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What could change the picture on Taiwan Strait.

6 standing questions Vigil is following on this conflict, each with the evidence that would change the assessment and a dated review ledger.

Open Watch in Explore
Active questions
6
Changed this review
3
Quiet but important
1
Resolved
0
Last reviewed

This review 3 questions moved — new evidence, a named test met, or a changed assessment. Reviewed .

Lead changeCivil Resilience

Can the energy system absorb a prolonged interruption?

The published stockpile requirements, the generation mix and the reactor restart review — not a synthetic days-of-energy figure.

Latest reviewMovement observed

Observed

A supplementary budget before the legislature carries an energy share. The requirements, the mix and the restart review are unchanged; the assessment holds.

Assessment

New evidence bears on the question; the assessment holds. The condition stands as of .

Watchboard 6 standing questions across 1 conflict. Select a question to see where it stands.

Domain

6 questions

Quiet but important Checked repeatedly and found the same, with a stated reason why the absence matters.

  1. Military

    Is coast guard activity becoming sustained enforcement rather than signalling?

    1. 2026-08-02: Baseline
    2. 2026-08-09: No material change
    3. 2026-08-16: No material change
    4. 2026-08-23: No material change
    5. 2026-08-28: No material change
    6. 2026-08-30: Movement observed
    7. 2026-09-06: No material change

    1 review without material change

    Each month in which the Kinmen model stays at Kinmen is evidence about the threshold: the capability to extend it exists, and the choice not to is the finding the standing count records.

Local record tests 3 further entries on the module’s standing watch list that stayed with the conflict record — record-specific tests rather than canonical questions.

3 local entriesrecord-specific tests on the module’s standing watch list
  • Are Japanese and Philippine positions changing what is materially available?

    Japanese defence-policy statements and the PRC's economic response to them; Philippine access arrangements and exercise patterns in northern Luzon and the Batanes group. The distinction that matters is between a political signal, a legal obligation and a granted access that remains revocable. Philippine contingency planning is publicly oriented toward evacuating its own nationals from Taiwan rather than toward intervention, and nothing here should be read as a commitment that has not been made.

  • Which economic instruments are being used, and in which direction?

    Trade restrictions, tariff investigations, tourism controls and targeted measures — applied to Taiwan and, since late 2025, to Japan. The inducement side belongs here too: the August 2026 Xiamen package offered Kinmen bridge, electricity and gas connections, which would create dependence rather than impose cost. Economic instruments are the most-used in this system and the least covered.

  • Is advanced-node capacity actually diversifying away from the island?

    Overseas fab milestones against Taiwan-based expansion, and the export-control rules that shape both. On completion of announced fabs, roughly 30 per cent of TSMC's 2nm-and-beyond capacity is projected to sit in Arizona — a real change, stated as future-conditional rather than current. Keep two measures apart: TSMC's share of the foundry market is a company figure, and the share of advanced chips fabricated on Taiwan is a geographic one, and they are not interchangeable.