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海軍艦艇

中國海警船艦

世界上最大的海警船艦——而且可以說是本模組中最具戰略效益的平臺,正是因為它們不是軍艦。

China Coast Guard vessels 中國 Large cutter classes commissioned from the 2010s onward.

狀態截至
2026-08
最後檢視
2026-09-09

評估中等信心

提供辨識背景,而非性能數據表。本目錄涵蓋與Vigil所關注之衝突相關的主要公開記載系統——並非詳盡的戰鬥序列。不記錄任何數量、可用狀況或當前配置。

紀錄 此系統是什麼、源自何處、由誰使用,以及與Vigil的哪些模組相關——並附上每一項所依據的證據。

服役 證據:有文件記錄
剪影 · 未按比例

紀錄

系列China Coast Guard vessels
衍生型Zhaotou-class and other large cutters
原產地中國
製造商Chinese state shipbuilding enterprises
年代Large cutter classes commissioned from the 2010s onward.
出現於臺灣海峽

衝突關聯性

這是本目錄中此系統的唯一紀錄。它與下方的模組相關;各模組的Force Atlas會顯示它在該處的使用方式。

戰場角色

Presence and asserted law-enforcement jurisdiction. Their function is categorical rather than kinetic: a white hull conducting "inspections" is extremely difficult to answer, because a military response is disproportionate and no response concedes the point.

優勢

Very large hulls with endurance for sustained presence, backed by the world's largest coast guard. Their real advantage is legal and political framing rather than material: they generate pressure while remaining below any threshold that would justify escalation. The framing rests on published authority — the 2021 Coast Guard Law asserts enforcement in undefined "maritime areas under Chinese jurisdiction", and administrative procedures in force from June 2024 set out boarding, inspection and detention of foreign vessels within that space. Endurance matters because it converts presence into routine: a task group that can be relieved on station, as happened east of Taiwan on 4 July 2026, sustains a claim that an episodic patrol does not.

限制

The strategy depends on ambiguity holding, and the ambiguity is doing more work than the hulls are. Incidents involving injury or death — as in the February 2024 Kinmen case that preceded the current patrol pattern — carry escalation risk the law-enforcement framing cannot contain. Visible integration into military operations cuts the same way: coast guard vessels operating inside the Justice Mission-2025 joint exercise made the civil–military distinction harder to maintain, which is a cost to the instrument as well as a demonstration of reach. Against a warship these are lightly armed vessels, and their value would fall sharply in any situation where the law-enforcement framing had already been abandoned.

與戰役的關聯

推導所得:這些戰役中的一個參與組織,與此系統有一筆具類型的裝備關聯。這並不等同於有文件記錄該系統在戰役本身中的使用。

外觀識別

White hulls with a diagonal blue-and-red stripe on the bow and CHINA COAST GUARD in English along the side — the markings are the point, and they are applied deliberately to be read at a distance and photographed. The largest class dwarfs any naval frigate in the strait, which is itself part of the instrument's effect; smaller cutters look conventional. Armament is light and usually a single forward gun.

有文件記錄的衝突使用

Recurring patrols in waters around Kinmen since February 2024, publicly reported by both Taiwanese authorities and Chinese official statements, with Taiwan's coast guard recording scores of incursions in the following year. Participation in the Justice Mission-2025 joint exercise of 29–31 December 2025, with 13 coast guard vessels detected on the first day and 15 on the second. Standing patrols east of Taiwan from June 2026, where a task group led by the Daishan was relieved by one led by the Xiushan on 4 July. Vigil records that these patrols occur and publishes no routes, schedules, patterns or vessel dispositions.

軍種與兵種使用方

相關關鍵事件

2026年6月 – 7月

一支海警編隊在臺灣以東輪替

在2026年6月之前,中國海警在臺灣以東海域的活動僅發生於已宣布的軍事演習之中。6月,一支由岱山號海警船率領的編隊開始在該處巡查,海警將其描述為執法,包括船舶檢查、漁業保護與救援。7月4日,由秀山號海警船率領的第二支編隊接替並延續巡查,該機構表示將在其稱為「中國管轄海域」的水域加強執法。臺灣方面拒絕此一定性。這次輪替引發區域各國政府表達關切。

評估截至 — 2026-08 最近檢視 — 2026-09-09