Ce qu’a été cette campagne
The transitional government's effort to convert control of Damascus into a functioning state: dissolving the factions, writing a constitutional order, seating a parliament, and extending administration into regions that did not come with the capital. Consolidation first, inclusion later, accountability last.
This is the campaign the transition is judged by, and the one that determines whether the others matter. A state that cannot protect minorities cannot credibly integrate a Kurdish-led northeast, negotiate a southern security agreement from a position of authority, or absorb custody of the detention system. It is also the clearest available study of how a transitional government converts military victory into governing legitimacy — the module's stated central question — and the record so far is that the institutional work has moved much faster than the protection work.
Confiance : modérée Au 2026-07Revu le 2026-07-28
Synthèse
From December 2024 the transitional government moved quickly on the institutional file: al-Sharaa named president in January 2025, the attacking factions and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham formally dissolved into new state structures, a constitutional declaration in March, first-phase elections in October and an appointed-and-elected interim parliament seated by July 2026. Sanctions relief followed in stages. The extension of actual authority has been far more uneven. In March 2025 the coastal violence killed over 1,400 people, mostly Alawite civilians, with government-affiliated forces implicated by UN investigators. In July 2025 fighting in Sweida between Druze factions, Bedouin fighters and government forces, accompanied by Israeli strikes on Damascus, left most of the province outside state control and its parliamentary seats vacant. The northeast was brought in by agreement rather than by force, and that file is recorded as its own campaign.
Objectifs déclarés
Ce que disent les participants. Chaque entrée cite où la position a été exprimée ; Vigil consigne qu’elle a été exprimée, non qu’elle est vraie.
The transitional government states its purpose as rebuilding a unified Syrian state with a monopoly on arms, inclusive institutions and a return to international standing.
Recorded as the government's stated position. The module tracks protection and inclusion outcomes rather than assurances.
Objectifs évalués
La lecture de Vigil, assortie d’un degré de confiance. Tenue structurellement à l’écart des positions déclarées, afin qu’une évaluation ne puisse jamais être publiée comme l’objectif déclaré de quelqu’un.
Consolidate a single security and administrative authority quickly enough that no rival centre of armed power becomes permanent, accepting the legitimacy costs of doing so before inclusion is settled.
Convert international recognition and sanctions relief into reconstruction finance, on the reading that delivery of services and salaries is what will make the settlement durable.
Manage the minority-protection file politically — through assurances, appointments and negotiated arrangements — rather than through prosecution and command accountability.
An inference from the observed sequence rather than a stated policy; the government states a commitment to accountability. Graded low accordingly.
Forces principales
- Forces de l’État syrien (ministère de la Défense) Force principale · Confiance : élevée · au 2026-07
- Syrian Army Force principale · Confiance : modérée · au 2026-08
The army the ministry has assembled from the factions — the instrument through which state authority is extended.
Forces adverses
- Factions druzes de Sweida Force adverse · Confiance : modérée · au 2026-07
A standoff rather than a continuous engagement. Druze-led factions and council structures have controlled most of Sweida province since July 2025 and refuse integration on Damascus's terms; there has been no sustained fighting since.
- National Guard (Sweida) Force adverse · Confiance : modérée · au 2026-08
The consolidated body holding Sweida outside state authority, which fought Interior Ministry forces on 31 August 2026.
Soutiens et acteurs extérieurs
- Sécurité intérieure et Service de sécurité générale Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2026-07
Internal security and policing are the instrument through which the extension of authority is actually felt in most of the country.
Reported participants
- Turkish-backed Syrian factions (SNA lineage) Reported participant · Confidence: Low · as of 2026-07
Turkish-backed factions were announced as absorbed into the new Ministry of Defence structures in January 2025. The degree of actual integration varies by faction and is disputed; participation in specific incidents has been reported rather than established.
Parties touchées
- Forces démocratiques syriennes (FDS) Affected party · Confidence: High · as of 2026-07
The northeast was brought into the state by agreement rather than by this campaign's methods. Its own record carries that file.
Dissolution and constitutional declaration
Al-Sharaa was named president, the attacking factions and HTS were formally dissolved into new state structures, and a constitutional declaration set the transitional order. The institutional claim was established before the security sector behind it existed.
The coastal violence
Over 1,400 people were killed on the coast, mostly Alawite civilians. UN investigators found widespread and systematic violations and implicated government-affiliated forces among the perpetrators. It is the transition's defining failure and the origin of the protection question that runs through everything after.
