Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) — JNIM

摘要

JNIM was formed in March 2017 from the groups the army had been fighting since 2012, and the relationship has run through three phases. Until 2022 the army fought with French and UN forces beside it and lost outlying posts while holding the towns. From 2022, with Russian personnel integrated at the point of main effort and armed drones arriving from Türkiye, it went over to hub defence with intervention columns — the model that retook Kidal from the CSP in November 2023. From September 2025 JNIM changed what it attacks: the declared fuel blockade, the burning of tanker convoys on the corridors and the April–July 2026 offensives against Kayes, Sévaré and the western belt aim at the roads, the economy and the columns between the hubs rather than at the hubs, and no overrun outlying camp has been documented as re-established since mid-2025 — Boulikessi in June 2025 and Dioura in September 2026 are the cases. Both sides have a documented civilian-harm record: JNIM's blockades and mass-casualty assaults, and the army's joint operations with Russian partners, of which Moura in March 2022 remains the gravest documented case. Neither side has offered the other terms the other will accept, which is the state-level record's subject rather than this one's.

為何重要

It is the relationship every other Sahel record runs through. The fuel blockade, the Russian presence, the AES joint force and the humanitarian access problem are all consequences of how these two forces fight, and a reader who takes the state's refusal to negotiate as the whole story misses that the army's method — hold the hubs, relieve by column — is what JNIM's 2025–26 campaign was designed to exhaust.

相關事件

• 戰爭轉向馬利中部 2015 – 2019

  Military · Humanitarian

• JNIM成立 2017年3月2日

  軍事 · 政治

• 陸軍奪回基達爾 2023年11月14日

  軍事 · 領土變化

• Boulikessi兩度被攻陷並遭放棄 2025年6月1日 – 6日

  軍事 · 領土變化

• JNIM宣布全國燃料封鎖 2025年9月 – 持續中

  Economic · Military · Humanitarian

• 2026年4月攻勢 — 基達爾失守，國防部長遇害 2026年4月25日 – 5月

  Military · Territorial change · Leadership change

• 2026年7月的全國性攻擊與Anéfis之戰 2026年7月4日 – 10日

  軍事

• San一次有爭議的駐軍遇襲事件，以及兩種無法調和的說法 2026年8月9日

  軍事

• Dioura營地被攻陷，且未獲重建 2026年9月10日

  軍事

組織

此關係藉以運作的結構。它們並非關係的當事方——當事方是上方的兩個行為者。

所依賴的系統

正式的後勤紀錄。它們載有此關係所依據、但不在此重述的走廊、節點、依賴與中斷歷史。

地點

本模組已發布的標記。此紀錄本身不增加任何地理精度。

仍然未知的事項

• Neither force publishes strengths, losses or an account of individual engagements; casualty and materiel claims from both sides are carried as claims in the event records and not reconciled here.
• Whether the non-re-establishment of overrun camps since mid-2025 is inability or a deliberate consolidation is not established in public.
• JNIM's internal command relationship between the central-Mali and northern components is described in analysis rather than documented, and this record does not assume a single decision-maker on the JNIM side.