September 2022 and holds most of the first two and part of the second two; Ukraine's constitution and stated policy require the restoration of its 1991 borders, and it has struck deep into Russia — refineries, export terminals, the Black Sea Fleet — since 2023. A United States-led negotiating push began in November 2025 around a 28-point plan Ukraine and its European allies read as reproducing Russia's maximalist demands; trilateral talks in Geneva in February 2026 and further rounds through the spring produced no ceasefire, and the capitals-only strike pause of 5–8 September 2026 lasted exactly as long as it was written for. Russia continues to require Ukrainian withdrawal from the Donbas; Ukraine continues to seek security guarantees with a United States backstop. Vigil records the war's shape and the negotiation's state, and characterises neither side's war aims beyond what each has said.

為何重要

This is the relationship every Watch question in the module measures movement against — force regeneration, air-defence supply, energy resilience, refining under strike, the negotiating architecture — and the reference case for how Vigil records an interstate war: as a standing adversarial relationship with a territorial dispute inside it, not as a front line.

協議

• Minsk II (Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements) · 簽署於2015-02-12 · ended 2022-02-22

  The instrument that froze the Donbas war; Russia's recognition of the two separatist entities on 21 February 2022 and the invasion three days later ended it. Recorded as the last signed bilateral framework.

• Black Sea Grain Initiative · 簽署於2022-07-22 · ended 2023-07-17

  The UN- and Türkiye-brokered export arrangement, the one wartime instrument both parties signed; Russia withdrew in July 2023 and Ukraine has since run its own corridor.

• Capitals-only strike pause · 簽署於2026-09-05 · ended 2026-09-08

  A three-day pause covering the two capitals, agreed through the negotiating track and observed for its stated duration; nothing replaced it.

相關事件

• 併吞克里米亞；頓巴斯戰爭爆發 2014年2月–3月

  Territorial change · Military · Political

• 明斯克二號協議凍結了戰爭，卻未解決戰爭 2015年2月

  外交

• 全面入侵 2022年2月24日

  軍事 · 領土變化

• 黑海穀物走廊開通 2022年7月

  Economic · Diplomatic

• 兼併宣言與部分動員 2022年9月

  Political · Territorial change · Leadership change

• 三方談判形式，以及附加於其上的期限 2026年2月

  外交 · 政治

• 28點計畫及其開啟的談判軌道 2025年11月 – 2026年3月

  Diplomatic · Political · Territorial change

• 僅涵蓋兩國首都、別無其他的暫停 2026年9月5–8日

  外交 · 軍事

組織

此關係藉以運作的結構。它們並非關係的當事方——當事方是上方的兩個行為者。

地點

本模組已發布的標記。此紀錄本身不增加任何地理精度。

仍然未知的事項

• The revised plan produced at Geneva in November 2025 has never been published; "ninety per cent agreed" is one party's characterisation.
• The security guarantees Ukraine seeks and the "reliable security guarantees" the 28-point plan offered are undefined in every text read.

證據同樣支持的其他解讀

• The negotiating track can be read as a path to a settlement or as a means by which each side manages its patron; the September pause is consistent with both.

列出這些解讀，是因為該紀錄本身的評估並非其來源所允許的唯一評估 — 而不是對上述評估的保留。