7 of 7 views have every part of their content in place for Sahel. That describes what a view is assembled from — not how certain any claim in it is. Each record carries its own confidence grade, as-of date and stated gaps.
Sahel
Understand
Full coverage
Orientation first, then the shape of the story, then who and what — the full record stays one click away throughout.
Zone coverage: Mali only · Burkina Faso and Niger pending evidence — an undrawn country is an absence of published geometry, not of activity.
Sahel zones show broad influence, activity, access pressure, or administrative context. They do not represent precise territorial control — influence and activity are not the same as control.
Sahel zones show broad influence, activity, access pressure, or administrative context. They do not represent precise territorial control — influence and activity are not the same as control.
Government-administered core — Cities and regions under state administration; rural margins pressured. As of 2026-07 · Confidence: Moderate.
JNIM activity areas — Reported JNIM operating and attack-reach areas — not held territory. As of 2026-07 · Confidence: Moderate.
Islamic State Sahel activity areas — Reported Islamic State Sahel activity areas — not held territory. As of 2026-07 · Confidence: Moderate.
Azawad activity zones — Reported FLA activity and presence — not held territory. As of 2026-07 · Confidence: Moderate.
Contested corridors — Broad bands along contested supply and trade arteries — not routes. As of 2026-07 · Confidence: Moderate.
The conflict in five minutes
6 points
Each point restates something this module establishes with sources elsewhere. Nothing here is a new claim.
It is not one war, and not two sides
Six camps operate at once: three military governments and their armies, the external partners fighting alongside them on their own terms, a separatist movement in northern Mali, an al-Qaeda-aligned coalition, an Islamic State province at war with that coalition, and the regional and international actors whose choices shape all of it.
It started in 2012 with a rebellion that lost control of itself
Libya's collapse sent home armed, experienced fighters.
France stopped the collapse and settled nothing
A jihadist column moving on the road south in January 2013 brought French intervention within hours.
The real war is on the roads, not in the cities
The state holds the towns; its enemies hold the space between them.
The central Sahel is one conflict system worked by three states, not three national wars: jihadist insurgency that crosses every border, Azawad separatism, military rule in all three capitals, foreign security partnerships without conditions, a confederation built to replace the regional order it walked out of, humanitarian emergency and economic siege — all running at once.
Why it matters
The central Sahel is where the collapse of a state is being tested in slow motion, three times over, and the answers are travelling.
AES states & allied forcescamp
The three Alliance of Sahel States military governments and their national armed forces, together with allied communal self-defence forces.
External security partnerscamp
Foreign forces and suppliers fighting alongside or arming the AES states — the Russian presence, Wagner then Africa Corps, and the drone supply relationship with Türkiye.
Azawad movementscamp
The separatist and allied northern movements — today unified in the FLA — whose project is self-determination for Azawad, not religious rule.
The military government formed by the 2020 and 2021 coups under General Assimi Goïta — sovereigntist in rhetoric, Russian-partnered in security, and since 2025 under the most serious military and economic pressure of its tenure.
The rebuilt, Russian-partnered military that retook the north in 2023 and lost much of it again in 2026 — expanded, drone-armed, and stretched across three fronts.
The al-Qaeda-aligned coalition under Iyad Ag Ghaly — the war’s strongest non-state force, now waging economic siege against the capital and coordinated offensives with the FLA.
The MNLA, alongside jihadist fighters of Ansar Dine, attacks army garrisons across the north — including Aguelhok, where captured soldiers are massacred.
Ansar Dine, AQIM and MUJAO turn on and expel the MNLA from Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal, imposing their rule on the northern cities — destroying shrines in Timbuktu and applying hudud punishments.
After a jihadist column pushes south toward Sévaré and the road to Bamako, France intervenes at Mali's request with airstrikes and a rapid ground force.
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Explore deeperWhy it matters · Headline figures · How it got here · Timeline — most recent first · +1 more
Why it matters
Significance, not narrative
The central Sahel is where the collapse of a state is being tested in slow motion, three times over, and the answers are travelling. An insurgency here is strangling a national economy by burning fuel trucks on roads that also carry a quarter of Senegal's exports; a separatist movement and a jihadist coalition with incompatible aims are fighting side by side; three military governments have swapped Western partners for Russian ones with no conditions attached and built a confederation to make the break permanent; and five million people in Mali alone need humanitarian assistance in a response funded at a fifth of what it asks for. The borders are the one thing the armed groups do not respect and the states cannot ignore. If you want to understand how modern insurgencies win without taking cities — and what happens to civilians while they do — this is the clearest case available.
The intervention prevented the immediate collapse of the Malian state — a real achievement — but resolved none of the governance, security, decentralisation or legitimacy problems that had produced it.
Central Mali proved the insurgency was not a northern or Tuareg phenomenon but a state-absence phenomenon — and it put the war astride the river, the roads and the food systems the whole country depends on.
Mutinous soldiers attacked the Diori Hamani International Airport, the presidential palace, the state broadcaster and Base 101 — the air force base that hosts both the Russian Africa Corps and the AES joint command.
Human Rights Watch reported on 20 August 2026 that Russian government controlled Africa Corps forces summarily killed nine civilians, including four children, and beat dozens of others at Bombori village in the Mopti region in early July 2026.
The military government formed by the 2020 and 2021 coups under General Assimi Goïta — sovereigntist in rhetoric, Russian-partnered in security, and since 2025 under the most serious military and economic pressure of its tenure.
The rebuilt, Russian-partnered military that retook the north in 2023 and lost much of it again in 2026 — expanded, drone-armed, and stretched across three fronts.
The al-Qaeda-aligned coalition under Iyad Ag Ghaly — the war’s strongest non-state force, now waging economic siege against the capital and coordinated offensives with the FLA.
Published 2026-08-30 · window 2026-08-24 → 2026-08-30
One item, and it is institutional rather than violent. The Alliance of Sahel States held the first session of its confederal parliament in Niamey from 24 to 29 August, with Mali represented by General Malick Diaw, president of its appointed transitional legislature. The body has no legislative and no budgetary power and its members are designated by three military governments rather than elected. Mali's own files did not move: the fuel blockade and the escorted-convoy arrangement continued, no verified change in state reach was identified, and no response was recorded to either of the two documented Africa Corps civilian-harm cases.
The Sahel alliance gives itself a parliament, and gives it nothing to decideConfidence: Moderatepolitical
The Alliance of Sahel States held the inaugural session of its confederal parliament in Niamey from 24 to 29 August 2026, opening at the Centre de Conférence Mahatma Gandhi with the first ordinary session following two days later.
Status wording updated — Module status line reviewed against the windowmodule change
No change to the module's framing. The AES track gains an institution; the security and access files are unchanged.
Reviewed, no material change — Fuel blockade and escorted supply to Bamakostanding file
The blockade and the escorted-convoy arrangement continued. No new blockade action, change in convoy terms, or verified nationwide supply disruption identified during the window.
