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戰役

2022年2月的入侵與基輔之敗

一場四路並進的開局戰役,假定一個國家會在數日內崩潰,而六週的時間證明了它不會。

2022年2月 – 4月 東部戰線

已結束
評估截至
2022-05
最後檢視
2026-07-26

評估高信心

提供背景,而非指引目標。戰役紀錄在已發表分析的層級上描述目標、參與方、階段與結果;其中不包含任何當前陣地、兵力對比、部隊位置或兵力規模。

定位圖 — 陸地輪廓取自Natural Earth 110m(公有領域);此紀錄提及的7個地點,標於本模組已公布的座標。圖中未繪製任何路線、邊界、控制範圍或活動。

此戰役是什麼

Russia's multi-axis invasion of February 2022 aimed at rapid political collapse rather than at defeating an army, and failed at Kyiv within six weeks. The withdrawal from the north converted a planned regime change into the attritional war that followed, and set both sides' subsequent posture.

Everything after this campaign is shaped by its failure. It converted an intended coup de main into an attritional war neither side had planned or resourced; it established that Ukraine would fight and that Western states would supply it; it produced the atrocities at Bucha that ended any prospect of an early negotiated settlement; and it delivered the southern land corridor that remains Russia's most significant territorial gain and the object of every subsequent Ukrainian offensive.

信心:高 截至2022-05檢視於2026-07-26

摘要

Russian forces entered Ukraine on multiple axes on 24 February 2022 — from Belarus toward Kyiv, from the north-east toward Kharkiv and Sumy, from the Donbas, and from Crimea into the south. The design assumed the Ukrainian state would collapse quickly: airborne troops seized Hostomel airport outside Kyiv on the first day in an attempt to open an air bridge, columns advanced on road axes with limited infantry protection, and the operation was conducted with a secrecy that left many Russian units unaware of their mission until it began. Hostomel was contested and the air bridge never opened. The northern advance stalled on constrained forested and marshy approaches, and Russian forces withdrew from the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy axes by early April. In the south, the campaign achieved its most durable result: a land corridor to Crimea, taken at the cost of the siege and destruction of Mariupol.

宣示目標

參與方所說的內容。每一條目都註明立場的提出出處;Vigil記錄的是該立場曾被提出,而非其為真。

經評估的目標

Vigil的解讀,附等級。在結構上與宣示立場分開,因此評估永遠不會被當作某一方的宣示目標發布。

主要部隊

  • 俄羅斯武裝部隊 主要部隊 · 信心:高 · 截至2022-04

    The invading force as a whole. Component commands are recorded separately where the module publishes them.

對立部隊

  • 烏克蘭武裝部隊 對立部隊 · 信心:高 · 截至2022-04
  • 國民警衛隊 對立部隊 · 信心:高 · 截至2022-05

    National Guard formations, including the Azov Regiment, were central to the defence of Mariupol.

  • 國土防衛部隊 對立部隊 · 信心:高 · 截至2022-04

    Territorial Defence expanded enormously in the opening weeks and held urban approaches the regular army could not cover simultaneously.

支援方與外部方

  • 空降軍(VDV) Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2022-02

    The Hostomel air-assault operation on the first day is the clearest documented VDV action of the campaign and its clearest failure.

階段

2022年3月 信心:高

The northern advance stalls

The advance on Kyiv did not develop. Constrained approaches, unprotected road columns, ambushed logistics and a defence that did not collapse produced a stalled envelopment rather than a seizure. The air bridge was never opened.

來源: ISW campaign assessments↗ · RUSI component and capability analyses↗

結果與目前狀態

A failed campaign with one durable achievement. Russia did not take Kyiv, did not replace the government, and withdrew entirely from the northern axes within six weeks; it did establish and retain a land corridor from the Donbas to Crimea. The strategic result was to convert a war designed to end in days into one measured in years, on terms — attrition, industrial supply, political endurance — that neither side had prepared for.

觀察到的調整

政治意涵

Bucha ended the Istanbul negotiating track and made a negotiated settlement politically unavailable in Kyiv for the foreseeable future.

軍事意涵

Established that the Russian army could not conduct a rapid deep operation against a defended state, and that Ukraine could absorb an opening blow.

人道意涵

Produced the war's largest single displacement wave and, at Mariupol, its most complete destruction of a major city.

仍然未知的事項

  • Russian planning documents are not public. The intended timetable and objectives are inferred from force composition, axis selection and captured material rather than from disclosure.
  • Casualty figures for the opening period are contested by an order of magnitude between the parties and are not stated here.
  • The Istanbul negotiations of March–April 2022 have been described inconsistently by participants, and what was actually on the table remains disputed.

證據同樣支持的其他解讀

  • The failure at Kyiv can be read as the collapse of a bad plan, or as a deliberate fixing operation intended to hold Ukrainian forces in the north while the south was taken. The second reading is asserted mainly by Russian officials after the fact; the force composition and the losses sustained fit the first more closely, but the module records that both readings exist.
  • The withdrawal from the north can be read as a defeat or as a negotiated de-escalation gesture during the Istanbul talks, which were live at the time. The subsequent revelation at Bucha makes the distinction largely academic in its effects, but not in what it implies about Russian decision-making.

列出這些解讀,是因為該紀錄本身的評估並非其來源所允許的唯一評估 — 而不是對上述評估的保留。

觀察重點

兩國政府事後如何描述這場戰役

Both have revised their public account of the opening period. Changes in how it is narrated track changes in what each is preparing to accept in any settlement.

布查與馬立波的問責程序

International investigations continue. Their progress is the clearest measure of whether the campaign's civilian record has legal consequences.

在探索中檢視執行此戰役的部隊 互動式:選取此紀錄並追蹤與其關聯的內容。

評估截至 — 2022-05 最近檢視 — 2026-07-26

相關紀錄

此戰役所提及、或提及此戰役的紀錄共13筆——每一筆都是已發布紀錄中的明確引用,沒有任何一筆是依主題推斷而來。