美國與臺灣海峽 — 中華人民共和國

摘要

The United States recognises the People's Republic of China diplomatically. That recognition, established alongside the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, is the architecture inside which the whole of this module sits: it is why American relations with Taipei are unofficial, why European technology and investment contact with Taiwan stops short of recognition, and why Taiwan's participation in international organisations is contested rather than routine. The relationship itself is broad — trade, technology and strategic competition — and Taiwan is one file within it rather than its organising subject, which is the structural reason Taiwan policy is periodically exposed to being traded against other American priorities. The formulations inside the architecture remain contested rather than settled: during his state visit to Washington on 23–25 September 2026, the Chinese president asked, in Beijing's readout of the 24 September meeting, that the United States adhere to "opposing" Taiwan independence — stronger than the American "do not support" — while the White House fact sheet on the visit did not mention Taiwan and the US ambassador to China said on 25 September that there was no change in Taiwan policy, citing the one-China policy, the Taiwan Relations Act, the three communiqués and the Six Assurances.

為何重要

Every unofficial relationship in this module is unofficial because of this one. A reader who treats Taiwan's isolation as a product of Chinese pressure alone will miss that the legal architecture producing it was built by the states that now support Taiwan, and is maintained by them.

相關事件

• 聯合國席位移交中華人民共和國 1971年10月

  外交 · 政治

• 美國將承認轉向北京；防禦條約終止 1979年1月

  外交 · 政治

• 臺灣關係法簽署 1979年4月

  Political · Weapons deliveries

仍然未知的事項

• This module dates the Taiwan Relations Act to 1979 and does not separately record the date recognition transferred. `validFrom` is given as 1979 on that basis and is context rather than a claim these sources establish independently.
• The full content of the bilateral relationship — trade, technology, strategic competition — is far broader than this module covers, and only the parts bearing on the Taiwan Strait are recorded here.
• The three communiqués and successive administrations' formulations differ in wording; this record does not parse them.