Reviewed, no material change — Response to the documented Africa Corps casesstanding file
None. No reply from the Russian or Malian defence ministries to the Human Rights Watch findings on Bombori published 20 August or on Kyrnia published 31 July, and no investigation announced by either government. The finding recorded on 23 August — documentation at intervals and no response of any kind — is unchanged in a second consecutive window.
The specific reports each development rests on, with their own publication dates. A report's publication date is not the date of the thing it describes — the brief's reporting window states the second, these citations state the first.
High that the session took place, its dates, its location and the three named presiding representatives, which were publicised by the confederation and reported. High that members are designated rather than elected and that no legislative or budgetary power is claimed, both of which come from the body's own description. Moderate overall because the seat count and allocation are not published, no founding instrument has been made available for inspection, and opening statements were not independently verified in the reporting available. The reading of the body's function is Vigil's assessment. Nothing here asserts anything about the AES joint force's capability or deployments.
Mutinous soldiers attacked the Diori Hamani International Airport, the presidential palace, the state broadcaster and Base 101 — the air force base that hosts both the Russian Africa Corps and the AES joint command.
Human Rights Watch reported on 20 August 2026 that Russian government controlled Africa Corps forces summarily killed nine civilians, including four children, and beat dozens of others at Bombori village in the Mopti region in early July 2026.
Whether formal territorial concession in the far north is treated as absolutely excluded is disputed. Official statements maintain territorial integrity as non-negotiable, while reporting describes the April 2026 far-northern withdrawals as negotiated. Whether that represents a tacit accommodation or a temporary military decision is contested and the terms are not public. Vigil records the disagreement rather than resolving it.
The military government formed by the 2020 and 2021 coups under General Assimi Goïta — sovereigntist in rhetoric, Russian-partnered in security, and since 2025 under the most serious military and economic pressure of its tenure.
The rebuilt, Russian-partnered military that retook the north in 2023 and lost much of it again in 2026 — expanded, drone-armed, and stretched across three fronts.
The al-Qaeda-aligned coalition under Iyad Ag Ghaly — the war’s strongest non-state force, now waging economic siege against the capital and coordinated offensives with the FLA.
Every campaign in Mali ultimately points at Bamako: JNIM's fuel blockade squeezes it, the April 2026 attacks reached Kati next door, and sabotage has hit its water and power.
DjiboContested / high-pressure townConfidence: Highas of 2026-08
Djibo is the complete form of the mechanism Bamako is experiencing partially.
FLA and JNIM waves in April and July 2026 that took Kidal, reached Bamako's approaches and left the far north largely outside state presence. The significance is structural rather than territorial: two movements with incompatible end-states are fighting as one, and Anéfis changed hands twice inside a week.
April 2026 – presentConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
April wave — Kidal and Kati25 April – May 2026
→July wave — Anéfis and the capital's approaches4 – 10 July 2026
A declared blockade of Mali's fuel-import corridors, prosecuted by burning tanker convoys rather than by taking ground. Declared in September 2025, eased in early 2026 and reimposed on 28 April. Neither broken nor decisive: convoys still move, escorted and costlier.
Declared September 2025; eased and reimposed sinceConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
Westward expansion2024 – mid-2025
→The Kayes–Nioro blockadeJune – September 2025
→Declared national blockadeSeptember 2025 – early 2026
→EasingEarly 2026
→Reimposition and compounded pressureApril – July 2026
Sustained violence in Niger's western border region, where Islamic State Sahel, JNIM and the Nigerien army all kill civilians and analysts rank the state second among the three. In August 2026 the losses reached the capital, carried there by the army's own mutinous soldiers.
Documented pattern since 2025Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
A four-year encirclement of a Burkinabè provincial capital: roads mined, convoys ambushed, surrounding populations driven inside, and resupply by air. The town has not fallen, which is the point — this is a method for making a place ungovernable without capturing it.
Since February 2022Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
Encirclement and population concentrationFebruary – October 2022
→Attrition on the relief columnsSeptember 2022 – 2023
→Mass assaults without captureNovember 2023 – September 2025
No security-status or threat-trend scale is shown: Vigil publishes no method for one, and a score without a method is false precision.Module overview →
Campaigns
4 records · 4 ongoing
FLA and JNIM waves in April and July 2026 that took Kidal, reached Bamako's approaches and left the far north largely outside state presence. The significance is structural rather than territorial: two movements with incompatible end-states are fighting as one, and Anéfis changed hands twice inside a week.
April 2026 – presentConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
April wave — Kidal and Kati25 April – May 2026
→July wave — Anéfis and the capital's approaches4 – 10 July 2026
A declared blockade of Mali's fuel-import corridors, prosecuted by burning tanker convoys rather than by taking ground. Declared in September 2025, eased in early 2026 and reimposed on 28 April. Neither broken nor decisive: convoys still move, escorted and costlier.
Declared September 2025; eased and reimposed sinceConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
Westward expansion2024 – mid-2025
→The Kayes–Nioro blockadeJune – September 2025
→Declared national blockadeSeptember 2025 – early 2026
→EasingEarly 2026
→Reimposition and compounded pressureApril – July 2026
Sustained violence in Niger's western border region, where Islamic State Sahel, JNIM and the Nigerien army all kill civilians and analysts rank the state second among the three. In August 2026 the losses reached the capital, carried there by the army's own mutinous soldiers.
Documented pattern since 2025Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
A four-year encirclement of a Burkinabè provincial capital: roads mined, convoys ambushed, surrounding populations driven inside, and resupply by air. The town has not fallen, which is the point — this is a method for making a place ungovernable without capturing it.
Since February 2022Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
Encirclement and population concentrationFebruary – October 2022
→Attrition on the relief columnsSeptember 2022 – 2023
→Mass assaults without captureNovember 2023 – September 2025
Disputed relationshipDan Na AmbassagouFormationConfidence: Lowas of 2026-06What is disputed: whether the state directs, supports or merely tolerates the militia.
Disputed relationshipMalian Defence and Security Forces (FDS)State militaryConfidence: Lowas of 2026-06What is disputed: whether the state directs, supports or merely tolerates the militia.
What kind of ground this is and what it does to movement in general.
A seasonally flooded inland delta the size of Switzerland, where the Niger spreads into channels and marshes from September to December. Water, not roads, sets who moves and when — and the same flood calendar governs the herding, farming and fishing rights the centre's violence is built on.
Central MaliConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-084 mapped constrictions
Flat, open desert giving way to Sahelian scrub, where distance rather than terrain is the obstacle. Three consequences follow: attack reach is not control, the side with the lighter logistics wins the geography, and sanctuary in the Adrar has let northern rebellions recur rather than conclude.
