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Critical infrastructure · full record

Infrastruktura energetyczna i wodna Strefy Gazy

Elektrownia wyłączona od października 2023 r., jedna izraelska linia zasilająca o mocy 4 MW zasilająca jeden zakład odsalania, trzy linie Mekorot i generatory zasilane olejem napędowym dostarczanym przy pośrednictwie ONZ — produkcja wody wyznaczana przez dostawy, które zatwierdzają inni.

2 published markers 1 supply system

Ocena na dzień
2026-10-02
Ostatni przegląd
2026-10-12

OcenaPewność: umiarkowana

Kontekst, nie wskazywanie celów. Wpis systemu wymienia opublikowane znaczniki i opublikowanych operatorów i podaje zależności na poziomie, na jakim robi to instytucja publikująca. Nie zawiera żadnych szczegółów dotyczących przepustowości, podatności, ochrony ani napraw poszczególnych obiektów; schemat nie ma na nie żadnego pola.

Lokalizator — zarys lądów z Natural Earth 110m (domena publiczna); miejsca wymienione w tym wpisie (liczba: 2), we współrzędnych, które moduł już publikuje. Nie narysowano tras, granic, kontroli ani aktywności.

Czym jest ten system

Gaza's electricity and water production now rest on imported inputs: diesel entering through Kerem Shalom, one 4 MW Israeli feeder to a single desalination plant, and three Mekorot water lines. The power plant is shut and its restart awaits Israeli approval, so supply is set by what is approved, not by plant.

The system turns imported inputs into the electricity and water on which Gaza's remaining services run. Because almost no generation operates inside the Strip, its state is set at the perimeter: by the fuel that enters through Kerem Shalom, by one Israeli feeder line and three bulk water lines, and by which spare parts, chemicals and equipment are approved. It is the physical link between the access regime and the water and health conditions the module's humanitarian records track.

Pewność: umiarkowana Stan na 2026-10-02Przejrzano 2026-10-12

System

Omówienie
Before the war (World Bank–EU–UN assessment, HISTORICAL), Gaza's electricity came from the Gaza Power Plant, which ran at an average of 70 MW against a nominal 140 MW, from Israeli Electric Corporation imports averaging 120 MW over ten distribution feeders, and from rooftop solar that had grown to about 80 MW peak; supply met under 35% of a demand of about 700 MW, and households received about eight hours a day. Water came from some 306 wells drawing on the coastal aquifer, three short-term low-volume seawater desalination plants and three Mekorot bulk connections from Israel. Those figures are kept separate and are not a capacity for today. The assessment put electricity damage at US$565.3 million with more than 90% of the infrastructure destroyed, and water-and-sanitation damage at US$1.7 billion; all six wastewater treatment plants were non-functional at its October 2025 cutoff. In 2026 the system is a set of separate, input-dependent pieces: the plant is shut, one Israeli feeder line operates, prioritised humanitarian facilities run on generators, and water production depends on fuel, that feeder, the Mekorot lines and repair materials Israel classifies as dual-use.
Current state · as of 2026-10-02
As of early October 2026. The Gaza Power Plant has been shut since October 2023; on 23 September 2026 OCHA listed the resumption of its operations, solar panels and commercial fuel entry among critical pending approvals. The World Bank reported in May 2026 that the only operating Israeli line was the Kissufim ("Kusuvim") feeder F11, at 4 MW of a 12 MW transfer potential, supplying only the southern desalination plant; OCHA described a "near-total absence of reliable electricity" on 11 September. Prioritised humanitarian facilities run on diesel generators with fuel facilitated by UNOPS (World Bank). On water, OCHA reported on 25 September that three Mekorot lines were delivering about 40% below contracted quantities because marine algae had affected Israeli desalination, and on 2 October that the two southern seawater plants were at their lowest recorded output. Engine oil, spare parts, electro-mechanical equipment, generators and chlorine remain restricted (OCHA). The head of Gaza's National Committee said in January 2026 that a plant restart "seems on track"; none had been reported by October.
Documented exposure
At the level the World Bank, the UN and the EU state it: the electricity sector lost more than 90% of its infrastructure, all seven distribution- company warehouses and its grid-control system, and 73 of 80 MW of solar was damaged (assessment, data to October 2025). What remains is exposed above all to the entry of inputs — fuel, oil, parts and chemicals — rather than to further damage at any one site, and water production is exposed to a single feeder line and to bulk deliveries the operator does not control.
Commodities and outputs
Paliwo i smary do generatorów w Strefie Gazy

Węzły

The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.