Sweida and the limits of reach
Fighting between Druze factions, Bedouin fighters and government forces, accompanied by Israeli strikes on Damascus, ended with most of Sweida province outside state control and its parliamentary seats vacant. The standoff has not been resolved and no negotiation format has been settled.
Elections and the interim parliament
First-phase parliamentary elections were held in October 2025 and an appointed-and-elected interim parliament was seated by July 2026, with Sweida's seats vacant. Institution-building has continued to move faster than the protection and accountability files it depends on.
Issue et situation actuelle
Ongoing and mixed. The institutional programme has largely been delivered on its own terms: a presidency, a constitutional declaration, elections, a seated parliament, recognition abroad and sanctions relief. The extension of authority has not: most of Sweida remains outside state control, coastal communities report continued fear a year after the March 2025 violence, accountability for both episodes of that year is partial, and the security sector remains assembled from dissolved factions rather than built as an institution. The transition is real, and so is every warning about it.
Adaptations observées
A shift from absorbing factions wholesale to vetting and reassigning personnel individually, reported after the March 2025 violence exposed what wholesale absorption had put into uniform.
Substitution of negotiated local arrangements for the extension of direct administration where communal structures are strong — the northeast by agreement, Sweida by standoff rather than by a second attempt at force.
Use of international engagement — recognition, sanctions certifications and reconstruction conversations — as a substitute source of legitimacy while the domestic protection file remains open.
Implications politiques
Legitimacy is being built from recognition and institutions outward rather than from protection and accountability upward, and the module's watch items are written to test which of those actually holds.
Implications militaires
A security sector assembled from dissolved factions carries the conduct risk that produced March 2025, and vetting is the file on which that risk is either reduced or inherited.
Implications économiques
Reconstruction finance is formally linked to the transition's conduct through the periodic certification cycle attached to the Caesar repeal, which makes protection outcomes an economic variable.
Implications humanitaires
Minority confidence, and with it a large share of return decisions, tracks protection outcomes rather than announcements.
Événements liés
Lieux
Lieux que ce module publie déjà comme repères cartographiques, listés parce que la campagne les concerne. Pas une zone d’opérations.
Ce qui reste inconnu
- The composition and command arrangements of the new security forces are not published in a form this module can state, and no figure for their size, structure or vetting throughput is asserted anywhere here.
- Accountability proceedings arising from the March and July 2025 violence are ongoing and incompletely reported; the record states that accountability is partial rather than characterising individual cases.
- Whether the shift toward individual vetting is a genuine change of practice or a stated intention is not established, which is why the adaptation is graded low.
- The relationship between the transitional authorities and the Turkish-backed factions announced as absorbed varies by faction and is not consistently reported; the participant edge is graded low for that reason.
Lectures que les éléments permettent aussi
- The consolidation-before-inclusion sequence can be read as a deliberate strategy, as the improvisation of a movement that took the capital faster than it could prepare to govern it, or as the structural consequence of inheriting no functioning institutions. The three imply very different trajectories and the evidence does not decisively separate them.
- Sweida's continued autonomy can be read as a failure of state reach or as a deliberate avoidance of a second coastal-scale confrontation. The absence of a further attempt at force is consistent with both.
Figure ici parce que l’évaluation propre à la fiche n’est pas la seule que ses sources permettent — et non comme une réserve sur l’évaluation ci-dessus.
Rendre des comptes pour les deux défaillances de 2025
Prosecutions and command accountability for the coastal and Sweida violence, and the conduct of security forces in mixed areas. These are the test cases for minority confidence, and nothing else substitutes for them.
Si le contrôle des antécédents modifie les comportements
Personnel vetting in the security sector is the mechanism between the inherited risk and a different outcome; conduct in mixed areas is how it would show.
Questions Watch que cette campagne concerne
Questions analytiques permanentes dont les éléments passent par cette campagne, chacune avec sa dernière revue. Dérivées de l’objet Watch, jamais reformulées ici.
- MilitaireLes forces restructurées de la Syrie peuvent-elles former une chaîne de commandement unique et fonctionnelle ?
- DiplomatiqueL’Iran revient-il en Syrie — par une ambassade, un itinéraire ou un réseau ?
- PolitiqueLe différend sur l’autorité à Sweida évolue-t-il vers un processus ou vers la violence ?
- PolitiqueLa transition produit-elle ses instruments constitutionnels selon le calendrier annoncé ?
Voir dans Explorer la force qui conduit cette campagne Interactif : sélectionnez cette fiche et suivez ce qui s’y rattache.
Évalué au — 2026-07 Dernière revue — 2026-07-28
