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IED / explosive threat · capability record · Naval mines and mining capability

伊朗海軍布雷能力

海灣中最常被討論卻最少被使用的能力:一批水雷存量,在分歧甚大的公開評估中估計為低位的數千枚,以及用以布放的小艇與潛艦——此一威脅四十年來左右著海峽的保險與航線安排,卻從未使其封閉過一次。

Naval mines 伊朗、蘇聯 / 俄羅斯、中國 Tanker War of the 1980s; stock and domestic production through the 2020s

狀態截至
2026-09
最後檢視
2026-09-09

評估中等信心

提供辨識背景,而非性能數據表。本目錄涵蓋與Vigil所關注之衝突相關的主要公開記載系統——並非詳盡的戰鬥序列。不記錄任何數量、可用狀況或當前配置。

紀錄 此系統是什麼、源自何處、由誰使用,以及與Vigil的哪些模組相關——並附上每一項所依據的證據。

服役 證據:有文件記錄
剪影 · 未按比例

紀錄

系列Naval mines
衍生型Moored contact mines; bottom influence mines; drifting mines; reported domestically produced classes
原產地伊朗、蘇聯 / 俄羅斯、中國
年代Tanker War of the 1980s; stock and domestic production through the 2020s
出現於油輪戰爭(1987–88)

衝突關聯性

這是本目錄中此系統的唯一紀錄。它與下方的模組相關;各模組的Force Atlas會顯示它在該處的使用方式。

使用方

Iran and the Gulf: Held by the Guard Navy and the Artesh Navy; mine-laying craft and small boats are the delivery means.

戰場角色

Sea denial by threat: the possibility of mining makes the strait's usable state a commercial judgement rather than a physical one.

優勢

Cheap, deniable and slow to clear; the mere possibility imposes escort, survey and insurance costs on every transit, which is precisely the effect that war-risk cover's withdrawal in March 2026 illustrated.

限制

Mining the strait would close Iran's own exports and invite the response that the Tanker War brought, which is why it has never been done; the Fifth Fleet keeps a standing mine-countermeasures force at Bahrain for it. Stock estimates are unreliable and none is adopted here.

與戰役的關聯

推導所得:這些戰役中的一個參與組織,與此系統有一筆具類型的裝備關聯。這並不等同於有文件記錄該系統在戰役本身中的使用。

有文件記錄的衝突使用

Iranian mining during the Tanker War of 1987–88 damaged American warships and merchant vessels and drew the escort operation that established the present naval architecture; limpet-mine attacks on tankers in 2019 are the most recent documented use of a related method.

軍種與兵種使用方

評估截至 — 2026-09 最近檢視 — 2026-09-09