此系統是什麼
Gaza's electricity and water production now rest on imported inputs: diesel entering through Kerem Shalom, one 4 MW Israeli feeder to a single desalination plant, and three Mekorot water lines. The power plant is shut and its restart awaits Israeli approval, so supply is set by what is approved, not by plant.
The system turns imported inputs into the electricity and water on which Gaza's remaining services run. Because almost no generation operates inside the Strip, its state is set at the perimeter: by the fuel that enters through Kerem Shalom, by one Israeli feeder line and three bulk water lines, and by which spare parts, chemicals and equipment are approved. It is the physical link between the access regime and the water and health conditions the module's humanitarian records track.
信心：中等 截至2026-10-02檢視於2026-10-12
系統
- 概覽
- Before the war (World Bank–EU–UN assessment, HISTORICAL), Gaza's electricity came from the Gaza Power Plant, which ran at an average of 70 MW against a nominal 140 MW, from Israeli Electric Corporation imports averaging 120 MW over ten distribution feeders, and from rooftop solar that had grown to about 80 MW peak; supply met under 35% of a demand of about 700 MW, and households received about eight hours a day. Water came from some 306 wells drawing on the coastal aquifer, three short-term low-volume seawater desalination plants and three Mekorot bulk connections from Israel. Those figures are kept separate and are not a capacity for today. The assessment put electricity damage at US$565.3 million with more than 90% of the infrastructure destroyed, and water-and-sanitation damage at US$1.7 billion; all six wastewater treatment plants were non-functional at its October 2025 cutoff. In 2026 the system is a set of separate, input-dependent pieces: the plant is shut, one Israeli feeder line operates, prioritised humanitarian facilities run on generators, and water production depends on fuel, that feeder, the Mekorot lines and repair materials Israel classifies as dual-use.
- Current state · as of 2026-10-02
- As of early October 2026. The Gaza Power Plant has been shut since October 2023; on 23 September 2026 OCHA listed the resumption of its operations, solar panels and commercial fuel entry among critical pending approvals. The World Bank reported in May 2026 that the only operating Israeli line was the Kissufim ("Kusuvim") feeder F11, at 4 MW of a 12 MW transfer potential, supplying only the southern desalination plant; OCHA described a "near-total absence of reliable electricity" on 11 September. Prioritised humanitarian facilities run on diesel generators with fuel facilitated by UNOPS (World Bank). On water, OCHA reported on 25 September that three Mekorot lines were delivering about 40% below contracted quantities because marine algae had affected Israeli desalination, and on 2 October that the two southern seawater plants were at their lowest recorded output. Engine oil, spare parts, electro-mechanical equipment, generators and chlorine remain restricted (OCHA). The head of Gaza's National Committee said in January 2026 that a plant restart "seems on track"; none had been reported by October.
- Documented exposure
- At the level the World Bank, the UN and the EU state it: the electricity sector lost more than 90% of its infrastructure, all seven distribution- company warehouses and its grid-control system, and 73 of 80 MW of solar was damaged (assessment, data to October 2025). What remains is exposed above all to the entry of inputs — fuel, oil, parts and chemicals — rather than to further damage at any one site, and water production is exposed to a single feeder line and to bulk deliveries the operator does not control.
- Commodities and outputs
- 加薩發電機所用的燃料與潤滑油
節點
The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.
- 加薩發電廠發電廠
Gaza's power plant, shut since October 2023 for lack of fuel; its resumption was a pending approval on 23 September 2026 (OCHA).
- 加薩南部海水淡化廠（Deir al-Balah地區）工廠 · 生產或組裝
The southern seawater desalination plant — the one facility the only operating Israeli feeder supplies (World Bank, May 2026). Its names differ between the World Bank, UNICEF and OCHA, and it is not merged with OCHA's "Al Basa" plant.
Routes and operators
Supply systems running through it
- 進入加薩的燃料Fuel imports · 3 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · named by the record柴油、烹飪用瓦斯與機油經由單一過境點進入，在聯合國協助與以色列核准下運送，加薩的發電機、水井與海水淡化均依賴於此。
Dependencies and constraints
Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.
Diesel and lubricants entering through Kerem Shalom. With the plant shut and grid power almost absent, prioritised humanitarian facilities run on diesel generators with fuel facilitated by UNOPS, and wells are generator- and fuel-dependent. Fuel entry is recorded in OCHA's dated figures (550,000 litres allowed in on 22 September 2026, which OCHA called "far from sufficient"); engine-oil approvals lag requests (OCHA, 11 September 2026).
