Strike UAV / loitering munition · Long-range one-way attack drone

Liutyi (An-196)

The domestically built one-way attack drone behind most of Ukraine's reported refinery strikes since 2024 — the instrument that freed the deep-strike campaign from partner-supplied missiles and the permissions attached to them.

Liutyi Ukraine Announced 2022; in documented use against Russian refineries from early 2024

Status as of
2026-06
Last reviewed
2026-10-29

AssessmentModerate confidence

Recognition context, not a stat sheet. The catalogue covers major publicly documented systems relevant to the conflicts Vigil covers — not an exhaustive order of battle. No quantities, availability or current allocations are recorded.

The record What this system is, where it comes from, who operates it and which of Vigil’s modules it is relevant to — with the evidence each of those rests on.

Fielded Evidence: Confirmed
Silhouette · not to scale

Record

FamilyLiutyi
VariantsAn-196 Liutyi; Lyutyi
OriginUkraine
ManufacturerUkroboronprom (Ukrainian Defence Industry) — Antonov
EraAnnounced 2022; in documented use against Russian refineries from early 2024
Appears inUkraine–Russia

Conflict relevance

This is the catalogue's single record for this system. It is relevant to the module below; each module's Force Atlas shows how it is used there.

Operators

Ukraine: Ukraine's principal reported long-range strike drone. Reporting attributes its employment to Defence Intelligence and the Security Service, with the Unmanned Systems Forces named as the institutional home of the long-range drone effort; Ukraine rarely confirms which structure flew a given strike, so each formation edge is graded reported.

Battlefield role

Deep strike against fixed economic and military infrastructure inside Russia — refinery process units, fuel storage, airfields and ammunition depots — at ranges beyond any supplied missile Ukraine holds, launched in numbers that accept attrition to air defence on the way in.

Typical employment

Salvos against a single plant's process units, often repeated at the same plant across weeks, as the refinery series in this module records; flown with decoys and alongside other long-range types so that air-defence effort is divided. Nothing about routes, launch areas or timing is authored.

How the system is commonly used, at the level of published analysis — never a procedure, a loadout or an engagement envelope.

Strengths

Range, cost and domestic supply. Announced for a 75 kg warhead at more than 1,000 km, with 2025–26 reporting of strikes at 1,300 km (Orsk, October 2025) and roughly 1,300 km (Ufa, June 2026); cheap enough to be used in salvos; and produced in Ukraine, so neither stocks nor targets depend on a partner government's decision.

Limitations

A small warhead — reporting gives 50 to 75 kg, with range traded for payload — that damages a process unit rather than destroying a plant; a propeller airframe vulnerable to point defence and electronic warfare on a long transit; and an effect that is cumulative and reparable rather than decisive. Production and loss rates are not published and are not stated here.

Typically used alongside

  • Storm Shadow / SCALP-EGConfidence: Moderate

    The supplied missile lane the drone programme was built to be independent of; used against hardened targets the drone's warhead cannot address.

  • R-360 NeptuneConfidence: Low

    Ukraine's other domestic long-range option, used against coastal and naval targets where the drone's payload is insufficient.

Observed adaptations

Campaign relevance

Derived: a participant organisation in these campaigns carries a typed equipment association with this system. That is not the same as documented use of the system in the campaign itself.

Visual identification

A conventional light-aircraft layout rather than a delta: straight wing, twin-boom tail and a nose-mounted propeller, with a slender fuselage — closer in silhouette to a small sport aircraft than to the Shahed family. Seen chiefly in Ukrainian government presentations and in debris.

Documented conflict use

Reported as the drone behind Ukraine's refinery strikes from early 2024, when the Ministry of Digital Transformation and defence-industry officials presented it publicly; thereafter the named type in reporting of strikes on refineries, fuel depots and airfields across European Russia, including the Orsk refinery in October 2025 and the Ufa refineries in June 2026. Ukraine's General Staff confirms strikes on named plants without naming the airframe, so type attribution per strike is reporting rather than official statement.

Dated changes

Assessed as of — 2026-06 Last reviewed — 2026-10-29