Izrael i Lewant — Hamas

Podsumowanie

Hostility between Israel and Hamas dates from the organisation's founding in 1987 and became a sustained war after the attack of 7 October 2023. Two ceasefires followed. The first, announced in Doha on 15 January 2025 and in force from 19 January, collapsed when Israel resumed large-scale strikes on 18 March 2025; its text was never officially published. The second rests on the US 20-point plan of 29 September 2025, which Resolution 2803 annexes and whose acceptance by the parties it acknowledges, and on a first-phase agreement reached at Sharm el-Sheikh on 8–9 October that has never been published. The ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025. The last living hostage was returned on 13 October and the last deceased hostage on 26 January 2026; Israel released 250 life-sentence prisoners and some 1,700 Gazans detained after 7 October 2023, according to the Board of Peace's report to the Council. Israeli forces hold the Strip behind what Israel calls the Yellow Line (Gaza), which has moved westward since October 2025. The Board reported violations on a "near daily basis" and named Hamas's refusal to accept verified decommissioning as the principal obstacle. Its roadmap of 30 July 2026 links decommissioning to a phased Israeli withdrawal; Hamas approved it and Israel is not a signatory. The Ministry of Health in Gaza, relayed by OCHA, counted 1,431 people killed between 10 October 2025 and early October 2026.

Dlaczego to ważne

Every other Gaza arrangement waits on this relationship: the technocratic committee's entry, the stabilisation force's deployment, Israeli withdrawal and reconstruction money are all sequenced against Hamas's weapons. The ceasefire froze the fighting without resolving that sequence, and the Israeli election of 27 October 2026 decides which government answers it.

Porozumienia

• Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict (20 points), annex 1 to Resolution 2803 · podpisano 2025-09-29

  A US plan, not a signed bilateral instrument. Israel's prime minister accepted it on its release; Resolution 2803 (17 November 2025) annexes it and acknowledges that the parties have accepted it. It provides for Israeli withdrawal "to the agreed upon line", the return of all hostages within 72 hours, no governance role for Hamas and demilitarisation under independent monitors, and ties further withdrawal to demilitarisation milestones. Where the line runs is not in the UN text.

• Board of Peace roadmap for completing the Comprehensive Plan (15 points), dated 30 July 2026

  Developed by the guarantors (Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye, the United States) and the High Representative. Hamas approved it; Israel is not a signatory, so it is not in force as a text binding both parties. It links decommissioning to "an Israeli withdrawal, in phases" and makes an International Verification Committee certify each stage; no document shows that committee constituted. Its annex (1) on cessation of operations is not published.

Powiązane wydarzenia

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  Dyplomacja · Wojsko

• Rezolucja 2803 zatwierdza Radę Pokoju i Międzynarodowe Siły Stabilizacyjne 17 lis. 2025

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Co pozostaje nieznane

• The Sharm el-Sheikh first-phase agreement of October 2025 — which the roadmap calls the "Sharm Sheikh Protocol" — has no published text. Its withdrawal map, aid threshold and operations-room arrangements cannot be cited to a primary source; the only official statement of the aid commitment is the Board's "4,200 trucks … weekly" (S/2026/418 §13).
• The January 2025 agreement was never officially published; its terms are known from an AP copy that Egyptian and Hamas officials authenticated.
• The share of the Strip behind the Yellow Line (Gaza) rests on estimates and an Israeli directive, not on a published line; it is not given here as a figure.
• Casualty totals since the ceasefire are the Ministry of Health in Gaza's, relayed by OCHA; Israeli reports of Hamas violations are the IDF's. The two are not combined.

Inne odczytania, które przesłanki również dopuszczają

• The ceasefire can be read as the war's end with its last terms outstanding, or as a pause in a war whose aims — on one side the removal of Hamas's arms, on the other Israeli withdrawal — are unchanged. The record dates the ceasefire and the instruments and does not choose.

Wymienione, ponieważ ocena zawarta we wpisie nie jest jedyną, na jaką pozwalają jego źródła — a nie jako zastrzeżenie osłabiające powyższą ocenę.