Ce qu’est cet acteur
Le voisin méridional de la Syrie, et l’État par lequel passe la route commerciale du sud vers le Golfe. La Jordanie a accueilli une importante population de réfugiés syriens pendant la guerre, a passé les dernières années de l’ère Assad à intercepter captagon et armes à la frontière, et frappe par les airs à l’intérieur de la Syrie depuis 2023 contre ce qu’elle appelle des trafiquants et, à partir d’octobre 2026, contre ce qu’elle appelle des positions de l’État islamique. Avec le gouvernement de transition, elle est convenue en janvier 2025 de former un comité de sécurité conjoint contre la contrebande et l’État islamique ; après ses frappes du 26 octobre 2026 à Daraa et Sweida, que Damas a dites non coordonnées et qui, selon la direction de la santé de Daraa, ont tué sept civils, les deux ministres des Affaires étrangères sont convenus de la nécessité urgente d’un tel comité. Elle a aussi accueilli la session Israël–Syrie sous médiation américaine du 23 août 2026 sans y être partie.
Confiance : modérée Revu le 2026-10-29
Objectifs
A southern Syria that exports neither captagon, weapons nor fighters across the border; a Damascus able and willing to police its south; the Nasib corridor open for Jordanian and Gulf trade; and the return of the Syrian refugees Jordan hosted through the war. Amman stated the first of these as the test of the new government within a month of the fall of Damascus, and has used force inside Syria when it judged the test failed.
Sources : Reuters↗ · Jordanian government statements (Petra, Armed Forces)↗
Trajectoire
From interdiction to intervention and back toward cooperation. Jordan's pre-emptive strikes against traffickers began under the late Assad state; the transition produced a stated commitment to a joint security committee in January 2025 and ministerial visits in 2026, while the strikes continued — deeper into Sweida in May 2026, and in October 2026 against what Amman called ISIS positions, with civilian deaths that Damascus condemned and a one-day closure of the crossing. The joint committee the two sides agreed on after the strikes is the same instrument they agreed to form twenty-one months earlier.
Sources : Reuters↗ · Official government statements · Established international media reporting
Relations
A working relationship with the transitional government, tested by the October 2026 strikes and the public dispute over whether they were coordinated; a venue for the US-mediated Israel–Syria track; alignment with the Gulf states on the transition's success; and a standing interest in the Sweida file, which Jordan's deputy prime minister discussed in Damascus in September 2026. Jordan is not a party to the Israel–Syria negotiation and is not recorded as one.
Sources : Al Jazeera English↗ · Official government statements
Ce que cette fiche ne couvre pas
Jordan's West Bank interface, its treaty water and gas with Israel and its role in Gaza police training are the Levant module's record; its airspace and basing in the Iran–Israel war are the Iran–Gulf module's. Jordan's own counter-terrorism investigation of the 23 October 2026 Karak church attack is a Jordanian matter and is cited here only as the stated trigger of the strikes.
Not published for Jordan and SyriaPosture (objectifs, contraintes, leviers)
Ailleurs dans le module Syrie
Dernière revue — 2026-10-29