Northern MaliConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-074 mapped constrictions
The Mali side of the Niger bend between Gao and Niamey, where three states meet across ground none of them has ever fully administered. Seasonal rainfall drives herding movement across the borders, and the same routes carry the region's deadliest insurgent competition.
Eastern MaliConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-084 mapped constrictions
The Sudanian belt between Bamako and the Atlantic ports, carrying Mali's fuel corridor, its main railway and its industrial goldfields on the same narrow band of ground. It is the country's economic spine, and until 2025 it was the part of Mali the war had not reached.
Western MaliConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-084 mapped constrictions
Burkina Faso imports 98% of its merchandise by sea and moves it inland by road through Lomé, Abidjan, Cotonou and Tema. The Lomé axis alone carries about 40% of cargo, and the state fuel monopoly holds its transit storage in four neighbouring countries rather than at home.
Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-083 disruptions recorded
Lomé–Ouagadougou corridorPrimary corridorThe largest of the four, carrying about 40% of all cargo entering the country, from a port that handled 30.6 million tonnes in 2024 and whose transit traffic is 92% bound for AES states.
→OuagadougouRegional hubDestination and distribution point, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.
Three overland routes from Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea carry Mali's entire fuel supply; with no refining, pipeline or rail alternative at scale, dependence is total. They have been under a declared blockade since September 2025, with several hundred tankers reported destroyed.
Confidence: Highas of 2026-085 disruptions recorded
Bamako–Dakar corridorPrimary corridorThe western route to the Atlantic through Senegal, and the axis on which the heaviest reported tanker losses occurred from late 2025.
→Bamako–Abidjan corridorPrimary corridorThe southern route to Côte d'Ivoire's ports, carrying the balance of fuel and container trade as pressure on the Dakar axis increased.
→KayesTransit nodeThe western regional centre on the Dakar corridor; fuel queues here are one of the reported measures of the blockade's bite.
→KitaTransit nodeRail and road town on the Bamako–Kayes stretch.
→SikassoTransit nodeThe southern regional centre through which the Abidjan corridor runs.
→BamakoRegional hubDestination and distribution point for national fuel supply, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.
Between 70% and 80% of Niger's imports once passed through Cotonou, and Nigerien cargo was around 80% of that port's transit. A bridge closure and a transit suspension in 2023 collapsed the route; traffic moved to Lomé, Abidjan, Dakar and Nouakchott at higher cost.
Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-084 disruptions recorded
Cotonou–Niamey corridorPrimary corridorThe historic principal route, carrying 70–80% of imports before 2023 and largely closed since.
→NiameyRegional hubDestination and distribution point for national imports.
Forces in the far north are sustained on one axis — Gao through Anéfis toward Kidal — with no surface alternative of comparable capacity and no air substitute at scale. Because that axis runs on imported fuel, northern sustainment is a second-order dependency on the corridors JNIM is blockading.
Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-074 disruptions recorded
Gao–Kidal corridorPrimary corridorThe desert road north from Gao through Anéfis to Kidal.
→GaoRegional hubThe northern logistics base and the anchor of any northern presence.
→SévaréRegional hubThe central hub covering the Mopti region and the approaches from the south.
→AnéfisChokepointThe road junction connecting Gao to Kidal and the far north.
→KidalTransit nodeThe northern terminus of the axis and the far north's political centre; held by the state 2023–2026, taken by the FLA in April 2026.
→TessalitTransit nodeFar-northern border town, reportedly evacuated by government and Russian forces in the April 2026 withdrawals.
Armed reconnaissance and strike over a national area from a small number of bases — the capability that substitutes for a conventional air force Mali does not have.
Rural depth before urban assault: build presence where the state is absent and apply force to movement — corridor ambush, blockade, roadside devices — rather than to the positions themselves. Manoeuvre is light and disperses fast. Declining to hold ground is a calculation, not a rule.
Where this breaks down3 further gaps on the record
The generalisation fails in three ways worth stating.
Most recent observed adaptationas of 2026-07Confidence: Moderate3 recorded
A shift from attacking military targets to attacking the movement of commercial goods, from September 2025 — an approach that requires no territorial holding and cannot be answered by recapturing ground.
Mutinous soldiers attacked the Diori Hamani International Airport, the presidential palace, the state broadcaster and Base 101 — the air force base that hosts both the Russian Africa Corps and the AES joint command.
Human Rights Watch reported on 20 August 2026 that Russian government controlled Africa Corps forces summarily killed nine civilians, including four children, and beat dozens of others at Bombori village in the Mopti region in early July 2026.
The military government formed by the 2020 and 2021 coups under General Assimi Goïta — sovereigntist in rhetoric, Russian-partnered in security, and since 2025 under the most serious military and economic pressure of its tenure.
The rebuilt, Russian-partnered military that retook the north in 2023 and lost much of it again in 2026 — expanded, drone-armed, and stretched across three fronts.
The al-Qaeda-aligned coalition under Iyad Ag Ghaly — the war’s strongest non-state force, now waging economic siege against the capital and coordinated offensives with the FLA.
The central Sahel is one conflict system worked by three states, not three national wars: jihadist insurgency that crosses every border, Azawad separatism, military rule in all three capitals, foreign security partnerships without conditions, a confederation built to replace the regional order it walked out of, humanitarian emergency and economic siege — all running at once.
Why it matters
The central Sahel is where the collapse of a state is being tested in slow motion, three times over, and the answers are travelling.
AES states & allied forcescamp
The three Alliance of Sahel States military governments and their national armed forces, together with allied communal self-defence forces.
External security partnerscamp
Foreign forces and suppliers fighting alongside or arming the AES states — the Russian presence, Wagner then Africa Corps, and the drone supply relationship with Türkiye.
Azawad movementscamp
The separatist and allied northern movements — today unified in the FLA — whose project is self-determination for Azawad, not religious rule.
What an actor says and what Vigil reads into it are different claims with different evidence requirements, and they are kept apart here.
posture as of 2026-08reviewed 2026-08-301 more on the profile
Statesthe actor’s own positionas of 2026-07
Restoration of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the defeat of "terrorism" — the frame under which the transition justifies both its security partnerships and the absence of an electoral timetable.
Statesthe actor’s own positionas of 2026-07
A sovereigntist foreign policy: security cooperation without governance conditionality, and regional integration through the Alliance of Sahel States rather than ECOWAS.
posture as of 2026-07reviewed 2026-07-262 more on the profile
Statesthe actor’s own positionas of 2026-07
The establishment of Islamic rule in Mali and the wider Sahel, under al-Qaeda's gradualist franchise model.
Statesthe actor’s own positionas of 2026-07
Repeated signalled openness to negotiation with the Malian state — on the organisation's own terms, and consistently including the departure of foreign forces.
