本頁部分內容仍以英文正本呈現:相關譯文尚未完成。 英文版本

Air defence · Short-range surface-to-air missile system

Tor-M2系列

俄羅斯短程防空系統,是陸軍在對烏克蘭戰爭中的標準點防空層——在亞美尼亞服役時,則是該國防空中具生存能力的一層:於2020年之前購入,被認為完成了此戰中亞美尼亞少數幾次攔截無人機的行動,並在戰後重建中,與為取代損失而購入的印度與法國系統一同保留。

Tor 俄羅斯 1986 (Tor-M1); Tor-M2 variants from the 2010s

狀態截至
2026-06
最後檢視
2026-09-09

評估中等信心

提供辨識背景,而非性能數據表。本目錄涵蓋與Vigil所關注之衝突相關的主要公開記載系統——並非詳盡的戰鬥序列。不記錄任何數量、可用狀況或當前配置。

紀錄 此系統是什麼、源自何處、由誰使用,以及與Vigil的哪些模組相關——並附上每一項所依據的證據。

服役 證據:有文件記錄
剪影 · 未按比例

紀錄

系列Tor
衍生型Tor-M2KM; Tor-M2E; Tor-M1
原產地俄羅斯
年代1986 (Tor-M1); Tor-M2 variants from the 2010s
出現於烏克蘭–俄羅斯 · 納戈爾諾-卡拉巴赫2020

衝突關聯性

這是本目錄中此系統的唯一紀錄。它與下方的各模組相關;各模組的Force Atlas會顯示它在該處的使用方式。

使用方

Russia: The Ground Forces' standard short-range air-defence system, fielded throughout the war against Ukraine with losses visually documented; a catalogue stub for the Russian fleet was promoted into this record in the remaining-atlas sprint. · Armenia: Tor-M2KM systems acquired before 2020; the short-range layer that survived the war better than the S-300 above it, and one of the few Armenian air-defence systems credited with drone intercepts.

戰場角色

Point defence against aircraft, helicopters, drones and precision munitions at short range — the layer that a drone-heavy opponent forces to work hardest.

優勢

Self-contained, mobile, and able to engage small targets; the 2020 record suggests it performed better than the long-range systems the loitering munitions hunted.

限制

Short range and limited magazine against an opponent that attacks in numbers; a Russian supply chain. No sites, numbers or coverage are recorded.

有文件記錄的衝突使用

Russian Tor systems are documented throughout the war against Ukraine, with losses catalogued by OSINT; Armenian claims of drone intercepts in the 2020 war are partly corroborated by published footage and not independently counted.

軍種與兵種使用方

評估截至 — 2026-06 最近檢視 — 2026-09-09