紀錄 此系統是什麼、源自何處、由誰使用，以及與Vigil的哪些模組相關——並附上每一項所依據的證據。
紀錄
戰場角色
Anti-ship strike from ground-based launchers and naval vessels, intended to make the waters around Taiwan costly to operate in rather than to contest control of them.
優勢
Domestically designed and produced, so inventory expansion requires no foreign approval. Ground-launched systems are relatively cheap, numerous and mobile, which makes them hard to neutralise comprehensively — the essential logic of denial. Land-based anti-ship missiles are the capability most analysts across the spectrum agree Taiwan should buy more of.
限制
Denial is not defence: these systems raise the cost of maritime operations but do nothing about the non-military pressure that constitutes the actual daily activity in this system. Sustained production capacity, targeting support and survivability under attack are the real constraints, and none is publicly quantifiable.
與戰役的關聯
推導所得：這些戰役中的一個參與組織，與此系統有一筆具類型的裝備關聯。這並不等同於有文件記錄該系統在戰役本身中的使用。
- 國防改革與民間韌性計畫 自2022年起
via ROC Army (Documented, moderate confidence)
- 門檻之下的持續壓力 自2020年起持續加劇
via ROC Navy (Documented, high confidence)
- 強制性海上攔阻——從隔離到封鎖 經評估的應變情境
via ROC Navy (Documented, high confidence)
外觀識別
Two very different objects share the name. The ground-launched systems are seen as truck-mounted box launchers, four canisters on the subsonic variants and three larger ramp-angled ones on the supersonic; the ship-borne fit is a cluster of angled canisters on a deckhouse. The supersonic variant's air intakes on the missile body are the clearest single distinguishing feature in a photograph.
有文件記錄的衝突使用
Publicly displayed at Taiwanese national day parades and defence exhibitions, and test-fired in announced trials; the Ministry of National Defense reported deployment of both principal variants during 2025 in response to large PLA naval activity. Production is run under the Sea-Air Combat Power Improvement Plan, a named and budgeted special programme covering 2022–2026, which is why the output figures that circulate are budget-derived rather than observed. The extended-range land-attack derivative, the Hsiung Sheng, entered mass production under the same programme and shares the production line. At the tri-service joint precision missile firing at Jiupeng in September 2026 both principal variants were fired inside a joint targeting exercise — the Hsiung Feng III by the Navy's littoral combat command and by a Coast Guard Administration cutter, the Hsiung Feng II from a Navy ship — on the defence ministry's own captions. Vigil records the programme and its announced milestones and publishes no inventories, battery locations or deployment detail.
相關關鍵事件
臺灣在九鵬、於靶場上執行一條跨軍種殺傷鏈，未見任何降級情境的描述
臺灣國軍於2026年9月16日至18日在屏東縣九鵬基地舉行2026年度三軍聯合精準飛彈射擊；賴清德總統於最後一天視導。國防部所屬新聞社於9月19日報導，此次射擊依循殺傷鏈程序 — 搜索、目標獲得、識別、目標分配與攻擊 — 運用艦載雷達、空軍空中管制、機動雷達車與無人機，透過指管節點與TAK戰場覺知介面，跨軍種、跨載臺連接至飛彈與攻擊無人機，射擊單位並從戰力保存位置移至射擊陣地，射擊後再行轉移。其圖說記載：空軍防空部隊射擊愛國者、天弓三型與車載天劍一型，陸軍射擊陸基天劍二型與海馬士，海軍濱海作戰指揮部及一艘海巡艦射擊雄風三型，海軍艦艇射擊雄風二型與標準SM-1，一架幻象2000射擊MICA。總統府表示，多型攻擊無人機首次參與聯合作戰演練。在射擊的第二天，即9月17日，國防部報告一次解放軍聯合戰備警巡，共十九架次，其中十五架次逾越海峽中線，所列機型中包括一架運-8電子干擾機；國防部未將其與射擊相連結，本紀錄亦不作此連結。國防部於9月18日發布的每日報告涵蓋至當天上午06:00為止的二十四小時，因此包含該次警巡，計28架次，其中24架次逾越中線，另有七艘海軍艦艇與兩艘公務船。
評估截至 — 2026-09 最近檢視 — 2026-09-25