Convert the post-MINUSMA military situation into irreversible control of the Kidal region and standing as the north's political authority — the position from which any future settlement would be negotiated.
posture as of 2026-08reviewed 2026-08-301 more on the profile
Statesthe actor’s own positionas of 2026-05
Territorial expansion of the Islamic State's caliphate project and the imposition of its religious order, as published through the movement's own media and the Islamic State's central output.
Statesthe actor’s own positionas of 2026-05
Rejection of JNIM as a legitimate jihadist actor — the doctrinal justification the movement publishes for a war it has fought against al-Qaeda-aligned groups since 2020.
posture as of 2026-08reviewed 2026-08-302 more on the profile
Statesthe actor’s own positionas of 2026-07
Security cooperation with a sovereign partner at that partner's request, framed as assistance in counter-terrorism and the restoration of state authority.
Statesthe actor’s own positionas of 2026-07
A partnership offered without governance, human-rights or electoral conditions — stated as a positive contrast with Western partnerships rather than as an omission.
Demonstrate that Russia's security offer works where the Western one did not, in a region where the comparison is being made publicly by three governments at once.
posture as of 2026-08reviewed 2026-08-302 more on the profile
Statesthe actor’s own positionas of 2025-12
Collective defence: an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all, with a unified force to give the commitment effect.
Statesthe actor’s own positionas of 2026-07
Sovereignty without conditionality — security and economic partnerships chosen without governance requirements attached, which is the explicit contrast the bloc draws with the previous Western and ECOWAS relationships.
Constrained by · Domestic politicalConfidence: High
No electoral exit and no announced end to the transition, which makes every security failure a direct legitimacy problem with no scheduled moment of renewal.
Constrained by · EconomicConfidence: High
Fiscal dependence on a single commodity: gold is roughly 80% of exports and the indispensable revenue base, concentrated in the western belt the insurgency has been pressing since 2024.
Camps first, because grouping the actors wrongly is the commonest error about this kind of conflict.
AES states & allied forcescamp
The three Alliance of Sahel States military governments and their national armed forces, together with allied communal self-defence forces. Coverage of Burkina Faso and Niger is thin at this stage; the camp is named for what it is, not for what is yet published about it. Colour marks the camp, not endorsement.
External security partnerscamp
Foreign forces and suppliers fighting alongside or arming the AES states — the Russian presence, Wagner then Africa Corps, and the drone supply relationship with Türkiye. Deliberately a separate camp from the states they support: the partnership carries no governance conditions, publishes no accounting, and answers to no Sahelian authority, and a shared colour would assert an integration that does not exist.
Azawad movementscamp
The separatist and allied northern movements — today unified in the FLA — whose project is self-determination for Azawad, not religious rule. A distinct camp from JNIM even where they currently fight alongside it.
The fall of the Gaddafi government releases thousands of Sahelian fighters from Libyan service — many of them Malian Tuareg — who return home with vehicles, weapons and combat experience.
Junior officers under Captain Sanogo, mutinying at Kati over the government's handling of the northern war, overthrow President Touré weeks before scheduled elections.
Observables, not predictions. Each is something that would change the assessment if it moved — in one direction or the other.
Attacks at Kéniéroba and Kati reached the capital region. Whether that becomes something more than raiding is the clearest single escalation signal in the module.
Movement from corridor attacks to sustained pressure on mining areas would attack the fiscal base itself, which has no substitute.
Gao is the anchor of any northern presence. Pressure on Gao is a different order of event from pressure on Anéfis.
Three coups since 2020 came from within the security establishment; the death of the defence minister in April 2026 removed a central figure.
JNIM announces a blockade of fuel imports and begins systematically burning tanker convoys from Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea — hundreds reported destroyed within months, with Bamako's power and fuel supply visibly degraded.
Rival and battlefield competitor since 2019–2020 — never a single “jihadist” bloc. Local truces and territorial seams exist, but the rivalry is structural.
The military government formed by the 2020 and 2021 coups under General Assimi Goïta — sovereigntist in rhetoric, Russian-partnered in security, and since 2025 under the most serious military and economic pressure of its tenure.
The rebuilt, Russian-partnered military that retook the north in 2023 and lost much of it again in 2026 — expanded, drone-armed, and stretched across three fronts.
The al-Qaeda-aligned coalition under Iyad Ag Ghaly — the war’s strongest non-state force, now waging economic siege against the capital and coordinated offensives with the FLA.
Mutinous soldiers attacked the Diori Hamani International Airport, the presidential palace, the state broadcaster and Base 101 — the air force base that hosts both the Russian Africa Corps and the AES joint command.
Human Rights Watch reported on 20 August 2026 that Russian government controlled Africa Corps forces summarily killed nine civilians, including four children, and beat dozens of others at Bombori village in the Mopti region in early July 2026.
FLA and JNIM waves in April and July 2026 that took Kidal, reached Bamako's approaches and left the far north largely outside state presence. The significance is structural rather than territorial: two movements with incompatible end-states are fighting as one, and Anéfis changed hands twice inside a week.
April 2026 – presentConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
April wave — Kidal and Kati25 April – May 2026
→July wave — Anéfis and the capital's approaches4 – 10 July 2026
A declared blockade of Mali's fuel-import corridors, prosecuted by burning tanker convoys rather than by taking ground. Declared in September 2025, eased in early 2026 and reimposed on 28 April. Neither broken nor decisive: convoys still move, escorted and costlier.
Declared September 2025; eased and reimposed sinceConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
Westward expansion2024 – mid-2025
→The Kayes–Nioro blockadeJune – September 2025
→Declared national blockadeSeptember 2025 – early 2026
→EasingEarly 2026
→Reimposition and compounded pressureApril – July 2026
Sustained violence in Niger's western border region, where Islamic State Sahel, JNIM and the Nigerien army all kill civilians and analysts rank the state second among the three. In August 2026 the losses reached the capital, carried there by the army's own mutinous soldiers.
Documented pattern since 2025Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
A four-year encirclement of a Burkinabè provincial capital: roads mined, convoys ambushed, surrounding populations driven inside, and resupply by air. The town has not fallen, which is the point — this is a method for making a place ungovernable without capturing it.
Since February 2022Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
Encirclement and population concentrationFebruary – October 2022
→Attrition on the relief columnsSeptember 2022 – 2023
→Mass assaults without captureNovember 2023 – September 2025
The central Sahel's humanitarian crisis is not a side-effect of the war; it is the medium the war is fought in.
