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Kampagne

Die Invasion vom Februar 2022 und das Scheitern vor Kyiv

Die Eröffnungskampagne auf vier Achsen, die davon ausging, dass ein Staat binnen Tagen zusammenbrechen würde, und die sechs Wochen, die zeigten, dass er es nicht tun würde.

Februar – April 2022 Die Ostfront

Abgeschlossen
Eingeschätzt zum Stand
2022-05
Zuletzt überprüft
2026-07-26

EinschätzungHohe Konfidenz

Kontext, keine Zielerfassung. Kampagneneinträge beschreiben Ziele, Beteiligte, Phasen und Ergebnisse auf der Ebene veröffentlichter Analysen; sie enthalten keine aktuellen Stellungen, Kräfteverhältnisse, Standorte oder Stärken von Einheiten.

Übersichtskarte — Landumriss aus Natural Earth 110m (gemeinfrei); 6 Orte, die dieser Eintrag nennt, an den Koordinaten, die das Modul bereits veröffentlicht. Es sind keine Routen, Grenzen, Kontrolle oder Aktivität eingezeichnet.

Was diese Kampagne war

Russia's multi-axis invasion of February 2022 aimed at rapid political collapse rather than at defeating an army, and failed at Kyiv within six weeks. The withdrawal from the north converted a planned regime change into the attritional war that followed, and set both sides' subsequent posture.

Everything after this campaign is shaped by its failure. It converted an intended coup de main into an attritional war neither side had planned or resourced; it established that Ukraine would fight and that Western states would supply it; it produced the atrocities at Bucha that ended any prospect of an early negotiated settlement; and it delivered the southern land corridor that remains Russia's most significant territorial gain and the object of every subsequent Ukrainian offensive.

Konfidenz: hoch Stand 2022-05Überprüft am 2026-07-26

Zusammenfassung

Russian forces entered Ukraine on multiple axes on 24 February 2022 — from Belarus toward Kyiv, from the north-east toward Kharkiv and Sumy, from the Donbas, and from Crimea into the south. The design assumed the Ukrainian state would collapse quickly: airborne troops seized Hostomel airport outside Kyiv on the first day in an attempt to open an air bridge, columns advanced on road axes with limited infantry protection, and the operation was conducted with a secrecy that left many Russian units unaware of their mission until it began. Hostomel was contested and the air bridge never opened. The northern advance stalled on constrained forested and marshy approaches, and Russian forces withdrew from the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy axes by early April. In the south, the campaign achieved its most durable result: a land corridor to Crimea, taken at the cost of the siege and destruction of Mariupol.

Erklärte Ziele

Was die Beteiligten sagen. Jeder Eintrag nennt, wo die Position geäußert wurde; Vigil hält fest, dass sie geäußert wurde, nicht dass sie zutrifft.

Eingeschätzte Ziele

Vigils Lesart, eingestuft. Strukturell von erklärten Positionen getrennt gehalten, damit eine Einschätzung nie als erklärtes Ziel von jemandem veröffentlicht werden kann.

Hauptkräfte

  • Armed Forces of Russia Hauptkraft · Konfidenz: hoch · Stand 2022-04

    The invading force as a whole. Component commands are recorded separately where the module publishes them.

Gegnerische Kräfte

  • Armed Forces of Ukraine Gegnerische Kraft · Konfidenz: hoch · Stand 2022-04
  • National Guard Gegnerische Kraft · Konfidenz: hoch · Stand 2022-05

    National Guard formations, including the Azov Regiment, were central to the defence of Mariupol.

  • Territorial Defence Forces Gegnerische Kraft · Konfidenz: hoch · Stand 2022-04

    Territorial Defence expanded enormously in the opening weeks and held urban approaches the regular army could not cover simultaneously.

Unterstützend und extern

  • Airborne Forces (VDV) Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2022-02

    The Hostomel air-assault operation on the first day is the clearest documented VDV action of the campaign and its clearest failure.

Phasen

24. Februar 2022 Konfidenz: hoch

Opening strikes and the four axes

Missile and air strikes across the country preceded ground entry on four broad axes — from Belarus toward Kyiv, from the north-east, from the Donbas, and from Crimea. The airborne assault on Hostomel aimed to open an air bridge into the capital's approaches on the first day.

Quellen: ISW campaign assessments↗ · Reuters↗ · Established historical record

März 2022 Konfidenz: hoch

The northern advance stalls

The advance on Kyiv did not develop. Constrained approaches, unprotected road columns, ambushed logistics and a defence that did not collapse produced a stalled envelopment rather than a seizure. The air bridge was never opened.

Quellen: ISW campaign assessments↗ · RUSI component and capability analyses↗

Ausgang und heutiger Stand

A failed campaign with one durable achievement. Russia did not take Kyiv, did not replace the government, and withdrew entirely from the northern axes within six weeks; it did establish and retain a land corridor from the Donbas to Crimea. The strategic result was to convert a war designed to end in days into one measured in years, on terms — attrition, industrial supply, political endurance — that neither side had prepared for.

Beobachtete Anpassungen

Politische Implikationen

Bucha ended the Istanbul negotiating track and made a negotiated settlement politically unavailable in Kyiv for the foreseeable future.

Militärische Folgen

Established that the Russian army could not conduct a rapid deep operation against a defended state, and that Ukraine could absorb an opening blow.

Humanitäre Folgen

Produced the war's largest single displacement wave and, at Mariupol, its most complete destruction of a major city.

Was unbekannt bleibt

  • Russian planning documents are not public. The intended timetable and objectives are inferred from force composition, axis selection and captured material rather than from disclosure.
  • Casualty figures for the opening period are contested by an order of magnitude between the parties and are not stated here.
  • The Istanbul negotiations of March–April 2022 have been described inconsistently by participants, and what was actually on the table remains disputed.

Lesarten, die die Belege ebenfalls stützen

  • The failure at Kyiv can be read as the collapse of a bad plan, or as a deliberate fixing operation intended to hold Ukrainian forces in the north while the south was taken. The second reading is asserted mainly by Russian officials after the fact; the force composition and the losses sustained fit the first more closely, but the module records that both readings exist.
  • The withdrawal from the north can be read as a defeat or as a negotiated de-escalation gesture during the Istanbul talks, which were live at the time. The subsequent revelation at Bucha makes the distinction largely academic in its effects, but not in what it implies about Russian decision-making.

Aufgeführt, weil die Einschätzung des Eintrags nicht die einzige ist, die seine Quellen zulassen — nicht als Absicherung der obigen Einschätzung.

Worauf zu achten ist

Wie beide Regierungen die Kampagne im Rückblick beschreiben

Both have revised their public account of the opening period. Changes in how it is narrated track changes in what each is preparing to accept in any settlement.

Aufarbeitungsverfahren zu Bucha und Mariupol

International investigations continue. Their progress is the clearest measure of whether the campaign's civilian record has legal consequences.

Die Kräfte, die dies führen, in Erkunden ansehen Interaktiv: Wählen Sie diesen Eintrag aus und verfolgen Sie, was mit ihm verbunden ist.

Eingeschätzt zum Stand — 2022-05 Zuletzt überprüft — 2026-07-26

Verknüpfte Einträge

13 Einträge, die diese Kampagne nennt oder die sie nennen — in jedem Fall ein ausdrücklicher Verweis in einem veröffentlichten Eintrag, nichts aus dem Themenbereich abgeleitet.