باتريوت MIM-104

السجل

الصلة بالنزاعات

هذا هو السجل الوحيد لهذا النظام في الكتالوج. وهو ذو صلة بالملفات أدناه؛ ويُظهر Force Atlas الخاص بكل ملف كيف يُستخدم فيه.

المشغّلون

Saudi Arabia: The kingdom's main missile defence since 1991, under the separate Air Defense Forces; engaged years of Houthi missiles during the Yemen campaign. · United Arab Emirates: The middle tier of the federation's missile defence, under the Air Force and Air Defence. · Qatar: Batteries defending the Ras Laffan complex, under the Emiri Air Force. · Kuwait: Under the Air Force's air-defence command; Kuwait reported its air defences engaging drones and missiles on 1–2 September 2026. · Bahrain: A small holding for an island state that hosts the American naval command. · The United States in the Gulf: Army batteries rotate through the theatre under the land component's air and missile defence command. · Ukraine: donated batteries from 2023 · Poland and the eastern flank: The Wisła programme: a first phase contracted in 2018 and delivered from 2022, whose 37th Air Defence Missile Squadron reached full operational capability on 18 December 2025 under the IBCS command system, per the ministry; a second phase contracted in 2023, with launchers due 2027–2029. Programme facts only. · Germany and the eastern flank: The Bundeswehr's long-range ground-based air defence; a further batch was contracted in 2024 through the NATO Support and Procurement Agency. Its deployment in Poland protecting the logistics hub for support to Ukraine, part of NATO integrated air and missile defence, ran from January to December 2025 and has ended. No holdings recorded. · Netherlands and the eastern flank: In Dutch service since the 1980s under the army's ground-based air defence command. Deployed to Poland from 1 December 2025 to protect the logistics hub for support to Ukraine, taking over from Germany; the ministry extended it to early December 2026 at the latest. No holdings recorded. · Sweden and the eastern flank: Contracted in 2018 as Luftvärnssystem 103 and declared in service by the Swedish Armed Forces in 2021; no holdings recorded. · Romania and the eastern flank: Contracted in 2017; the first system was accepted in 2020, and the 74th Patriot Regiment completed certification in December 2024, as reported from the ministry. Romania's transfer of one system to Ukraine was announced in 2024 and is recorded under donors.

الدور في ساحة المعركة

المستوى الأعلى في الدفاع الجوي الأوكراني — المنظومة التي يُنسب إليها علنًا اعتراض الصواريخ الباليستية بصورة اعتيادية فوق المدن.

نقاط القوة

Proven against ballistic targets including hypersonic-marketed Kinzhal missiles; forward "Patriot ambush" tactics have downed combat aircraft deep behind the front.

مواطن القصور

Each engagement spends missiles that cost far more than most targets, and the batteries are high-value targets themselves. The number of launchers fielded is not the variable that matters; the rate at which interceptors are replaced is, and that rate is not published. Reported interception against ballistic missiles has been low since the second half of 2025 — a decline that predates the interceptor-exhaustion claims made in mid-2026 — and this module does not attribute it to a single cause. See `publiclyDocumentedUse` for the competing explanations and for why the reported rate is difficult to read at all.

الصلة بالحملات

مُستنتَج: تحمل جهةٌ مشاركة في هذه الحملات ارتباطًا مصنَّفًا بالمعدات مع هذا النظام. وهذا ليس مثل الاستخدام الموثّق للنظام في الحملة نفسها.

• الجبهة السعودية–الحوثية في البحر الأحمر، جولة 2026 منذ 13 يوليو 2026

  via Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces (Documented)

• حملة الضربات العميقة الأوكرانية منذ 2022

  via Air Force (Documented, high confidence)

• الحملة الاستراتيجية على منظومة الكهرباء الأوكرانية Since October 2022

  via Surface-to-Air Missile Forces (Documented, high confidence); Air Force (Documented, high confidence)

التعرّف البصري

Towed launcher stations, each with four large rectangular canisters angled skyward; separate flat-faced phased-array radar vehicle; typically dispersed as a battery, not a single vehicle.

الاستخدام الموثّق في النزاعات

In documented Ukrainian service since spring 2023; publicly credited with the first Kinzhal intercepts and with forward ambushes against Russian aviation. WHY BALLISTIC INTERCEPTION IS LOW — UNRESOLVED. Reported interception against ballistic missiles fell through 2025: specialist analysis records roughly 37 per cent across attacks in summer 2025, about 17 per cent over 1–24 October 2025, and around 15 per cent across 2025 as a whole, with a majority of individual attacks producing no interceptions at all. At least three explanations are live and this record ranks none of them. RUSI attributes the decline primarily to Russian missile improvement — steeper trajectories permitting terminal manoeuvre, improved decoys, and coordinated salvos — while stating that no conclusive answer is yet possible. Independent missile analysis ranks trajectory adaptation most plausible, notes that Russia may increasingly strike undefended areas where no engagement is attempted, and observes that interceptor scarcity cannot by itself explain a fall that began before the shortages being cited. A fourth difficulty sits underneath all of them: Ukraine does not publish how many incoming missiles were engaged, so a published interception rate has no denominator and cannot be read as a measure of system performance. PRODUCTION AND LICENSING — SEPARATE THINGS. Announced capacity, actual production and arrival in Ukraine are three different quantities. Actual PAC-3 MSE output was 620 interceptors in 2025, against a baseline rate of about 600 a year; a seven-year framework agreed in January 2026 targets 2,000 a year by 2030, and interceptors funded under an April 2026 contract are assessed as unlikely to arrive before mid-2028. That output is not Ukraine's: 94 per cent of the funding is Foreign Military Sales, with an allied order backlog of more than 4,300 rounds — roughly seven years of output at 2025 rates. Named bottlenecks are seeker production and solid rocket motors, both under expansion contracts and neither established as resolved. Separately, licensed Ukrainian co-production was pledged at the July 2026 NATO summit, publicly disowned by the US president on 31 July, described by the US ambassador to NATO on 3 August as something that would not be concluded before winter, and asserted as decided by President Zelensky in August without US confirmation. As of 14 August 2026 there was no licence, no contract and no delivery. Ukrainian holdings and delivery volumes are not public and are not stated here. NATO EASTERN FLANK. Patriot is the upper tier of the flank's ground-based air defence and the system through which the interceptor-supply problem above reaches the Alliance: the same PAC-3 MSE production line serves Ukraine, the Gulf and the allied order backlog. Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Romania operate it; Poland's Wisła programme and the 2024 NSPA joint procurement are the published programme facts the module tracks under its air-defence-production economy object. Rotational US Army batteries on the flank are recorded on the organisation side, not here. No holdings, sites or deployments are stated. The Taiwan PAC-3 fleet is a separate per-module record (patriot-pac3-taiwan).

الأفرع والصنوف المشغِّلة

• سلاح الجو الألماني موثق
• القوة الجوية الكويتية موثق
• القوات الجوية الأميرية القطرية موثق
• القوات الجوية الرومانية موثق
• القوات البرية الرومانية موثق
• قوات الدفاع الجوي الملكي السعودي موثق
• قوات الصواريخ أرض-جو موثق
• القوات الجوية موثق
• القوات الجوية والدفاع الجوي الإماراتية موثق
• القيادة المركزية للجيش الأمريكي موثق

التشكيلات الموثّقة

• قيادة الدفاع الجوي الأرضي موثّق · ثقة عالية
• لواء الصواريخ المضادة للطائرات 96 موثّق · ثقة عالية