Israël et le Levant — Hezbollah

Synthèse

Hezbollah emerged during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and fought the Israeli presence in the south until the 2000 withdrawal, then the 2006 war that ended with Resolution 1701. It opened a front on 8 October 2023 that became full war in September 2024 and ended with the Israel–Lebanon cessation of 27 November 2024, to which Hezbollah was not a party. It re-entered on 2 March 2026, after the US–Israeli strikes on Iran; Israel answered with a countrywide air campaign and ground operations from about 16 March. Between 21 February and 20 June UNIFIL radar detected 52,514 trajectories from south to north of the Blue Line and 6,929 from north to south, and observed or detected 2,418 air strikes, according to the Secretary-General. An understanding on Beirut's southern suburbs followed on 1 June. The UN records a US–Iran memorandum announced on 14 June that stipulated a cessation on the Lebanese front, and a Hezbollah–Israel ceasefire in effect from 19 June. The memorandum itself has since lapsed: the US President called it "over" on 7 July and its 60-day period ended unextended on 17 August, while Iranian officials say the United States suspended its commitments first, according to Al Jazeera. UNIFIL last detected Hezbollah projectiles on 21 June, according to Security Council Report; Israel reports attacks on its forces inside Lebanon since, and Israeli strikes in Lebanon continue. Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health counted 4,106 people killed between 2 March and 20 June; the UN records at least 3 Israeli civilians and 36 soldiers killed in the same period.

Pourquoi c’est important

Every Israel–Lebanon instrument is designed to remove the threat this relationship poses, and none binds the party that poses it. Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon is sequenced against Hezbollah's disarmament by the Lebanese state, so the relationship governs the front through a third party that has banned Hezbollah's military activity without enforcing the ban.

Événements associés

• Le Hezbollah émerge, et Israël se retire sur une zone de sécurité au sud du Liban 1982 – 1985

  Militaire · Politique

• Israël se retire du sud du Liban jusqu’à la Ligne bleue 24 mai 2000 (ligne confirmée en juin 2000)

  Militaire · Changement territorial

• La résolution 1701 met fin à la guerre de 2006 entre Israël et le Hezbollah 12 juil. – 14 août 2006 (adoptée le 11 août)

  Diplomatique · Militaire

• Le Hezbollah ouvre un front depuis le Liban 8 oct. 2023 – sept. 2024

  Militaire

• La campagne israélienne Northern Arrows et la mort de Hassan Nasrallah 23 sept. – nov. 2024

  Military · Leadership change

• La cessation des hostilités entre Israël et le Liban et son Mécanisme 26 – 27 nov. 2024

  Diplomatique · Militaire

• Le Hezbollah entre dans la guerre de 2026, et Israël frappe dans tout le Liban 2 mars 2026

  Militaire

• Israël lance des opérations terrestres dans le sud du Liban À partir du ~16 mars 2026

  Military · Humanitarian

Ce qui reste inconnu

• The text of the June 2026 US–Iran memorandum and the terms of the 19 June ceasefire have not been read; the record relies on the UN's description (S/2026/566 para 23). No agreement is authored for it.
• UNIFIL radar cannot detect anti-tank missiles, tank rounds, air-to-surface missiles or light-weapons fire, and Hezbollah stopped publishing daily claims in mid-June 2026; a quiet radar is not evidence of an absence of attacks.
• UNIFIL's north-to-south count is not attributed to a party, and many of those trajectories did not cross the Blue Line.
• Casualty figures are the parties' own — the Lebanese ministry's and Israel's as recorded by the UN — and the Lebanese total does not separate combatants from civilians.

Lectures que les éléments permettent aussi

• Hezbollah's near-silence on UNIFIL radar since 21 June can be read as compliance with the June ceasefire, or as a shift of its attacks to Israeli forces inside Lebanon that the radar does not see. Israel reports the second; the evidence read does not settle the scale.

Figure ici parce que l’évaluation propre à la fiche n’est pas la seule que ses sources permettent — et non comme une réserve sur l’évaluation ci-dessus.