Situation de référence Iran–Golfe — 4 septembre 2026

Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz closed to normal commercial traffic on 28 February 2026, the opening day of the war. The declaration did not seal the water and no party has closed it physically at any point since. Protection-and-indemnity clubs issued 72-hour notices terminating war-risk extensions in early March, replacement cover was quoted at rates that made most voyages uneconomic, and commercial transits fell by more than 80%. In April the International Maritime Organization stated there was no safe transit anywhere in the strait — a statement about navigational conditions, not about a closure. In May Iran announced a Persian Gulf Strait Authority asserting a legal régime over passage; all six Gulf states rejected it, including Oman, and it altered neither physical passage nor commercial access.

Why it matters. This is the module's central finding and the thing most easily misreported. Legal access, physical access and commercial access are three separate states here, they have moved independently through the war, and the one that actually stopped the traffic is the commercial one. A binary reading of the strait gets every part of this wrong, including what would have to change for traffic to resume.

• Strait of Hormuz: Background and Issues for Congress (R45281) — Congressional Research Service, 2026-08-07
• Joint War Committee listed areas and marine war-risk practice — Joint War Committee / Lloyd's, 2026

United States and Israeli strikes on Iran opened on 28 February 2026. Israel killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that day; Mojtaba Khamenei was selected on 8 March. Central Command reported striking more than ten thousand targets in Iran by 25 March, with roughly fifty thousand US service members deployed in and around the Middle East that month, and no congressional authorisation for the use of military force was obtained. Iran fired more than 6,700 drones and missiles at the six Gulf Arab states between late February and mid-May, nearly half of them at the UAE. A memorandum of understanding signed on 17 June and hosted by Pakistan was declared over on 7 July and expired unextended on 17 August. The heaviest exchange in over a month followed on 1–2 September.

Why it matters. The war is the reason almost everything else in this module moved, and it is not the module's subject: Vigil covers it as events and disruptions inside a regional system rather than as a live tracker. The baseline state at launch is a war continuing with nothing negotiated in force.

• U.S. Conflict with Iran (R48887) — Congressional Research Service, 2026-03-26
• Security Council resolution 2817 (2026) — United Nations Security Council, 2026-03

Production shut-ins across the region peaked above eleven million barrels a day, and OECD inventories fell to their lowest level since 2003. A United States strategic reserve release was announced on 11 March alongside an IEA collective release. Saudi Arabia's East–West pipeline and the UAE's Fujairah route both reach open water without passing the strait and both carried more than usual; their combined assessed wartime throughput remains a fraction of normal Hormuz volumes, and they serve two of the six states. Qatari LNG has no equivalent: liquefaction trains damaged at Ras Laffan removed around 17% of capacity for a period the operator has estimated at up to five years, and no pipeline substitutes for a liquefaction plant.

Why it matters. The distinction that matters is between capacity, availability and flow. The bypasses are real mitigation and they are not a replacement, and treating a design figure as a current alternative is how a partial workaround becomes an imaginary full one. For gas the question does not arise at all — there is nowhere else for it to go.

• Short-Term Energy Outlook and Today in Energy — US Energy Information Administration, 2026-04
• Oil market and emergency stock releases — International Energy Agency, 2026-03

The Security Council condemned Iranian attacks on Gulf states in resolution 2817, which recalls resolution 552 of 1984 by name; it acts under no Chapter VII authority and imposes no measures. In April the Council split on a shipping text, with two vetoes. The June memorandum reopened the strait toll-free for three weeks before collapsing. Meanwhile Saudi Arabia signed a defence agreement with the United States and, on 7 August, a joint defence agreement in Mecca with Türkiye and Pakistan — neither a Gulf Cooperation Council member. Oman and Iran agreed a joint working group on the future management of navigation in August.

Why it matters. Six states sharing one waterway, one institution and one exposure have answered the same war differently, and two of them have gone outside the institution built for exactly this. That is the clearest structural development of the war after the strait itself.

• Security Council resolution 2817 (2026), full text — United Nations Security Council, 2026-03
• The Arab Gulf States, the Iran Conflict, and U.S. Relations (R48971) — Congressional Research Service, 2026-06-03

The IAEA stopped conducting verification activities in Iran on 28 February 2026. Access is denied to twenty declared nuclear sites and one location outside facilities; the only inspection since was at Bushehr on 1–3 June 2026, covering refuelling oversight at one power reactor. In its 4 June reporting the Agency states it cannot verify whether Iran has suspended enrichment-related activities including research and development, whether it has suspended reprocessing, the size of its uranium stockpile, whether it has suspended work on heavy-water projects, or its inventories of centrifuges. Its last verified figures date from 13 June 2025 and include 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to up to 60% U-235. The Board of Governors adopted a resolution urging cooperation on 10 June 2026.

Why it matters. The absence of verification does not establish that Iran suspended enrichment, and it does not establish that Iran continued it. That is the most important epistemic rule in this module and it cuts in both directions. The 440.9 kg figure is a June 2025 historical baseline, not a current inventory: this module publishes no 2026 quantity, applies no production arithmetic, and offers no assessment of its own about the state of the programme.

• Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran — International Atomic Energy Agency, 2026-06-04
• Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran — International Atomic Energy Agency, 2026-06-04

Four conditions carry more analytical weight than anything else at launch. Marine war-risk cover being written for Hormuz transits at rates charterers accept would reopen the strait commercially whatever its legal or physical state. An IAEA inspection actually carried out at a declared site other than Bushehr would begin to restore verification — an inspection, not an undertaking, because practical modalities were agreed in September 2025 and no inspections followed. A new written United States–Iran arrangement would be the first thing in force since 17 August. And a formal Gulf Cooperation Council decision creating shared early warning or a common air picture would turn an institution into a capability.

Why it matters. An observable is a concrete condition whose change would update the analysis, and it is not a forecast. This module publishes no probability, no escalation measure and no view on what will happen — only what to check, what the baseline is, and what would count as a change.

• Strait of Hormuz: Background and Issues for Congress (R45281) — Congressional Research Service, 2026-08-07
• Analysis of IAEA Iran verification and NPT safeguards reports — Institute for Science and International Security, 2026-06-09