Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) — JNIM

Podsumowanie

JNIM was formed in March 2017 from the groups the army had been fighting since 2012, and the relationship has run through three phases. Until 2022 the army fought with French and UN forces beside it and lost outlying posts while holding the towns. From 2022, with Russian personnel integrated at the point of main effort and armed drones arriving from Türkiye, it went over to hub defence with intervention columns — the model that retook Kidal from the CSP in November 2023. From September 2025 JNIM changed what it attacks: the declared fuel blockade, the burning of tanker convoys on the corridors and the April–July 2026 offensives against Kayes, Sévaré and the western belt aim at the roads, the economy and the columns between the hubs rather than at the hubs, and no overrun outlying camp has been documented as re-established since mid-2025 — Boulikessi in June 2025 and Dioura in September 2026 are the cases. Both sides have a documented civilian-harm record: JNIM's blockades and mass-casualty assaults, and the army's joint operations with Russian partners, of which Moura in March 2022 remains the gravest documented case. Neither side has offered the other terms the other will accept, which is the state-level record's subject rather than this one's.

Dlaczego to ważne

It is the relationship every other Sahel record runs through. The fuel blockade, the Russian presence, the AES joint force and the humanitarian access problem are all consequences of how these two forces fight, and a reader who takes the state's refusal to negotiate as the whole story misses that the army's method — hold the hubs, relieve by column — is what JNIM's 2025–26 campaign was designed to exhaust.

Powiązane wydarzenia

• Wojna przenosi się do środkowego Mali 2015 – 2019

  Military · Humanitarian

• Powstanie JNIM 2 mar. 2017

  Wojsko · Polityka

• Armia odbija Kidal 14 lis. 2023

  Wojsko · Zmiana terytorialna

• Boulikessi zostaje dwukrotnie zdobyte i opuszczone 1 – 6 cze. 2025 r.

  Wojsko · Zmiana terytorialna

• JNIM ogłasza ogólnokrajową blokadę paliwową wrz. 2025 r. – trwa

  Economic · Military · Humanitarian

• Ofensywa z kwietnia 2026 r. — Kidal upada, ginie minister obrony 25 kwi. – maj 2026 r.

  Military · Territorial change · Leadership change

• Ogólnokrajowe ataki z lipca 2026 r. i bitwa o Anéfis 4 – 10 lip. 2026 r.

  Wojsko

• Sporny atak na garnizon w San i dwie niedające się pogodzić relacje 9 sierpnia 2026

  Wojsko

• Obóz w Diourze zostaje opanowany i nie zostaje odtworzony 10 wrz. 2026 r.

  Wojsko

Organizacje

Struktury, przez które działa ta relacja. Nie są jej stronami — stronami są dwaj aktorzy wymienieni powyżej.

Systemy, od których zależy

Kanoniczne wpisy logistyczne. Zawierają korytarze, węzły, zależności i historię zakłóceń, na których opiera się ta relacja i których nie powtarza.

Miejsca

Znaczniki, które ten moduł już publikuje. Ten wpis nie dodaje własnej precyzji geograficznej.

Co pozostaje nieznane

• Neither force publishes strengths, losses or an account of individual engagements; casualty and materiel claims from both sides are carried as claims in the event records and not reconciled here.
• Whether the non-re-establishment of overrun camps since mid-2025 is inability or a deliberate consolidation is not established in public.
• JNIM's internal command relationship between the central-Mali and northern components is described in analysis rather than documented, and this record does not assume a single decision-maker on the JNIM side.