MIM-104愛國者飛彈

紀錄

衝突關聯性

這是本目錄中此系統的唯一紀錄。它與下方的各模組相關；各模組的Force Atlas會顯示它在該處的使用方式。

使用方

Saudi Arabia: The kingdom's main missile defence since 1991, under the separate Air Defense Forces; engaged years of Houthi missiles during the Yemen campaign. · United Arab Emirates: The middle tier of the federation's missile defence, under the Air Force and Air Defence. · Qatar: Batteries defending the Ras Laffan complex, under the Emiri Air Force. · Kuwait: Under the Air Force's air-defence command; Kuwait reported its air defences engaging drones and missiles on 1–2 September 2026. · Bahrain: A small holding for an island state that hosts the American naval command. · The United States in the Gulf: Army batteries rotate through the theatre under the land component's air and missile defence command. · Ukraine: donated batteries from 2023 · Poland and the eastern flank: The Wisła programme: a first phase contracted in 2018 and delivered from 2022, whose 37th Air Defence Missile Squadron reached full operational capability on 18 December 2025 under the IBCS command system, per the ministry; a second phase contracted in 2023, with launchers due 2027–2029. Programme facts only. · Germany and the eastern flank: The Bundeswehr's long-range ground-based air defence; a further batch was contracted in 2024 through the NATO Support and Procurement Agency. Its deployment in Poland protecting the logistics hub for support to Ukraine, part of NATO integrated air and missile defence, ran from January to December 2025 and has ended. No holdings recorded. · Netherlands and the eastern flank: In Dutch service since the 1980s under the army's ground-based air defence command. Deployed to Poland from 1 December 2025 to protect the logistics hub for support to Ukraine, taking over from Germany; the ministry extended it to early December 2026 at the latest. No holdings recorded. · Sweden and the eastern flank: Contracted in 2018 as Luftvärnssystem 103 and declared in service by the Swedish Armed Forces in 2021; no holdings recorded. · Romania and the eastern flank: Contracted in 2017; the first system was accepted in 2020, and the 74th Patriot Regiment completed certification in December 2024, as reported from the ministry. Romania's transfer of one system to Ukraine was announced in 2024 and is recorded under donors.

戰場角色

烏克蘭防空的上層——公開被認為完成其城市上空例行彈道飛彈攔截的系統。

優勢

Proven against ballistic targets including hypersonic-marketed Kinzhal missiles; forward "Patriot ambush" tactics have downed combat aircraft deep behind the front.

限制

Each engagement spends missiles that cost far more than most targets, and the batteries are high-value targets themselves. The number of launchers fielded is not the variable that matters; the rate at which interceptors are replaced is, and that rate is not published. Reported interception against ballistic missiles has been low since the second half of 2025 — a decline that predates the interceptor-exhaustion claims made in mid-2026 — and this module does not attribute it to a single cause. See `publiclyDocumentedUse` for the competing explanations and for why the reported rate is difficult to read at all.

與戰役的關聯

推導所得：這些戰役中的一個參與組織，與此系統有一筆具類型的裝備關聯。這並不等同於有文件記錄該系統在戰役本身中的使用。

• 沙烏地–胡塞紅海戰線，2026年回合 Since 13 July 2026

  via Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces (Documented)

• 烏克蘭縱深打擊戰役 自2022年起

  via Air Force (Documented, high confidence)

• 針對烏克蘭電力系統的戰略攻勢 Since October 2022

  via Surface-to-Air Missile Forces (Documented, high confidence); Air Force (Documented, high confidence)

外觀識別

Towed launcher stations, each with four large rectangular canisters angled skyward; separate flat-faced phased-array radar vehicle; typically dispersed as a battery, not a single vehicle.

有文件記錄的衝突使用

In documented Ukrainian service since spring 2023; publicly credited with the first Kinzhal intercepts and with forward ambushes against Russian aviation. WHY BALLISTIC INTERCEPTION IS LOW — UNRESOLVED. Reported interception against ballistic missiles fell through 2025: specialist analysis records roughly 37 per cent across attacks in summer 2025, about 17 per cent over 1–24 October 2025, and around 15 per cent across 2025 as a whole, with a majority of individual attacks producing no interceptions at all. At least three explanations are live and this record ranks none of them. RUSI attributes the decline primarily to Russian missile improvement — steeper trajectories permitting terminal manoeuvre, improved decoys, and coordinated salvos — while stating that no conclusive answer is yet possible. Independent missile analysis ranks trajectory adaptation most plausible, notes that Russia may increasingly strike undefended areas where no engagement is attempted, and observes that interceptor scarcity cannot by itself explain a fall that began before the shortages being cited. A fourth difficulty sits underneath all of them: Ukraine does not publish how many incoming missiles were engaged, so a published interception rate has no denominator and cannot be read as a measure of system performance. PRODUCTION AND LICENSING — SEPARATE THINGS. Announced capacity, actual production and arrival in Ukraine are three different quantities. Actual PAC-3 MSE output was 620 interceptors in 2025, against a baseline rate of about 600 a year; a seven-year framework agreed in January 2026 targets 2,000 a year by 2030, and interceptors funded under an April 2026 contract are assessed as unlikely to arrive before mid-2028. That output is not Ukraine's: 94 per cent of the funding is Foreign Military Sales, with an allied order backlog of more than 4,300 rounds — roughly seven years of output at 2025 rates. Named bottlenecks are seeker production and solid rocket motors, both under expansion contracts and neither established as resolved. Separately, licensed Ukrainian co-production was pledged at the July 2026 NATO summit, publicly disowned by the US president on 31 July, described by the US ambassador to NATO on 3 August as something that would not be concluded before winter, and asserted as decided by President Zelensky in August without US confirmation. As of 14 August 2026 there was no licence, no contract and no delivery. Ukrainian holdings and delivery volumes are not public and are not stated here. NATO EASTERN FLANK. Patriot is the upper tier of the flank's ground-based air defence and the system through which the interceptor-supply problem above reaches the Alliance: the same PAC-3 MSE production line serves Ukraine, the Gulf and the allied order backlog. Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Romania operate it; Poland's Wisła programme and the 2024 NSPA joint procurement are the published programme facts the module tracks under its air-defence-production economy object. Rotational US Army batteries on the flank are recorded on the organisation side, not here. No holdings, sites or deployments are stated. The Taiwan PAC-3 fleet is a separate per-module record (patriot-pac3-taiwan).

軍種與兵種使用方

• 德國空軍 有文件記錄
• 科威特空軍 有文件記錄
• 卡達埃米爾空軍 有文件記錄
• 羅馬尼亞空軍 有文件記錄
• 羅馬尼亞陸軍 有文件記錄
• 沙烏地皇家防空部隊 有文件記錄
• 地對空飛彈部隊 有文件記錄
• 空軍 有文件記錄
• 阿聯空軍及防空部隊 有文件記錄
• 美國中央陸軍司令部 有文件記錄

有文件記錄的部隊

• 國防地面防空司令部 有文件記錄 · 高信心
• 第96防空飛彈旅 有文件記錄 · 高信心