Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) — JNIM

ملخص

JNIM was formed in March 2017 from the groups the army had been fighting since 2012, and the relationship has run through three phases. Until 2022 the army fought with French and UN forces beside it and lost outlying posts while holding the towns. From 2022, with Russian personnel integrated at the point of main effort and armed drones arriving from Türkiye, it went over to hub defence with intervention columns — the model that retook Kidal from the CSP in November 2023. From September 2025 JNIM changed what it attacks: the declared fuel blockade, the burning of tanker convoys on the corridors and the April–July 2026 offensives against Kayes, Sévaré and the western belt aim at the roads, the economy and the columns between the hubs rather than at the hubs, and no overrun outlying camp has been documented as re-established since mid-2025 — Boulikessi in June 2025 and Dioura in September 2026 are the cases. Both sides have a documented civilian-harm record: JNIM's blockades and mass-casualty assaults, and the army's joint operations with Russian partners, of which Moura in March 2022 remains the gravest documented case. Neither side has offered the other terms the other will accept, which is the state-level record's subject rather than this one's.

لماذا يهم

It is the relationship every other Sahel record runs through. The fuel blockade, the Russian presence, the AES joint force and the humanitarian access problem are all consequences of how these two forces fight, and a reader who takes the state's refusal to negotiate as the whole story misses that the army's method — hold the hubs, relieve by column — is what JNIM's 2025–26 campaign was designed to exhaust.

الأحداث ذات الصلة

• الحرب تنتقل إلى وسط مالي 2015 – 2019

  Military · Humanitarian

• تأسيس جماعة نصرة الإسلام والمسلمين 2 مارس 2017

  عسكري · سياسي

• الجيش يستعيد كيدال 14 نوفمبر 2023

  عسكري · تغيّر إقليمي

• اجتياح Boulikessi مرتين والتخلي عنه 1 – 6 يونيو 2025

  عسكري · تغيّر إقليمي

• جماعة نصرة الإسلام والمسلمين تعلن حصارًا وطنيًا على الوقود سبتمبر 2025 – مستمر

  Economic · Military · Humanitarian

• هجوم أبريل 2026 — سقوط كيدال ومقتل وزير الدفاع 25 أبريل – مايو 2026

  Military · Territorial change · Leadership change

• هجمات يوليو 2026 على الصعيد الوطني ومعركة Anéfis 4 – 10 يوليو 2026

  عسكري

• هجوم متنازع عليه على حامية San، وروايتان عنه لا يمكن التوفيق بينهما 9 أغسطس 2026

  عسكري

• معسكر Dioura يُجتاح ولا يُعاد إنشاؤه 10 سبتمبر 2026

  عسكري

المنظمات

البنى التي تعمل هذه العلاقة من خلالها. ليست أطرافًا فيها — فالطرفان هما الجهتان الفاعلتان المذكورتان أعلاه.

المنظومات التي تعتمد عليها

سجلات اللوجستيات المرجعية. تحمل الممرات والعُقد والاعتماد وتاريخ الاضطرابات التي تقوم عليها هذه العلاقة ولا تعيد ذكرها.

الأماكن

علامات ينشرها هذا الملف أصلًا. ولا يضيف هذا السجل أي دقة جغرافية خاصة به.

ما لا يزال مجهولًا

• Neither force publishes strengths, losses or an account of individual engagements; casualty and materiel claims from both sides are carried as claims in the event records and not reconciled here.
• Whether the non-re-establishment of overrun camps since mid-2025 is inability or a deliberate consolidation is not established in public.
• JNIM's internal command relationship between the central-Mali and northern components is described in analysis rather than documented, and this record does not assume a single decision-maker on the JNIM side.