馬利 — 過渡當局 — 法國

摘要

Operation Serval, launched on 11 January 2013 at the request of the Malian government, stopped the jihadist advance and recaptured the northern towns; Barkhane succeeded it in 2014 as a regional force headquartered in Chad with its main Malian bases at Gao, Timbuktu and Ménaka, under a 2014 defence cooperation treaty. Relations with the post-2020 military authorities deteriorated over the Wagner deployment and the transition timetable: France announced Barkhane's departure from Mali in February 2022, Bamako denounced the 2014 treaty and the status-of-forces arrangements on 2 May 2022, and the last French elements crossed into Niger on 15 August 2022. Since then the relationship has been conducted through expulsions and detentions rather than instruments — the August 2026 pardon and expulsion of a convicted French embassy official is the latest such act — and no security cooperation of any kind exists.

為何重要

Every external-actor question in the module descends from this termination: the Russian presence arrived as the French one left, the AES was built by three governments that had each expelled France, and the northern towns Serval recaptured in 2013 are the ones the 2026 offensives took back. The relationship is historical; its consequences are the module's present.

協議

• Mali–France defence cooperation treaty · 簽署於2014-07 · ended 2022-05-02

  Denounced by the transitional authorities together with the status-of-forces arrangements for Serval and Barkhane; text not read.

相關事件

• 藪貓行動展開 2013年1月11日

  軍事

• 收復加奧與廷巴克圖 2013年1月 – 2月

  軍事 · 領土變化

• 法國撤出馬利 2022年2月 – 8月

  軍事 · 外交

• 哥伊塔特赦一名被定罪的法國大使館官員並將其驅逐出境 2026年8月13日

  政治 · 外交

組織

此關係藉以運作的結構。它們並非關係的當事方——當事方是上方的兩個行為者。

地點

本模組已發布的標記。此紀錄本身不增加任何地理精度。

仍然未知的事項

• Any residual intelligence or consular channel between the two governments is not described by either; the record states that the security relationship ended.