此系統是什麼
The flank's energy system is a set of cross-border links. The Baltic states left the Russian-led BRELL grid for the Continental European one in February 2025, and two Gulf of Finland interconnectors were damaged and repaired in 2023–25. The record dates both; it maps no cable or pipeline.
Explains why undersea damage in the Baltic is a defence subject in this module: the links that carry the region's power and gas are few, cross-border and in shared waters, and the synchronisation of 2025 ended the Baltic grid's operational dependence on Russia.
信心:中等 截至2025-06檢視於2026-11-08
系統
- 概覽
- On 8 February 2025 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania disconnected from the BRELL power ring they had shared with Russia and Belarus, and on 9 February they synchronised with the Continental European grid through the Lithuania–Poland link. Under the Gulf of Finland, the Balticconnector gas pipeline was damaged in October 2023 and returned to commercial use on 22 April 2024, and the Estlink 2 power cable was damaged on 25 December 2024 and returned to commercial use in June 2025. Further south, Moldova's electricity system connects westward through the interface with Romania.
- Current state · as of 2025-06
- Both damaged interconnectors were back in commercial use by June 2025; the Baltic grid has run synchronised with Continental Europe since February 2025. No outage, capacity or flow figure is carried.
- Commodities and outputs
- Natural gas and crude oil · Electricity interconnection
節點
The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.
- 摩爾多瓦–羅馬尼亞電力介面發電廠
Moldova's westward electricity interconnection with Romania and the European grid.
Routes and operators
Supply systems running through it
- 波羅的海海上連結General trade · 9 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · named by the record一片只有一個入口的海,也是這個戰區南北兩半之所以相連的原因。
Dependencies and constraints
Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.
A small number of cross-border interconnectors in shared waters. Power and gas between Finland and Estonia cross the Gulf of Finland on a few links; the damage incidents of 2023 and 2024 each took one out of service for months.
The record names dependencies and never locates, sizes or rates the vulnerability of a cable, pipeline or interconnector.
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania disconnected from the BRELL ring on 8 February 2025 and synchronised with the Continental European grid on 9 February, through the Lithuania–Poland link.
The Estlink 2 power interconnector was damaged; Fingrid reported the repair complete on 18 June 2025 and the link back in commercial use that month.
The Balticconnector gas pipeline was damaged; it returned to commercial use on 22 April 2024 after offshore repair.
經由此系統的傳導鏈
Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.
- 波羅的海海底基礎設施損壞及其曝險Economic exposure · as of 2026-09
- asset 已證實
- disruption 已證實
- exposure 合理可信的曝險
- significance 合理可信的曝險
- 北歐國家加入與波羅的海增援問題Economic exposure · as of 2026-09
- asset 已證實
- disruption 已證實
- exposure 合理可信的曝險
- significance 合理可信的曝險
- 計畫指派部隊與調動制約Economic exposure · as of 2026-09-22
- asset 已證實
- disruption 已證實
- exposure 合理可信的曝險
- significance 合理可信的曝險
Watch questions bearing on it
- 波羅的海海底基礎設施的曝險是否正在改變,歸屬認定是否終究會出現?active · No material change 2026-11-22
- 集體防禦所依賴的民用系統是否正在強化?active · Movement observed 2026-11-22
- 推動並維持增援的各項機制,是在推進還是受到限制?active · No material change 2026-11-22
Economic exposures it underlies
仍然未知的事項
- The status of the other Baltic links (NordBalt, LitPol, the planned Harmony Link) after 2025 was not verified by this pass.
在探索中開啟互動式:選取此紀錄並追蹤與其關聯的內容。
評估截至 — 2025-06 最近檢視 — 2026-11-08