S-300 family

紀錄

衝突關聯性

這是本目錄中此系統的唯一紀錄。它與下方的各模組相關；各模組的Force Atlas會顯示它在該處的使用方式。

使用方

Ukraine: The inherited backbone of Ukraine's long-range air defence in 2022 and still a large part of it; interceptor supply is the constraint, since the missiles are no longer produced for Ukraine and were sourced from allied Soviet-era stocks. Documented losses of launchers and radars throughout the war. · Russia: Fielded across the Aerospace Forces' air-defence formations; S-300 series missiles have also been fired in a surface-to-surface role against Ukrainian cities since 2022, a use documented by Ukrainian authorities and open-source analysts. · Iran and the Gulf: S-300PMU-2 batteries delivered by Russia in 2016 after a six-year freeze, operated by the Artesh Air Defence Force; their condition after the 2025 and 2026 campaigns is not established. · Armenia: Backbone of Armenian long-range air defence into 2020; multiple components visually documented as destroyed by drones and loitering munitions during the war. · Azerbaijan: Acquired S-300PMU-2 from Russia in the 2010s; not the system the 2020 air campaign turned on.

戰場角色

Long-range, high-altitude area air defence — designed against aircraft and cruise missiles, structurally challenged by small, slow, cheap unmanned systems attacking the radars it cannot fight without.

優勢

Genuine long-range reach against conventional air threats; mobility by design; the reason manned airpower played a marginal role in the Karabakh wars.

限制

The 2020 record is the point: radars that must emit to matter were found and killed by anti-radiation loitering munitions and TB2-directed fires, with losses visually documented — a capability lesson that reshaped air defence thinking well beyond the region.

與戰役的關聯

推導所得：這些戰役中的一個參與組織，與此系統有一筆具類型的裝備關聯。這並不等同於有文件記錄該系統在戰役本身中的使用。

• 卡拉巴赫衝突，1988–2023 February 1988 – September 2023

  via Armenian Armed Forces (Historically associated, high confidence); Azerbaijani Air Force (Documented)

• 亞美尼亞–亞塞拜然關係正常化進程 Since November 2020

  via Armenian Armed Forces (Historically associated, high confidence)

• 針對烏克蘭電力系統的戰略攻勢 Since October 2022

  via Aerospace Forces (VKS) (Documented, high confidence)

外觀識別

Tube quads on 5P85 transporter-erector-launchers, large phased-array engagement radar, distinctive mast-mounted low-altitude radar on some batteries.

有文件記錄的衝突使用

CAUCASUS. Armenian S-300 components (launchers, radars) documented destroyed in Azerbaijani strike footage and independent OSINT counts during the 2020 war. For that module the record is historical context for the capability story, not an inventory of current holdings. UKRAINE–RUSSIA. The family is in active service on both sides. For Ukraine it was the long-range layer that held the sky in 2022 and remains a large part of the air-defence order of battle beneath the donated Western systems; its interceptors are a finite Soviet-era stock topped up from allied inventories, which is why the module's air-defence layer treats interceptor supply rather than launcher count as the variable. Russia has used S-300 missiles as ground-attack weapons against Kharkiv and other cities since 2022 — an inaccurate use documented by Ukrainian authorities and open-source analysts. Losses of launchers and radars on both sides are visually documented. No holdings or battery locations are stated. MIDDLE EAST. Iran's S-300PMU-2 batteries are recorded as capability context; their condition after the 2025 and 2026 campaigns is not established.

軍種與兵種使用方

• 亞美尼亞空軍與防空部隊 歷史上相關
• 亞美尼亞武裝部隊 歷史上相關
• 亞塞拜然空軍 有文件記錄
• 伊朗正規軍防空部隊 有文件記錄
• 空天軍（VKS） 有文件記錄