~5.7 million — Region: displaced by end-2026 (projected)as of 2026Confidence: Moderate
UNHCR projection for the central Sahel, Mauritania and the coastal states of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo, up from 4 million at 30 Sep 2025. Includes refugees and stateless people, not IDPs alone
2.1 million — Burkina Faso: internally displacedas of 2023-03Confidence: Low
THE LATEST AVAILABLE OFFICIAL FIGURE, NOT A CURRENT MEASUREMENT. No consolidated displacement count has been published since March 2023. It is still widely quoted against 2026 datelines; it is three years old and should be read as the last established count rather than today's
~400,000 (2025) — Burkina Faso: new displacement per yearas of 2025Confidence: Low
Registered by the rapid-response coordination platform, similar to 2024 and down from roughly 700,000/year in 2022–2023. A flow figure, not a stock — it cannot be added to or substituted for the 2023 total
Locations here are regional; no facility, warehouse, convoy route or aid schedule is published anywhere in this module.Humanitarian →
Economic situation
Figures as of 2026-08 · Confidence: Moderate
Mali's economy is the war's main battlefield: a landlocked, gold-dependent state whose revenue runs through mines its enemies are approaching and whose fuel runs through corridors they are burning.
Gold is roughly 80% of exports and the state's indispensable revenue, concentrated in the western belt around Kayes and Kéniéba.
Hundreds of thousands work Mali's artisanal gold sites — a livelihood system, an export channel that partly escapes the state, and a soft target no one protects.
Development finance contracted sharply after the coups, the Wagner deployment and the Western rupture; humanitarian funding, at ~21% of the 2025 appeal, is the lowest in a decade.
Exposure and transmission, not investment advice.Economy →
Commodities and sectors
5 entries · sensitivity graded
Goldhigh sensitivity
~80% of exports and the fiscal base of the state — industrial mines in the west, a vast artisanal sector, and the revenue that pays for the war and, by credible reporting, for the Russian partnership.
Refined fuel (imported)high sensitivity
Entirely imported through Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, the first two reportedly carrying close to 95% of it.
Cottonmoderate sensitivity
The main cash crop and the largest rural employer after subsistence farming, concentrated in the Sikasso belt — exposed to input costs, transport insecurity and world prices at once.
Between 70% and 80% of Niger's imports passed through the Port of Cotonou before the crisis, and Nigerien cargo is around 80% of that port's transit volume — a mutual dependence rather than a one-way one.
Burning tanker convoys on Mali's three import corridors raises road-freight costs across an economy in which almost everything moves by road, reaching food supply, harvest movement, capital electricity and gold-sector inputs. The compounding fiscal squeeze that implies is plausible, not documented.
Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-08Plausible exposure at the final step
JNIM declares a blockade of fuel imports, September 2025
The three overland import corridors — Dakar via Kayes, Abidjan via Sikasso, and the Guinean leg — carry the entire national fuel supply.
Documented as having occurred, with sources.Confidence: High
Systematic burning of tanker convoys from late 2025 — several hundred reported destroyed.
Documented as having occurred, with sources.Confidence: High
Fuel scarcity and escort costs raise road-transport costs across an economy in which almost everything moves by road.
Documented as having occurred, with sources.Confidence: Moderate
Sustained transport-cost inflation compresses trade volumes and customs revenue at the same time as it raises the cost of the state's own military logistics — the army's relief columns burn the same imported diesel.
A mechanism Vigil assesses as likely; not documented as having occurred.Confidence: Moderate
Burkina Faso imports 98% of its merchandise by sea and moves it inland by road through Lomé, Abidjan, Cotonou and Tema. The Lomé axis alone carries about 40% of cargo, and the state fuel monopoly holds its transit storage in four neighbouring countries rather than at home.
Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-083 disruptions recorded
Lomé–Ouagadougou corridorPrimary corridorThe largest of the four, carrying about 40% of all cargo entering the country, from a port that handled 30.6 million tonnes in 2024 and whose transit traffic is 92% bound for AES states.
→OuagadougouRegional hubDestination and distribution point, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.
Three overland routes from Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea carry Mali's entire fuel supply; with no refining, pipeline or rail alternative at scale, dependence is total. They have been under a declared blockade since September 2025, with several hundred tankers reported destroyed.
Confidence: Highas of 2026-085 disruptions recorded
Bamako–Dakar corridorPrimary corridorThe western route to the Atlantic through Senegal, and the axis on which the heaviest reported tanker losses occurred from late 2025.
→Bamako–Abidjan corridorPrimary corridorThe southern route to Côte d'Ivoire's ports, carrying the balance of fuel and container trade as pressure on the Dakar axis increased.
→KayesTransit nodeThe western regional centre on the Dakar corridor; fuel queues here are one of the reported measures of the blockade's bite.
→KitaTransit nodeRail and road town on the Bamako–Kayes stretch.
→SikassoTransit nodeThe southern regional centre through which the Abidjan corridor runs.
→BamakoRegional hubDestination and distribution point for national fuel supply, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.
Between 70% and 80% of Niger's imports once passed through Cotonou, and Nigerien cargo was around 80% of that port's transit. A bridge closure and a transit suspension in 2023 collapsed the route; traffic moved to Lomé, Abidjan, Dakar and Nouakchott at higher cost.
Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-084 disruptions recorded
Cotonou–Niamey corridorPrimary corridorThe historic principal route, carrying 70–80% of imports before 2023 and largely closed since.
→NiameyRegional hubDestination and distribution point for national imports.
Forces in the far north are sustained on one axis — Gao through Anéfis toward Kidal — with no surface alternative of comparable capacity and no air substitute at scale. Because that axis runs on imported fuel, northern sustainment is a second-order dependency on the corridors JNIM is blockading.
Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-074 disruptions recorded
Gao–Kidal corridorPrimary corridorThe desert road north from Gao through Anéfis to Kidal.
→GaoRegional hubThe northern logistics base and the anchor of any northern presence.
→SévaréRegional hubThe central hub covering the Mopti region and the approaches from the south.
→AnéfisChokepointThe road junction connecting Gao to Kidal and the far north.
→KidalTransit nodeThe northern terminus of the axis and the far north's political centre; held by the state 2023–2026, taken by the FLA in April 2026.
→TessalitTransit nodeFar-northern border town, reportedly evacuated by government and Russian forces in the April 2026 withdrawals.
JNIM announces a blockade of fuel imports and begins systematically burning tanker convoys from Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea — hundreds reported destroyed within months, with Bamako's power and fuel supply visibly degraded.
Energy, industrial and extractive geography as this module publishes it.
ArlitMining area · broad regionMining economyConfidence: Moderate
Niger is the world's fourth-largest uranium producer, around 6.9% of global output, and Arlit is where that comes from.
KéniébaMining area · broad regionMining economyConfidence: Moderate
The Kéniéba cercle holds Mali’s richest gold ground — the Malian part of the historic Bambouk goldfields — including the Loulo–Gounkoto complex, which returned to its operator’s control in December 2025 after a two-year dispute and had its permit renewed for ten years in February 2026.
FLA and JNIM waves in April and July 2026 that took Kidal, reached Bamako's approaches and left the far north largely outside state presence. The significance is structural rather than territorial: two movements with incompatible end-states are fighting as one, and Anéfis changed hands twice inside a week.