The single Kissufim feeder from Israel. The World Bank reported in May 2026 that feeder F11 ("Kusuvim"), at 4 MW, was the only operational Israeli line and supplied only the southern desalination plant. The Palestinian Water Authority has said it paid for electricity supplied to that plant. When cable connectors were damaged on 25 March 2026, the plant ran on diesel at under 20% of output until it was back on the grid within days (UNICEF).
Mekorot bulk water lines from Israel. Three Mekorot lines supply water into Gaza; on 25 September 2026 OCHA reported them delivering about 40% below contracted quantities, which it attributed to marine algae affecting Israeli desalination. The assessment had recorded two of the three bulk connections non-functional at its October 2025 cutoff; OCHA's reporting supersedes that as a current reading. The Palestinian Water Authority says it pays for the water.
Repair materials and treatment inputs under the dual-use regime. Electrical equipment is restricted under Israel's dual-use classification (World Bank, May 2026), and OCHA reports engine oil, spare parts, electro-mechanical equipment, generators and chlorine restricted. Desalination output fell for lack of chemicals and spare parts (UNICEF, citing the WASH Cluster). Caustic soda and antiscalant delivered on 23 September 2026 covered about a month (OCHA).
Restarting the power plant requires an Israeli approval that was still pending on 23 September 2026, alongside solar panels and commercial fuel entry (OCHA).
Engine-oil approvals: from 1 March to early September 2026, 13,445 litres approved against 92,778 litres pending (OCHA, 11 September 2026).
The current Israeli dual-use list is not published, so which repair inputs are restricted can be read only from the denials that agencies report.
Repairs to Mekorot lines east of the Israeli military's "Yellow Line" have been reported stalled; OCHA reported 65% of Gaza's land under access restrictions on 2 October 2026.
OCHA reported the two southern seawater desalination plants at their lowest recorded output.
OCHA reported three Mekorot water lines delivering about 40% below contracted quantities, attributed to marine algae affecting Israeli desalination.
OCHA listed resumption of the power plant, solar panels and commercial fuel entry among critical pending approvals, a day after 550,000 litres of fuel were allowed in.
The World Bank reported feeder F11 ("Kusuvim"), at 4 MW of a 12 MW transfer potential, as the only operational Israeli line, supplying only the southern desalination plant.
Six high-voltage cable connectors were damaged; the southern desalination plant ran on diesel at under 20% of output and was back on the grid within days (UNICEF).
The damage assessment's cutoff: electricity damage US$565.3 million and losses US$163.6 million; water-and-sanitation damage US$1.7 billion; one of three main seawater desalination plants, two of three Mekorot bulk connections and all six wastewater treatment plants non-functional.
All ten Israeli Electric Corporation distribution feeders into Gaza were interrupted (World Bank).
The Gaza Power Plant shut for lack of fuel and has not been reported operating since.
經由此系統的傳導鏈
Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.
- 燃料與電力投入 → 加薩的供水生產Civilian impact · as of 2026-10-02
- asset 已證實
- disruption 已證實
- exposure 已證實
- significance 合理可信的曝險
Watch questions bearing on it
- 管制何物可進入加薩的制度——通道、軍民兩用規則、由誰運送——是開放、維持還是收緊？active · Baseline 2026-10-12
Economic exposures it underlies
Actors and arrangements
仍然未知的事項
- The southern desalination plant's names differ across the World Bank, UNICEF and OCHA, and OCHA's "Al Basa" plant may or may not be the same facility; no plant-level record is merged until a source reconciles them.
- No source read states the plant's operator, so no industry record is authored for it.
- The 2026 status of Gaza's wastewater treatment plants is not evidenced beyond the assessment's October 2025 finding that all six were non-functional.
- Whether the Egyptian lines named in older sources carry any power in 2026 is not established, and the assessment's pre-war paragraph does not quantify them.
- A pre-war "212 MW available" figure given by Gaza's administration (January 2026) differs from the assessment's components and is not carried.
證據同樣支持的其他解讀
- Low desalination output in 2026 can be read as an input-approval effect (chemicals, spare parts, oil), as a power effect (one feeder line), or as equipment failure under strain (OCHA cites a brine-pump failure and generator overuse at the Al Basa plant). The sources name these in different weeks and do not weigh them.
列出這些解讀，是因為該紀錄本身的評估並非其來源所允許的唯一評估 — 而不是對上述評估的保留。
在探索中開啟互動式：選取此紀錄並追蹤與其關聯的內容。
評估截至 — 2026-10-02 最近檢視 — 2026-10-12