Що це за система
Ukraine's grid lost roughly half its dispatchable generation in the first year of the war and runs on repair, European interconnection and imported fuel; Russia's refining tier, not its crude output, is what Ukrainian deep strike has reached since 2024, reaching Russian motorists as rationing in 2026.
Generation decides whether households have heat, light and pumped water in winter, whether industry including the defence industry can operate, and how much of the budget goes to imported electricity and repair. Refining decides whether Russian crude abundance becomes Russian product availability. The system is where the military, economic and humanitarian dimensions of the war become one subject.
Впевненість: помірна Станом на 2026-09-27Переглянуто 2026-10-03
Система
- Огляд
- Ukraine entered the war with a generation mix dominated by nuclear, supported by hydro on the Dnipro and thermal plant, and a refining sector in long decline. On the IEA's figures available dispatchable generation was roughly 38 GW before 2022; occupation, destruction and damage removed about 19 GW in the first year; concentrated attacks in spring 2024 brought the figure to about 12 GW; some 3 GW was restored before the 2024/25 winter and repair has continued since. Synchronisation with the European grid in 2022 made imports a standing part of supply, and liquid fuel is now overwhelmingly imported through the western land corridors. The largest nuclear station, at Zaporizhzhia, has been under Russian control since 2022 with all six reactors shut since 2024. On the other side of the same system, Russia produces around nine million barrels of crude a day but reaches its own motorists only through refineries, and that tier — concentrated in the Volga and central regions, behind the Black Sea coast and in Siberia — has been the principal object of the Ukrainian deep-strike campaign since 2024, at increasing depth.
- Current state · as of 2026-09-27
- Strike tempo on the Ukrainian grid stayed active through September 2026 and the target set widened; Ukrenergo reported new outages in six regions after the attacks to 25 September. On the Russian side, refinery throughput fell to about 3.6 million barrels a day in July 2026 on commercial estimates, roughly a third below the seasonal norm; purchase limits returned at filling stations in the Moscow region in August; Reuters attributes the shortages to strikes, seasonal demand and unscheduled maintenance together, and the published data does not separate them.
- Documented exposure
- At the level the IEA and the IAEA publish: the capacity series above, the off-site power supply of the Zaporizhzhia station as a standing IAEA concern, and the refinery-throughput estimate carried by Bloomberg. No facility-level state is published here.
- Commodities and outputs
- Natural gas · Crude & products
Вузли
The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.
- Кстовський НПЗ («Лукойл-Нижегороднефтеоргсинтез»)Нафтопереробний завод
- Курська АЕСNuclear facility · generalized
- Московський НПЗ (Капотня)Нафтопереробний завод
The capital's refinery at Kapotnya, halted on the last day of the September 2026 Duma vote.
- Нижньокамський нафтопереробний комплекс (ТАНЕКО)Нафтопереробний завод
The Nizhnekamsk complex, struck on 10 August 2026 roughly 1,200 km from the Ukrainian border — the deepest strike of the war.
- Нововоронезька АЕСNuclear facility · generalized
- Омський НПЗНафтопереробний завод
- Ростовська АЕСNuclear facility · generalized
- Рязанський НПЗНафтопереробний завод
- Порт Усть-ЛугаПорт
- Волгоградський НПЗНафтопереробний завод
- Ярославський НПЗ («Славнефть-ЯНОС»)Нафтопереробний завод
- Запорізька АЕСNuclear facility · generalized
Ukraine's largest nuclear station, under Russian control since 2022 and not generating — a production source removed from the system rather than one within it.
- Афіпський НПЗНафтопереробний завод
- Дніпровська ГЕС: гребля й електростанціяPower plant
- Ільський НПЗНафтопереробний завод
- Кременчуцький НПЗНафтопереробний завод
Ukraine's principal refining capacity before the war; domestic refining has not been a significant share of supply since 2022.
- Новокуйбишевський НПЗНафтопереробний завод
- Новошахтинський НПЗНафтопереробний завод
- Пермський НПЗНафтопереробний завод
- Салаватський нафтопереробний і нафтохімічний комплексНафтопереробний завод
- Саратовський НПЗНафтопереробний завод
- Слов’янський НПЗ (Слов’янськ-на-Кубані)Нафтопереробний завод
- Сизранський НПЗНафтопереробний завод
- Уфимський нафтопереробний кластерНафтопереробний завод
Routes and operators
Supply systems running through it
- Виробництво електроенергії та постачання пальногоFuel imports · 7 nodes · 4 documented disruptions · named by the recordСистема, яка вирішує, чи можна забезпечити країні у стані війни тепло, світло і роботу, — і яку атакують саме з цієї причини.
- Переробка сирої нафти та внутрішнє постачання пальногоFuel imports · 10 nodes · 2 documented disruptions · named by the recordРівень між нафтовидобувником і справною заправкою — і єдине місце в енергетичній системі Росії, де дефіцит узагалі можливий.
