ما كانت هذه الحملة
Russia's multi-axis invasion of February 2022 aimed at rapid political collapse rather than at defeating an army, and failed at Kyiv within six weeks. The withdrawal from the north converted a planned regime change into the attritional war that followed, and set both sides' subsequent posture.
Everything after this campaign is shaped by its failure. It converted an intended coup de main into an attritional war neither side had planned or resourced; it established that Ukraine would fight and that Western states would supply it; it produced the atrocities at Bucha that ended any prospect of an early negotiated settlement; and it delivered the southern land corridor that remains Russia's most significant territorial gain and the object of every subsequent Ukrainian offensive.
الثقة: عالية حتى 2022-05رُوجع 2026-07-26
ملخص
Russian forces entered Ukraine on multiple axes on 24 February 2022 — from Belarus toward Kyiv, from the north-east toward Kharkiv and Sumy, from the Donbas, and from Crimea into the south. The design assumed the Ukrainian state would collapse quickly: airborne troops seized Hostomel airport outside Kyiv on the first day in an attempt to open an air bridge, columns advanced on road axes with limited infantry protection, and the operation was conducted with a secrecy that left many Russian units unaware of their mission until it began. Hostomel was contested and the air bridge never opened. The northern advance stalled on constrained forested and marshy approaches, and Russian forces withdrew from the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy axes by early April. In the south, the campaign achieved its most durable result: a land corridor to Crimea, taken at the cost of the siege and destruction of Mariupol.
الأهداف المعلنة
ما يقوله المشاركون. يذكر كل بند الموضع الذي أُعلن فيه الموقف؛ ويسجل Vigil أنه صدر، لا أنه صحيح.
Russia stated the operation's purposes as the "demilitarisation" and "denazification" of Ukraine and the protection of the populations of the Donbas, presenting it as a limited special military operation rather than a war.
Ukraine stated its objective as the defence of the state within its internationally recognised borders, and declared martial law and general mobilisation on the first day.
الأهداف بحسب التقييم
قراءة Vigil، مصنّفة بدرجات. وتُفصل بنيويًا عن المواقف المعلنة كي لا يُنشر تقييمٌ أبدًا على أنه هدف أعلنه أحد.
The operational design implies a political objective rather than a military one: seizure of the capital and replacement of the government, on a timetable measured in days. The force committed was too small to occupy Ukraine and the axes too dispersed to defeat its army.
The southern axis appears to have been the best-prepared and was the only one to meet its objectives, which suggests preparation was uneven across commands rather than uniformly poor.
القوات الرئيسية
- القوات المسلحة الروسية القوة الرئيسية · الثقة: عالية · حتى 2022-04
The invading force as a whole. Component commands are recorded separately where the module publishes them.
القوات المقابلة
- القوات المسلحة الأوكرانية قوة مقابلة · الثقة: عالية · حتى 2022-04
- الحرس الوطني قوة مقابلة · الثقة: عالية · حتى 2022-05
National Guard formations, including the Azov Regiment, were central to the defence of Mariupol.
- قوات الدفاع الإقليمي قوة مقابلة · الثقة: عالية · حتى 2022-04
Territorial Defence expanded enormously in the opening weeks and held urban approaches the regular army could not cover simultaneously.
الداعمون والأطراف الخارجية
- القوات المحمولة جوًا (VDV) Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2022-02
The Hostomel air-assault operation on the first day is the clearest documented VDV action of the campaign and its clearest failure.
Opening strikes and the four axes
Missile and air strikes across the country preceded ground entry on four broad axes — from Belarus toward Kyiv, from the north-east, from the Donbas, and from Crimea. The airborne assault on Hostomel aimed to open an air bridge into the capital's approaches on the first day.
The northern advance stalls
The advance on Kyiv did not develop. Constrained approaches, unprotected road columns, ambushed logistics and a defence that did not collapse produced a stalled envelopment rather than a seizure. The air bridge was never opened.
Mariupol and the southern land corridor
The southern axis achieved what the others did not, linking Crimea to the Donbas by land. Mariupol was besieged, largely destroyed and taken after a final defence in the Azovstal works — the campaign's most consequential and most costly single action.
Withdrawal from the north, and what it revealed
Russian forces withdrew from the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy axes, redeploying to the east. The recapture of the northern suburbs revealed mass civilian killings at Bucha and elsewhere, which ended the negotiating track then under way in Istanbul.
النتيجة والوضع الحالي
A failed campaign with one durable achievement. Russia did not take Kyiv, did not replace the government, and withdrew entirely from the northern axes within six weeks; it did establish and retain a land corridor from the Donbas to Crimea. The strategic result was to convert a war designed to end in days into one measured in years, on terms — attrition, industrial supply, political endurance — that neither side had prepared for.
التكيّفات المرصودة
Ukrainian forces adapted rapidly to dispersed small-unit defence against road columns, using anti-tank weapons supplied immediately before and during the invasion in a way that pre-war planning had not anticipated.
Russian forces abandoned the multi-axis design after April and concentrated on the east, a shift from a political objective to a territorial one that has governed their approach since.
التداعيات السياسية
Bucha ended the Istanbul negotiating track and made a negotiated settlement politically unavailable in Kyiv for the foreseeable future.
التداعيات العسكرية
Established that the Russian army could not conduct a rapid deep operation against a defended state, and that Ukraine could absorb an opening blow.
التداعيات الإنسانية
Produced the war's largest single displacement wave and, at Mariupol, its most complete destruction of a major city.
الأحداث المرتبطة
المواقع
أماكن ينشرها هذا الملف أصلًا بوصفها علامات على الخريطة، وتُدرج لأن الحملة تتعلق بها. ليست منطقة عمليات.
ما لا يزال مجهولًا
- Russian planning documents are not public. The intended timetable and objectives are inferred from force composition, axis selection and captured material rather than from disclosure.
- Casualty figures for the opening period are contested by an order of magnitude between the parties and are not stated here.
- The Istanbul negotiations of March–April 2022 have been described inconsistently by participants, and what was actually on the table remains disputed.
قراءات تدعمها الأدلة أيضًا
- The failure at Kyiv can be read as the collapse of a bad plan, or as a deliberate fixing operation intended to hold Ukrainian forces in the north while the south was taken. The second reading is asserted mainly by Russian officials after the fact; the force composition and the losses sustained fit the first more closely, but the module records that both readings exist.
- The withdrawal from the north can be read as a defeat or as a negotiated de-escalation gesture during the Istanbul talks, which were live at the time. The subsequent revelation at Bucha makes the distinction largely academic in its effects, but not in what it implies about Russian decision-making.
مُدرجة لأن تقييم السجل نفسه ليس التقييم الوحيد الذي تسمح به مصادره — لا بوصفها تحوّطًا من التقييم أعلاه.
كيف تصف الحكومتان الحملة بأثر رجعي
Both have revised their public account of the opening period. Changes in how it is narrated track changes in what each is preparing to accept in any settlement.
إجراءات المساءلة بشأن بوتشا وماريوبول
International investigations continue. Their progress is the clearest measure of whether the campaign's civilian record has legal consequences.
اعرض القوة التي تدير هذه الحملة في «استكشف» تفاعلي: اختر هذا السجل وتتبّع ما يرتبط به.
التقييم حتى — 2022-05 آخر مراجعة — 2026-07-26