Strike UAV / loitering munition · Iranian-derived one-way attack and reconnaissance UAVs, with first-person-view drones reported from 2026

Hezbollah UAV families

The unmanned aircraft Hezbollah flies, recorded as families: the Mirsad reconnaissance and attack types that Alma dates to 2002–03 and derives from the Iranian Mohajer series, the Ababil-T that FDD and Alma describe as its main one-way attack drone, the Ayub that Alma derives from the Shahed-129, and the small first-person-view drones, some fibre-optic-guided, that Israeli and regional press reported from April 2026 as the main weapon used against Israeli forces inside Lebanon. Alma's further candidates (Mohajer, Shahed, Samad, Karrar, Saegheh) are its estimate, not confirmed in service.

Hezbollah one-way attack, reconnaissance and first-person-view drones, by family Iran Mirsad-1 in service from 2002 and Mirsad-2 from 2003 by Alma's account; one-way attack use documented from 2023; FPV use reported from 2026

Status as of
2026-10
Last reviewed
2026-10-29

AssessmentModerate confidence

Recognition context, not a stat sheet. The catalogue covers major publicly documented systems relevant to the conflicts Vigil covers — not an exhaustive order of battle. No quantities, availability or current allocations are recorded.

The record What this system is, where it comes from, who operates it and which of Vigil’s modules it is relevant to — with the evidence each of those rests on.

Documented in conflict Evidence: Confirmed
Silhouette · not to scale

Record

FamilyHezbollah one-way attack, reconnaissance and first-person-view drones, by family
VariantsMirsad-1; Mirsad-2; Ababil-T; Ayub; Ma'arab; Rami-1; FPV drones (including fibre-optic-guided)
OriginIran
EraMirsad-1 in service from 2002 and Mirsad-2 from 2003 by Alma's account; one-way attack use documented from 2023; FPV use reported from 2026
Appears inIsrael–Hezbollah hostilities 2023–24 · Lebanon war 2026

Conflict relevance

This is the catalogue's single record for this system. It is relevant to the module below; each module's Force Atlas shows how it is used there.

Operators

Hezbollah: Used for reconnaissance and attack against northern Israel in 2023–24 and in the 2026 war; the IDF reports explosive drones launched at its forces inside Lebanon after the 19 June 2026 ceasefire (29 July, early September and 23 September–5 October 2026), which are IDF claims not matched by a UN detection.

Battlefield role

Reconnaissance over northern Israel and over Israeli forces in Lebanon, one-way attack at ranges that reach beyond the border area, and, from 2026, short-range precision attack on vehicles and positions with FPV drones — the function the module's "drone unit" organisation record names.

Strengths

Low cost and low radar signature relative to rockets, and a growing share of the attack effort: Alma's analysis records drones as a markedly larger share of Hezbollah's attacks in March 2026 than in October 2024, and described them as the primary means of warfare in the week of 17–24 May 2026. The Ababil-T is described by FDD as Hezbollah's main one-way attack drone; no range or payload figure is carried, under the module's ceiling.

Limitations

Vulnerable to interception, with Israel's layered air defence and aircraft credited with most shoot-downs; the named types' present numbers and production are not established by any source read; and the identification of individual drones in 2026 attacks rests on Israeli statements and press rather than on a UN detection, since UNIFIL's radar count does not separate drones from other projectiles.

Documented conflict use

Reconnaissance flights over Israel from 2004 onward (Alma); attack use across the 2023–24 front and the 2026 war; after the 19 June 2026 ceasefire, IDF statements of explosive drones launched at its forces near Ali al-Taher (29 July) and elsewhere in southern Lebanon (September and early October 2026), recorded on the module's Watch as attributed claims.

Documented formations

Assessed as of — 2026-10 Last reviewed — 2026-10-29