Routes and operators

Supply systems running through it

  • Paliwo do Strefy GazyFuel imports · 3 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · named by the recordOlej napędowy, gaz do gotowania i olej silnikowy wjeżdżające przez jedno przejście, przy wsparciu ONZ i za zgodą Izraela, od których zależy praca generatorów, studni i zakładów odsalania w Strefie Gazy.

Dependencies and constraints

Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.

Depends onUdokumentowane Pewność: wysoka

Diesel and lubricants entering through Kerem Shalom. With the plant shut and grid power almost absent, prioritised humanitarian facilities run on diesel generators with fuel facilitated by UNOPS, and wells are generator- and fuel-dependent. Fuel entry is recorded in OCHA's dated figures (550,000 litres allowed in on 22 September 2026, which OCHA called "far from sufficient"); engine-oil approvals lag requests (OCHA, 11 September 2026).

Źródła: World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · UNICEF State of Palestine — WASH situation updates and field reporting↗

Depends onUdokumentowane Pewność: wysoka

The single Kissufim feeder from Israel. The World Bank reported in May 2026 that feeder F11 ("Kusuvim"), at 4 MW, was the only operational Israeli line and supplied only the southern desalination plant. The Palestinian Water Authority has said it paid for electricity supplied to that plant. When cable connectors were damaged on 25 March 2026, the plant ran on diesel at under 20% of output until it was back on the grid within days (UNICEF).

Źródła: World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · UNICEF State of Palestine — WASH situation updates and field reporting↗ · WAFA — Palestinian News and Info Agency↗

Depends onUdokumentowane Pewność: umiarkowana

Mekorot bulk water lines from Israel. Three Mekorot lines supply water into Gaza; on 25 September 2026 OCHA reported them delivering about 40% below contracted quantities, which it attributed to marine algae affecting Israeli desalination. The assessment had recorded two of the three bulk connections non-functional at its October 2025 cutoff; OCHA's reporting supersedes that as a current reading. The Palestinian Water Authority says it pays for the water.

Źródła: UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · WAFA — Palestinian News and Info Agency↗

Depends onUdokumentowane Pewność: umiarkowana

Repair materials and treatment inputs under the dual-use regime. Electrical equipment is restricted under Israel's dual-use classification (World Bank, May 2026), and OCHA reports engine oil, spare parts, electro-mechanical equipment, generators and chlorine restricted. Desalination output fell for lack of chemicals and spare parts (UNICEF, citing the WASH Cluster). Caustic soda and antiscalant delivered on 23 September 2026 covered about a month (OCHA).

Źródła: World Bank — West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon economic monitoring and damage assessments↗ · UN OCHA occupied Palestinian territory — humanitarian reporting and data↗ · UNICEF State of Palestine — WASH situation updates and field reporting↗

Ostatnie zmiany strukturalne

Łańcuchy transmisji przez ten system

Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.

Co pozostaje nieznane

  • The southern desalination plant's names differ across the World Bank, UNICEF and OCHA, and OCHA's "Al Basa" plant may or may not be the same facility; no plant-level record is merged until a source reconciles them.
  • No source read states the plant's operator, so no industry record is authored for it.
  • The 2026 status of Gaza's wastewater treatment plants is not evidenced beyond the assessment's October 2025 finding that all six were non-functional.
  • Whether the Egyptian lines named in older sources carry any power in 2026 is not established, and the assessment's pre-war paragraph does not quantify them.
  • A pre-war "212 MW available" figure given by Gaza's administration (January 2026) differs from the assessment's components and is not carried.

Inne odczytania, które przesłanki również dopuszczają

  • Low desalination output in 2026 can be read as an input-approval effect (chemicals, spare parts, oil), as a power effect (one feeder line), or as equipment failure under strain (OCHA cites a brine-pump failure and generator overuse at the Al Basa plant). The sources name these in different weeks and do not weigh them.

Wymienione, ponieważ ocena zawarta we wpisie nie jest jedyną, na jaką pozwalają jego źródła — a nie jako zastrzeżenie osłabiające powyższą ocenę.

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Ocena na dzień — 2026-10-02 Ostatni przegląd — 2026-10-12