此系統是什麼
Syria's usable crude is in the north-east, its refineries are on the west coast and at Homs, and for a decade the two ends were under separate authorities. Available generation is under a third of pre-war capacity, making fuel and electricity the most visible daily measure of whether the transition delivers.
The most visible daily measure of whether the transition delivers: fuel at the pump and hours of electricity, and the seam between the north-east's resources and the west's refineries that the integration question turns on.
信心：中等 截至2026-09-30檢視於2026-10-04
系統
- 概覽
- The system is the north-east's fields and gas plants, the refineries at Baniyas and Homs, the coastal terminals, and the generation that depends on gas-fired plant. The fuel-and-power logistics record carries the import side — Iraqi fuel oil trucked across Syria and loaded at Baniyas, which the state oil company put at 2.123 million tonnes by mid-September 2026, a transit role the module records as documented but not yet durable — and the north-east transfer chain carries what the integration of the north-east's fields under the transitional government means for energy. On 18 August 2026 an explosion halted pumping on the gas export pipeline from the al-Jabsa plant in Hasakah; the state oil company said preliminary investigation indicated sabotage, and no party has been identified. Gas from the Jbeissa (al-Jabsa) plant to the power stations was stopped again on 28 September 2026 by a valve explosion between al-Shola and Deir ez-Zor, which the company also called sabotage; on 30 September a separate, unexplained explosion near Damascus took three gas-fired stations offline.
- Current state · as of 2026-09-30
- As the fuel-and-power record last assessed it (reviewed 4 October 2026): generation under a third of pre-war capacity, the Baniyas fuel-oil transit documented, and gas to generation interrupted three times since August — the al-Jabsa pipeline in August and the Jbeissa line on 28 September, both called sabotage by the operator with no party identified, and a separate explosion near Damascus on 30 September whose cause the energy ministry called unclear. No restoration of either September interruption had been announced by 4 October.
- Commodities and outputs
- Oil & gas (northeast fields) · Electricity & fuel
節點
The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.
- 東北部油田（大範圍區域）礦區 · 廣泛區域
The broad area the module publishes for the north-east's usable crude and gas; no field-level marker exists by rule.
Named by the record through one of its routes, under another system tag:
- Baniyas主要城市
Refinery town and coastal terminal; since April 2026 the loading point for Iraqi fuel oil.
Routes and operators
Supply systems running through it
Organisations that run it
- Syrian Petroleum CompanyState enterprise · ActiveThe state oil company that operates the north-east's gas export pipeline and reports the fuel-oil transit through Baniyas — the organisation at the seam between the north-east's crude and the west's refineries.
Dependencies and constraints
Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.
Integration of the north-east's fields under one authority. Crude is in the north-east and refining in the west; the two ends were under separate authorities for a decade, and the transfer chain carries what integration changes.
Imported fuel through the coastal terminals. Domestic refining does not cover demand; the Baniyas fuel-oil transit and imports through the coast are documented, not yet durable.
Available generation is under a third of pre-war capacity.
A separate explosion on a gas line near Haran al-Awamid, east of Damascus, cut gas to the Deir Ali, al-Nasiriyah and Tishreen stations and took all three offline. The energy ministry said the cause was unclear and did not link it to the 28 September incident; temporary rationing followed in Daraa.
An explosion at a sectional valve on the gas line between al-Shola and Deir ez-Zor started a fire and stopped gas from the Jbeissa (al-Jabsa) plant reaching power stations. The state oil company called it sabotage; a local oil official described an apparent theft gone wrong. No party has been identified and no repair date was given.
An explosion halted pumping on the gas export pipeline from the al-Jabsa plant; the state oil company said preliminary investigation indicated sabotage, and no party has been identified.
經由此系統的傳導鏈
Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.
- 東北部資產移交 → 燃料、電力與國家收入Economic exposure · as of 2026-08
- asset 已證實
- disruption 已證實
- exposure 已證實
- significance 合理可信的曝險
- 穀物收購移交 → 麵包補貼 → 家戶糧食取得Civilian impact · as of 2026-06
- asset 已證實
- disruption 已證實
- exposure 已證實
- significance 合理可信的曝險
Watch questions bearing on it
- 解散後的東北部整合能否維持 — 薪餉、民政事務、具名指揮部？active · Movement observed 2026-10-04
- 俄羅斯的基地是否會留下？active · No material change 2026-10-04
Events at its nodes
Actors and arrangements
仍然未知的事項
- No field-level production figure is published by the module; the broad marker and the state company's own statements are what the record rests on.
在探索中開啟互動式：選取此紀錄並追蹤與其關聯的內容。
評估截至 — 2026-09-30 最近檢視 — 2026-10-04