Organisations that run it
- RosneftEnergy company · ActiveRussia's largest state-controlled oil company, operator of several of the Volga refineries the module publishes as markers and a party to the refined-product shortfall of 2026.
- Gazprom NeftEnergy company · ActiveThe Gazprom group's oil arm, operator of the Moscow, Omsk and Salavat refining complexes the module publishes as markers — one of them Russia's largest by throughput.
- NaftogazState enterprise · ActiveUkraine's state oil and gas company, which imported several billion cubic metres of gas for the 2025–26 heating season after strikes on production and storage, financed externally.
- UkrenergoInfrastructure operator · ActiveUkraine's transmission system operator, whose outage and restriction statements are the operator source the module reads for the state of the grid under strike.
Dependencies and constraints
Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.
European grid interconnection. The only fast-acting relief available to Ukrainian supply, and finite: firm import capacity was set at 2.1 GW for winter and 1.7 GW for summer as of December 2024, against a winter peak demand the IEA puts at 18 GW in 2023/24 and 16.5 GW in 2024/25. Imports are a margin, not a substitute.
The western land corridors. Imported refined fuel depends entirely on the same corridors that carry military supply, so a constraint on those corridors is simultaneously a fuel constraint.
The Russian refining tier. Crude reaches Russian consumers only through refining; producing more crude does not substitute for it, and the tier is capital intensive, slow to repair and dependent on process equipment sanctions have made harder to source.
Transmission and a small number of nuclear sites. Three nuclear plants carry about half of Ukraine's generation capacity on the IEA's accounting — roughly 7.7 GW — which concentrates an unusual share of the system in few sites and in the transmission that connects them. The concentration is the exposure; nothing here says what state it is in.
Electricity cannot be stockpiled: generation lost is generation unavailable until repaired or replaced, and the long-lead components involved take many months to source.
Falling Russian product exports can be read as lost capacity or as deliberate reallocation under the export ban; the ban makes the two indistinguishable in the export figures.
Strike tempo on the Ukrainian grid stayed active and the target set widened; Ukrenergo reported new outages in six regions after the attacks to 25 September and applied no scheduled outages.
The Moscow refinery at Kapotnya halted on the last day of the Duma vote.
The deepest strike of the war hit the Nizhnekamsk complex, roughly 1,200 km from the Ukrainian border.
Purchase limits returned at filling stations in Moscow and the surrounding region, with operators publishing caps of 30 to 60 litres per vehicle.
Ланцюги передачі через цю систему
Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.
- Удари по НПЗ → дефіцит переробки → доступність пального на внутрішньому ринкуEconomic exposure · as of 2026-08
- asset Підтверджено
- disruption Підтверджено
- exposure Підтверджено
- significance Правдоподібна вразливість
- Кампанія проти енергомережі → дефіцит генерації → промислове виробництво і державні фінансиEconomic exposure · as of 2026-08
- asset Підтверджено
- disruption Підтверджено
- exposure Підтверджено
- significance Правдоподібна вразливість
- Кампанія проти енергомережі → тепло, вода й медичні послуги взимкуCivilian impact · as of 2026-08
- asset Підтверджено
- disruption Підтверджено
- exposure Підтверджено
- significance Правдоподібна вразливість
- Санкції та цінова стеля → нафта зі знижкою → фіскальна спроможність РосіїEconomic exposure · as of 2026-07
- asset Підтверджено
- disruption Підтверджено
- exposure Підтверджено
- significance Правдоподібна вразливість
Watch questions bearing on it
- Чи зможуть ремонт та імпорт випередити кампанію ударів до зими?active · Movement observed 2026-09-27
- Чи поглинає нафтопереробна галузь Росії кампанію ударів, чи обмеження наростає?active · Movement observed 2026-09-27
- Чи надходять перехоплювачі в Україну швидше, ніж витрачаються?active · Movement observed 2026-09-27
- Чи справді удари по тіньовому флоту змінюють обсяги російського експорту?active · Assessment changed 2026-09-27
Events at its nodes
Economic exposures it underlies
Actors and arrangements
Що залишається невідомим
- No clean published figure exists for the winter 2025/26 generation outcome; the record states so rather than interpolating one.
- Which Russian facilities are currently degraded is not published by the module, by rule.
Інші прочитання, які також підтримують свідчення
- Russian product shortages have three published causes — strikes, seasonal demand and unscheduled maintenance — and the data does not separate them.
Наведено тому, що власна оцінка запису — не єдина, яку допускають його джерела, а не як застереження щодо наведеної вище оцінки.
Відкрити в режимі «Досліджувати» Інтерактивно: виберіть цей запис і простежте, що з ним пов’язано.
Оцінено станом на — 2026-09-27 Востаннє переглянуто — 2026-10-03