- Institutional emblem · official · carried by Republic of China Armed Forces
- 國家隸屬 · 臺灣
- Vigil類別圖示 · 非官方徽記
識別來源
Institutional emblem: Flag of the Ministry of National Defense — the ministry these forces sit under — carried by Republic of China Armed Forces, not issued to this record. THE MINISTRY'S FLAG, NOT THE ARMED FORCES' OWN, and the label says so: the Republic of China Armed Forces are under civilian control through the Ministry of National Defense, and the ministry's flag is the institutional identity the whole structure sits beneath. The services that have flags of their own author them and override this; the ones that do not inherit it, which is the correct reading of what they are. WHAT CHANGED THE EARLIER REFUSAL. The Taiwan pass refused every ROC mark on the SYMBOL test — the ROC Copyright Act names no exclusion for military symbols, so no supplied file could clear. That reasoning was about the FILE'S LICENCE and was applied to a question it does not reach: this Commons file is tagged PUBLIC DOMAIN in its own right, with the ROC Ministry of National Defence recorded as the author of the original, so there is no licence to satisfy and no attribution or share-alike obligation attaches. FILE: Wikimedia Commons "ROC Ministry of National Defense Flag.svg", public domain. Optimised for web display — editor metadata removed and coordinate precision reduced to two decimals on a 1000-unit canvas; no path, colour, proportion or viewBox altered.
國家隸屬：臺灣。
較小的方形標記是Vigil的類別符號，依據本紀錄自身的領域、層級與角色繪製——並非官方徽章。
概要
臺灣負責資訊、通信、電子與網路功能的聯合指揮部——與本模組在海峽另一側所記錄的解放軍架構相對應。
- 範圍
- 結構、角色、沿革與連結。未發布任何下屬紀錄。
- 隸屬
- 隸屬：已證實
- 來源
- 紀錄所載：4
- 紀錄狀態
- 部分
- 廣泛活動地區
- Taiwan's military networks and the electromagnetic environment around the island
- 重要歷史
- Stood up on 29 June 2017 and reporting to the Ministry of National Defense rather than to any single service, which is the same design decision the PLA made in 2015 and revisited in 2024 — a joint information command sitting beside the services rather than inside one. Its published tasks are electronic warfare, information and network defence, and the operation and maintenance of military communications. The command was restructured on 1 January 2026: several communications groups and an offshore-islands element returned to army control, and a protection command was reorganised directly under the headquarters. The direction of that change — narrowing a joint command back toward a core function while returning service-specific communications units to the services — is the fact worth recording; its rationale has not been stated publicly.
- 優勢
- A joint command outside the service structure, which is the arrangement that lets an information function be resourced without competing inside one service's budget. Taiwan's networks are also unusually well exercised: the annual Urban Resilience programme and the August 2026 mobile-network throttling drills tested continuity at population scale rather than in a laboratory.
- 限制
- Almost nothing about this command's actual capability is public, and the module treats that as the honest state rather than filling it. In 2025 mainland public-security authorities publicly alleged that the command was responsible for a cyber intrusion against a company in Guangzhou; the command denied it. Vigil records the allegation and the denial as what they are — two stated positions — and attributes nothing. No capabilities, operations, tooling, personnel or effectiveness assessment appear here.
相關組織
- 中華民國陸軍 在機構上關聯於 · 截至2026-09 · 中等信心
Several communications groups and an offshore-islands element transferred from this command back to army control on 1 January 2026. The boundary between a joint information command and service communications units is still moving, and this edge records that rather than a standing relationship.
沿革與機構歷史
系統入口
此紀錄與Vigil其他部分的連結處。每一列之所以列在這裡，是因為此組織確實與之相連。
評估截至 — 2026-09 最近檢視 — 2026-09-09
在結構中檢視此部隊 互動式：選取此紀錄並追蹤與其關聯的內容。