April 2026 – presentConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
April wave — Kidal and Kati25 April – May 2026
→July wave — Anéfis and the capital's approaches4 – 10 July 2026
A declared blockade of Mali's fuel-import corridors, prosecuted by burning tanker convoys rather than by taking ground. Declared in September 2025, eased in early 2026 and reimposed on 28 April. Neither broken nor decisive: convoys still move, escorted and costlier.
Declared September 2025; eased and reimposed sinceConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
Westward expansion2024 – mid-2025
→The Kayes–Nioro blockadeJune – September 2025
→Declared national blockadeSeptember 2025 – early 2026
→EasingEarly 2026
→Reimposition and compounded pressureApril – July 2026
Sustained violence in Niger's western border region, where Islamic State Sahel, JNIM and the Nigerien army all kill civilians and analysts rank the state second among the three. In August 2026 the losses reached the capital, carried there by the army's own mutinous soldiers.
Documented pattern since 2025Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
A four-year encirclement of a Burkinabè provincial capital: roads mined, convoys ambushed, surrounding populations driven inside, and resupply by air. The town has not fallen, which is the point — this is a method for making a place ungovernable without capturing it.
Since February 2022Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
Encirclement and population concentrationFebruary – October 2022
→Attrition on the relief columnsSeptember 2022 – 2023
→Mass assaults without captureNovember 2023 – September 2025
Mutinous soldiers attacked the Diori Hamani International Airport, the presidential palace, the state broadcaster and Base 101 — the air force base that hosts both the Russian Africa Corps and the AES joint command.
Human Rights Watch reported on 20 August 2026 that Russian government controlled Africa Corps forces summarily killed nine civilians, including four children, and beat dozens of others at Bombori village in the Mopti region in early July 2026.
Conflict reviewed 2026-08-30 — a module review does not claim every underlying record was revalidated. Record-level dates stay on the records.
Civilian situation
Data as of 2026-08 · Confidence: Moderate
The central Sahel's humanitarian crisis is not a side-effect of the war; it is the medium the war is fought in.
~5.7 million — Region: displaced by end-2026 (projected)as of 2026Confidence: Moderate
UNHCR projection for the central Sahel, Mauritania and the coastal states of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo, up from 4 million at 30 Sep 2025. Includes refugees and stateless people, not IDPs alone
2.1 million — Burkina Faso: internally displacedas of 2023-03Confidence: Low
THE LATEST AVAILABLE OFFICIAL FIGURE, NOT A CURRENT MEASUREMENT. No consolidated displacement count has been published since March 2023. It is still widely quoted against 2026 datelines; it is three years old and should be read as the last established count rather than today's
~400,000 (2025) — Burkina Faso: new displacement per yearas of 2025Confidence: Low
Registered by the rapid-response coordination platform, similar to 2024 and down from roughly 700,000/year in 2022–2023. A flow figure, not a stock — it cannot be added to or substituted for the 2023 total
Locations here are regional; no facility, warehouse, convoy route or aid schedule is published anywhere in this module.Humanitarian →
Conditions by system
7 systems · data as of 2026-08
Displacement, food, access, services and protection as this module documents them.
Where the displaced actually are, and how well it is countedas of 2026-08
Roughly three quarters of the central Sahel's internally displaced people are in Burkina Faso — which is also the country whose figures are least current.
Displacement in Malias of 2026-08
Displacement is concentrated in the northern and central regions and moves with the fighting: the 2026 offensives displaced people from Kidal, Ménaka and the Mopti countryside, while earlier waves from the Ménaka region fled Islamic State Sahel's campaigns.
Food securityas of 2026
Hunger here is a logistics problem before it is a harvest problem.
Locations here are regional; no facility, warehouse, convoy route or aid schedule is published anywhere in this module.Humanitarian →
Civilian impact — transmission chains
1 chain · every step graded
Mined roads, armed-group taxation and village blockades cut civilians from fields and markets, with acute food insecurity projected at about 1.56 million people for 2026. Access is degraded by the same insecurity that creates the need, so these figures are floors rather than ceilings.
Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-07Plausible exposure at the final step
Corridor blockade and rural road insecurity, compounded by village blockades in the centre
The systems civilians depend on run on the same roads the war is fought over: fuel and food imports through the southern corridors, harvest movement out of the Office du Niger irrigation zone and the inland delta, herds to market across the pastoral zones, and the supply chains that keep health facilities and schools functioning in contested areas.
Documented as having occurred, with sources.Confidence: High
Roads are mined and ambushed; armed groups tax or block movement; village blockades in the Niono and Mopti areas have cut farmers from their fields at planting and harvest.
Documented as having occurred, with sources.Confidence: High
Acute food insecurity projected at about 1.56 million people for 2026, with pockets of famine-like conditions reported in northern areas and severe child malnutrition projected above 227,000.
Documented as having occurred, with sources.Confidence: Moderate
Access is the binding constraint on the response, and it is degraded by the same insecurity that creates the need.
A mechanism Vigil assesses as likely; not documented as having occurred.Confidence: Moderate
Burkina Faso imports 98% of its merchandise by sea and moves it inland by road through Lomé, Abidjan, Cotonou and Tema. The Lomé axis alone carries about 40% of cargo, and the state fuel monopoly holds its transit storage in four neighbouring countries rather than at home.
Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-083 disruptions recorded
Lomé–Ouagadougou corridorPrimary corridorThe largest of the four, carrying about 40% of all cargo entering the country, from a port that handled 30.6 million tonnes in 2024 and whose transit traffic is 92% bound for AES states.
→OuagadougouRegional hubDestination and distribution point, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.
Three overland routes from Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea carry Mali's entire fuel supply; with no refining, pipeline or rail alternative at scale, dependence is total. They have been under a declared blockade since September 2025, with several hundred tankers reported destroyed.
Confidence: Highas of 2026-085 disruptions recorded
Bamako–Dakar corridorPrimary corridorThe western route to the Atlantic through Senegal, and the axis on which the heaviest reported tanker losses occurred from late 2025.
→Bamako–Abidjan corridorPrimary corridorThe southern route to Côte d'Ivoire's ports, carrying the balance of fuel and container trade as pressure on the Dakar axis increased.
→KayesTransit nodeThe western regional centre on the Dakar corridor; fuel queues here are one of the reported measures of the blockade's bite.
→KitaTransit nodeRail and road town on the Bamako–Kayes stretch.
→SikassoTransit nodeThe southern regional centre through which the Abidjan corridor runs.
→BamakoRegional hubDestination and distribution point for national fuel supply, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.
Between 70% and 80% of Niger's imports once passed through Cotonou, and Nigerien cargo was around 80% of that port's transit. A bridge closure and a transit suspension in 2023 collapsed the route; traffic moved to Lomé, Abidjan, Dakar and Nouakchott at higher cost.
Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-084 disruptions recorded
Cotonou–Niamey corridorPrimary corridorThe historic principal route, carrying 70–80% of imports before 2023 and largely closed since.
