Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) — JNIM

Synthèse

JNIM was formed in March 2017 from the groups the army had been fighting since 2012, and the relationship has run through three phases. Until 2022 the army fought with French and UN forces beside it and lost outlying posts while holding the towns. From 2022, with Russian personnel integrated at the point of main effort and armed drones arriving from Türkiye, it went over to hub defence with intervention columns — the model that retook Kidal from the CSP in November 2023. From September 2025 JNIM changed what it attacks: the declared fuel blockade, the burning of tanker convoys on the corridors and the April–July 2026 offensives against Kayes, Sévaré and the western belt aim at the roads, the economy and the columns between the hubs rather than at the hubs, and no overrun outlying camp has been documented as re-established since mid-2025 — Boulikessi in June 2025 and Dioura in September 2026 are the cases. Both sides have a documented civilian-harm record: JNIM's blockades and mass-casualty assaults, and the army's joint operations with Russian partners, of which Moura in March 2022 remains the gravest documented case. Neither side has offered the other terms the other will accept, which is the state-level record's subject rather than this one's.

Pourquoi c’est important

It is the relationship every other Sahel record runs through. The fuel blockade, the Russian presence, the AES joint force and the humanitarian access problem are all consequences of how these two forces fight, and a reader who takes the state's refusal to negotiate as the whole story misses that the army's method — hold the hubs, relieve by column — is what JNIM's 2025–26 campaign was designed to exhaust.

Événements associés

• La guerre gagne le centre du Mali 2015 – 2019

  Military · Humanitarian

• Formation du JNIM 2 mars 2017

  Militaire · Politique

• L’armée reprend Kidal 14 nov. 2023

  Militaire · Changement territorial

• Boulikessi est submergé deux fois et abandonné 1 – 6 juin 2025

  Militaire · Changement territorial

• Le JNIM décrète un blocus national du carburant sept. 2025 – en cours

  Economic · Military · Humanitarian

• Offensive d’avril 2026 — Kidal tombe, le ministre de la Défense est tué 25 avr. – mai 2026

  Military · Territorial change · Leadership change

• Attaques de juillet 2026 à l’échelle nationale et bataille d’Anéfis 4 – 10 juil. 2026

  Militaire

• Une attaque contestée contre une garnison à San, et deux versions inconciliables 9 août 2026

  Militaire

• Le camp de Dioura est submergé, et il n’est pas rétabli 10 sept. 2026

  Militaire

Organisations

Structures par lesquelles cette relation s’exerce. Elles n’y sont pas parties — les parties sont les deux acteurs ci-dessus.

Systèmes dont elle dépend

Fiches logistiques canoniques. Elles portent les corridors, les nœuds, la dépendance et l’historique des perturbations sur lesquels repose cette relation, et qu’elle ne reformule pas.

Lieux

Repères que ce module publie déjà. Cette fiche n’ajoute aucune précision géographique qui lui soit propre.

Ce qui reste inconnu

• Neither force publishes strengths, losses or an account of individual engagements; casualty and materiel claims from both sides are carried as claims in the event records and not reconciled here.
• Whether the non-re-establishment of overrun camps since mid-2025 is inability or a deliberate consolidation is not established in public.
• JNIM's internal command relationship between the central-Mali and northern components is described in analysis rather than documented, and this record does not assume a single decision-maker on the JNIM side.