→NiameyRegional hubDestination and distribution point for national imports.
Forces in the far north are sustained on one axis — Gao through Anéfis toward Kidal — with no surface alternative of comparable capacity and no air substitute at scale. Because that axis runs on imported fuel, northern sustainment is a second-order dependency on the corridors JNIM is blockading.
Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-074 disruptions recorded
Gao–Kidal corridorPrimary corridorThe desert road north from Gao through Anéfis to Kidal.
→GaoRegional hubThe northern logistics base and the anchor of any northern presence.
→SévaréRegional hubThe central hub covering the Mopti region and the approaches from the south.
→AnéfisChokepointThe road junction connecting Gao to Kidal and the far north.
→KidalTransit nodeThe northern terminus of the axis and the far north's political centre; held by the state 2023–2026, taken by the FLA in April 2026.
→TessalitTransit nodeFar-northern border town, reportedly evacuated by government and Russian forces in the April 2026 withdrawals.
Human Rights Watch reported on 20 August 2026 that Russian government controlled Africa Corps forces summarily killed nine civilians, including four children, and beat dozens of others at Bombori village in the Mopti region in early July 2026.
JNIM announces a blockade of fuel imports and begins systematically burning tanker convoys from Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea — hundreds reported destroyed within months, with Bamako's power and fuel supply visibly degraded.
Jihadist forces, primarily Ansarul Islam and JNIM, encircled the Soum provincial capital of Djibo in northern Burkina Faso, destroying infrastructure, mining the roads and ambushing supply convoys.
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Explore deeperInfrastructure and economic geography · Timeline — most recent first · Campaigns · Sources and review state · +1 more
Infrastructure and economic geography
4 mapped sites and regions
Energy, industrial and extractive geography as this module publishes it.
ArlitMining area · broad regionMining economyConfidence: Moderate
Niger is the world's fourth-largest uranium producer, around 6.9% of global output, and Arlit is where that comes from.
KéniébaMining area · broad regionMining economyConfidence: Moderate
The Kéniéba cercle holds Mali’s richest gold ground — the Malian part of the historic Bambouk goldfields — including the Loulo–Gounkoto complex, which returned to its operator’s control in December 2025 after a two-year dispute and had its permit renewed for ten years in February 2026.
Mutinous soldiers attacked the Diori Hamani International Airport, the presidential palace, the state broadcaster and Base 101 — the air force base that hosts both the Russian Africa Corps and the AES joint command.
Human Rights Watch reported on 20 August 2026 that Russian government controlled Africa Corps forces summarily killed nine civilians, including four children, and beat dozens of others at Bombori village in the Mopti region in early July 2026.
FLA and JNIM waves in April and July 2026 that took Kidal, reached Bamako's approaches and left the far north largely outside state presence. The significance is structural rather than territorial: two movements with incompatible end-states are fighting as one, and Anéfis changed hands twice inside a week.
April 2026 – presentConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
April wave — Kidal and Kati25 April – May 2026
→July wave — Anéfis and the capital's approaches4 – 10 July 2026
A declared blockade of Mali's fuel-import corridors, prosecuted by burning tanker convoys rather than by taking ground. Declared in September 2025, eased in early 2026 and reimposed on 28 April. Neither broken nor decisive: convoys still move, escorted and costlier.
Declared September 2025; eased and reimposed sinceConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
Westward expansion2024 – mid-2025
→The Kayes–Nioro blockadeJune – September 2025
→Declared national blockadeSeptember 2025 – early 2026
→EasingEarly 2026
→Reimposition and compounded pressureApril – July 2026
Sustained violence in Niger's western border region, where Islamic State Sahel, JNIM and the Nigerien army all kill civilians and analysts rank the state second among the three. In August 2026 the losses reached the capital, carried there by the army's own mutinous soldiers.
Documented pattern since 2025Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
A four-year encirclement of a Burkinabè provincial capital: roads mined, convoys ambushed, surrounding populations driven inside, and resupply by air. The town has not fallen, which is the point — this is a method for making a place ungovernable without capturing it.
Since February 2022Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
Encirclement and population concentrationFebruary – October 2022
→Attrition on the relief columnsSeptember 2022 – 2023
→Mass assaults without captureNovember 2023 – September 2025
Mutinous soldiers attacked the Diori Hamani International Airport, the presidential palace, the state broadcaster and Base 101 — the air force base that hosts both the Russian Africa Corps and the AES joint command.
Human Rights Watch reported on 20 August 2026 that Russian government controlled Africa Corps forces summarily killed nine civilians, including four children, and beat dozens of others at Bombori village in the Mopti region in early July 2026.
Grouped by how a claim is grounded — an official statement, government data, satellite imagery and a think-tank assessment are different kinds of evidence. That is a separate question from confidence, which grades how strongly the evidence supports the claim.
Established media6 sources
Africa Defense Forum (ADF) · Al Jazeera English · Associated Press · and 3 more
International organisation5 sources
UN OCHA humanitarian reporting (Mali / Sahel) · UN Security Council and Panel of Experts reporting · UNHCR operational data (Mali situation) · and 2 more
Think tank / research institute4 sources
ACLED conflict data & analysis · Africa Center for Strategic Studies · International Crisis Group · and 1 more
Official statement2 sources
Armed-group statements (JNIM, FLA, IS-Sahel and others) · Official government statements
25 records, reviewed between 2026-07-11 and 2026-07-19.
4 more not shown in this summary
Terminology used in this module
6 of 22 glossary entries · most recently reviewed
Every entry states what the term does not mean as well as what it does — the misreading is usually the part that matters.
An actor taken as a whole: political system, leadership, military capacity, alliances, strengths and vulnerabilities, with every figure dated and graded. Actors are described by role and alignment, never as friend or foe.
How strongly the available evidence supports a specific claim, graded low, moderate or high. Shown on brief items, profiles, records, figures, map markers and zones — never as a site-wide average.
On an equipment record, how the system's presence in a conflict is documented — for example visually confirmed, or reported. It answers a different question from confidence.
A module's structured catalogue of the organisations fighting in it — services, commands, formations and the equipment they are documented to field — with the structure and history of each, and nothing operational.
One conflict or regional system covered in depth: its map, history, key events, actors, force structure, economy and human impact, cross-linked and reviewed on a stated cadence.
The first brief a module publishes: the analytical starting picture at launch, covering a longer window than a weekly review because it has to establish where things stand.
Assembled from the records themselves, not written separately, so it cannot drift from what each record actually admits. A record that names its gaps is more useful than one that implies completeness.
Casualty figures throughout this campaign come from a mix of official statements, local sources and media reporting; military claims of insurgent losses consistently exceed independently verifiable counts and are recorded as claims.
18 more not shown in this summary
Related records
9 record types in this module
Every cross-reference on this site is resolved when it is built: a link to a deleted record fails the build rather than rotting quietly.
The intervention prevented the immediate collapse of the Malian state — a real achievement — but resolved none of the governance, security, decentralisation or legitimacy problems that had produced it.
Central Mali proved the insurgency was not a northern or Tuareg phenomenon but a state-absence phenomenon — and it put the war astride the river, the roads and the food systems the whole country depends on.
The military government formed by the 2020 and 2021 coups under General Assimi Goïta — sovereigntist in rhetoric, Russian-partnered in security, and since 2025 under the most serious military and economic pressure of its tenure.
The rebuilt, Russian-partnered military that retook the north in 2023 and lost much of it again in 2026 — expanded, drone-armed, and stretched across three fronts.
The al-Qaeda-aligned coalition under Iyad Ag Ghaly — the war’s strongest non-state force, now waging economic siege against the capital and coordinated offensives with the FLA.
FLA and JNIM waves in April and July 2026 that took Kidal, reached Bamako's approaches and left the far north largely outside state presence. The significance is structural rather than territorial: two movements with incompatible end-states are fighting as one, and Anéfis changed hands twice inside a week.
April 2026 – presentConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
April wave — Kidal and Kati25 April – May 2026
→July wave — Anéfis and the capital's approaches4 – 10 July 2026
A declared blockade of Mali's fuel-import corridors, prosecuted by burning tanker convoys rather than by taking ground. Declared in September 2025, eased in early 2026 and reimposed on 28 April. Neither broken nor decisive: convoys still move, escorted and costlier.
Declared September 2025; eased and reimposed sinceConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
Westward expansion2024 – mid-2025
→The Kayes–Nioro blockadeJune – September 2025
→Declared national blockadeSeptember 2025 – early 2026
→EasingEarly 2026
→Reimposition and compounded pressureApril – July 2026
Sustained violence in Niger's western border region, where Islamic State Sahel, JNIM and the Nigerien army all kill civilians and analysts rank the state second among the three. In August 2026 the losses reached the capital, carried there by the army's own mutinous soldiers.
Documented pattern since 2025Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
A four-year encirclement of a Burkinabè provincial capital: roads mined, convoys ambushed, surrounding populations driven inside, and resupply by air. The town has not fallen, which is the point — this is a method for making a place ungovernable without capturing it.
Since February 2022Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-08
Encirclement and population concentrationFebruary – October 2022
→Attrition on the relief columnsSeptember 2022 – 2023
→Mass assaults without captureNovember 2023 – September 2025
What kind of ground this is and what it does to movement in general.
A seasonally flooded inland delta the size of Switzerland, where the Niger spreads into channels and marshes from September to December. Water, not roads, sets who moves and when — and the same flood calendar governs the herding, farming and fishing rights the centre's violence is built on.
Central MaliConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-084 mapped constrictions
Flat, open desert giving way to Sahelian scrub, where distance rather than terrain is the obstacle. Three consequences follow: attack reach is not control, the side with the lighter logistics wins the geography, and sanctuary in the Adrar has let northern rebellions recur rather than conclude.
Northern MaliConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-074 mapped constrictions
The Mali side of the Niger bend between Gao and Niamey, where three states meet across ground none of them has ever fully administered. Seasonal rainfall drives herding movement across the borders, and the same routes carry the region's deadliest insurgent competition.
Eastern MaliConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-084 mapped constrictions
The Sudanian belt between Bamako and the Atlantic ports, carrying Mali's fuel corridor, its main railway and its industrial goldfields on the same narrow band of ground. It is the country's economic spine, and until 2025 it was the part of Mali the war had not reached.
Western MaliConfidence: Moderateas of 2026-084 mapped constrictions
Burkina Faso imports 98% of its merchandise by sea and moves it inland by road through Lomé, Abidjan, Cotonou and Tema. The Lomé axis alone carries about 40% of cargo, and the state fuel monopoly holds its transit storage in four neighbouring countries rather than at home.
Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-083 disruptions recorded
Lomé–Ouagadougou corridorPrimary corridorThe largest of the four, carrying about 40% of all cargo entering the country, from a port that handled 30.6 million tonnes in 2024 and whose transit traffic is 92% bound for AES states.
→OuagadougouRegional hubDestination and distribution point, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.
Three overland routes from Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea carry Mali's entire fuel supply; with no refining, pipeline or rail alternative at scale, dependence is total. They have been under a declared blockade since September 2025, with several hundred tankers reported destroyed.
Confidence: Highas of 2026-085 disruptions recorded
Bamako–Dakar corridorPrimary corridorThe western route to the Atlantic through Senegal, and the axis on which the heaviest reported tanker losses occurred from late 2025.
→Bamako–Abidjan corridorPrimary corridorThe southern route to Côte d'Ivoire's ports, carrying the balance of fuel and container trade as pressure on the Dakar axis increased.
→KayesTransit nodeThe western regional centre on the Dakar corridor; fuel queues here are one of the reported measures of the blockade's bite.
→KitaTransit nodeRail and road town on the Bamako–Kayes stretch.
→SikassoTransit nodeThe southern regional centre through which the Abidjan corridor runs.
→BamakoRegional hubDestination and distribution point for national fuel supply, and the place where shortage becomes politically visible.
Between 70% and 80% of Niger's imports once passed through Cotonou, and Nigerien cargo was around 80% of that port's transit. A bridge closure and a transit suspension in 2023 collapsed the route; traffic moved to Lomé, Abidjan, Dakar and Nouakchott at higher cost.
Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-084 disruptions recorded
Cotonou–Niamey corridorPrimary corridorThe historic principal route, carrying 70–80% of imports before 2023 and largely closed since.
→NiameyRegional hubDestination and distribution point for national imports.
Forces in the far north are sustained on one axis — Gao through Anéfis toward Kidal — with no surface alternative of comparable capacity and no air substitute at scale. Because that axis runs on imported fuel, northern sustainment is a second-order dependency on the corridors JNIM is blockading.
Confidence: Moderateas of 2026-074 disruptions recorded
Gao–Kidal corridorPrimary corridorThe desert road north from Gao through Anéfis to Kidal.
→GaoRegional hubThe northern logistics base and the anchor of any northern presence.
→SévaréRegional hubThe central hub covering the Mopti region and the approaches from the south.
→AnéfisChokepointThe road junction connecting Gao to Kidal and the far north.
→KidalTransit nodeThe northern terminus of the axis and the far north's political centre; held by the state 2023–2026, taken by the FLA in April 2026.
→TessalitTransit nodeFar-northern border town, reportedly evacuated by government and Russian forces in the April 2026 withdrawals.
Context, not targeting. This module publishes no current unit positions, strengths or movements, no facility detail, and no operational guidance — those classes of content have no fields in Vigil's schemas and cannot be authored. Every card is a summary of a canonical record; follow its link for the full text, its sources and its stated limits. See the methodology and the corrections log.
